Appalachia\u27s Path to Dependency: Rethinking a Region\u27s Economic History, 1730-1940 by Salstrom, Paul
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Appalachian Studies Arts and Humanities 
1994 
Appalachia's Path to Dependency: Rethinking a Region's 
Economic History, 1730-1940 
Paul Salstrom 
Saint Mary-of-the-Woods College 
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Thanks to the University of Kentucky Libraries and the University Press of Kentucky, this book is 
freely available to current faculty, students, and staff at the University of Kentucky. 
Find other University of Kentucky Books at uknowledge.uky.edu/upk. For more information, 
please contact UKnowledge at uknowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Salstrom, Paul, "Appalachia's Path to Dependency: Rethinking a Region's Economic History, 1730-1940" 
(1994). Appalachian Studies. 1. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_appalachian_studies/1 

Appalachia's Path 
to ·Dependency 
30 60 
M1les 
THE THREE 
APPALACHIAS 
90 
§ Older Appalachia Intermediate Appalachia 
Newer Appalachia 
County lines as of 1860; Virginia-West Virginia border as since 1866 
APPALACHIA'S PATH 
TO DEPENDENCY 
Rethinking a Region's 
Economic History 
1730-1940 
PAUL SALSTROM 
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY 
Publication of this volume was made possible in part by a grant 
from the National Endowment for the Humanities. 
Copyright © 1994 by The University Press of Kentucky 
Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth, 
serving Bellarmine College, Berea College, Centre 
College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, 
The Filson Club Historical Society, Georgetown College, 
Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, 
Morehead State University, Murray State University, 
Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, 
University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, 
and Western Kentucky University. 
All rights reserved 
Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky, 
663 South Limestone, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008 
Frontispiece: Map from Robert D. Mitchell, ed.,Appalachian Frontiers: 
Settlement, Sociery, and Development in the Preindustrial Era 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991) 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Salstrom, Paul 
Appalachia's path to dependency: rethinking a region's economic 
history, 1730-1940/ Paul Salstrom. 
p. em. 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
ISBN 0-8131-1860-3 (doth: alk. paper)-ISBN 0-8131..()868-3 (pbk: 
alk. paper) 
1. Appalachian Region, Southern-Economic conditions. 
2. Appalachian Region, Southern-Social conditions. 3. Poor-
Appalachian Region, Southern-History. I. Title. 
HC107.A127S24 1994 
330.974-dclO 93-39818 
This book is printed on acid-free recycled paper meeting 
the requirements of the American National Standard 
for permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials 
9® 
Manufactured in the United States of America 
Contents 
Tables and Figure v1 
Preface vii 
Introduction: The Issue xm 
1. Early Settlement and Self-Sufficiency, 17 30-1860 1 
2. Accelerated Agricultural Decline and Adverse Federal Policy, 
1860-1880 20 
3. Rural Appalachia's Subsistence-Barter-and-Borrow 
Systems 41 
. 4. Labor-intensive Mining and the Subsistence Reproduction of 
Labor Power, 1880-1930 60 
5. The New Deal and Appalachia's Industry 83 
6. The New Deal and Appalachia's Agriculture 94 
7. The Welfare of Rural Appalachia 111 
Conclusion 122 
Notes 139 
Bibliography 170 
Index 191 
· Tables and Figure 
Table 1. Population Growth in Appalachia's Subregions 
and in the Midwest (the Old Northwest), 1790s-1940s xvi 
Table 2. Farm Livestock, Commodities, and Acreage 
Per Capita of Total Population, with 
Average Farm Size, 1840-1880 14 
Table 3. Tree Count in Virgin Hardwood Forest, Wayne 
and Mingo Counties, West Virginia, Early 1890s 27 
Table 4. Bituminous Coal Value, Wages, and Number of 
Workers, 1870-1902 35 
Figure. A Subsistence-Barter-and-Borrow Cycle and 
a Money Cycle 55 
Preface 
In 1972 I moved to a county in rural Appalachia, bought land there, 
and read Harry Caudill's book Night Comes to the Cumberlands. At that 
time I knew scores of other young people doing the same thing. It is 
now known that thousands of others did that, including reading Harry 
Caudill's book, which by then was already nine years old but to us 
seemed very new. Some of the "homesteaders" of that day, including my 
younger brother and his wife, have stayed on the land. Most, however, 
have resumed mainstream behavior. My own desire to expound the joys 
of homesteading helped draw me away quite soon. In 1975 an elderly 
friend named Mildred Loomis, director of a back-to-the-land group 
called the School of Living, asked me to edit that group's monthly mag-
azine Green Revolution. To produce the magazine, I began working at a 
labor-history press in Huntington, West Virginia, called Appalachian 
Movement Press. In 1978, as that marginal operation itself became 
history, I took the further step "back in" of returning to school. 
After receiving a work-experience B.A. from Marshall University in 
Huntington, and then starting graduate work at Southern Illinois Uni-
versity, my wife suggested we sell our goats and move to a big city. 
That landed us at Brandeis University near Boston, where this book was 
first drafted with no little nostalgia for the hills. Like many other 
books, it tries to continue what Harry Caudill started, piecing together 
the puzzle of how Appalachia became the way it is. 
Meanwhile however, during the 1980s, Appalachia changed (again). 
In a 1990 interview, John Gaventa of the Highlander Research and Ed-
ucation Center said: 
I think it's a whole new period for Appalachia. I think much of our work 
over the last 20 years has been around trying to get a fairer share of the pie. 
Now we find that the shape of the pie is changing altogether. It's a whole new 
ball game, and it poses whole new questions about what economic develop-
ment ought to be. 
You see the crisis now not just in what industries are leaving. You see it in 
what new jobs are coming in. Because people are so desperate, those jobs are 
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lower paying. There's fewer unions, worse benefits than were there before. The 
region's moving backwards economically. (John Gaventa, quoted in Woodside, 
"Creating the Path as You Go," 20.) 
This final version of what started as a dissertation will try to rein-
terpret the history of Appalachia in the light of what Gaventa 
calls "new questions about what economic development ought to be." 
It will ponder Appalachia's history, especially its changing relations 
with other U.S. regions and with the national economy. It will look 
at Appalachia's past in light of challenges that the region now 
faces and in light of today's national economic challenges-such 
as our uncompetitive industries, adverse trade balances, and grow-
ing deficits. 
This book is an extended argument covering the entire course of Ap-
palachia's economic history since white settlement began. The fulcrum 
of its argument is Appalachia's increasing vulnerability to capitalist de-
velopment during the second half of the nineteenth century. To under-
stand Appalachia's vulnerability to capitalism we must understand how 
ill matched the values of most rural Appalachian people were with the 
industrial transformation that occurred in their midst. Appalachia's 
early settlers understood entrepreneurship-often they manifested it 
dramatically-but they usually did so within the context of what I will 
call their local subsistence-barter-and-borrow networks. In the absence 
of very much money, and so long as available land continued to be plen-
tiful, their local subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems were successful 
expedients. Later, however, and although their low-money systems con-
tinued to help support them, they began to hire out much of their labor 
to an industrialization that depended on outside financing and outside 
decision making. Gradually, for many of them, even their traditional 
subsistence life-style grew dependent on the extra income they were 
earning from wage work. 
In other words, while their subsistence life-style was helping to sub-
sidize, and to maximize, Appalachia's industrialization, that industri-
alization was in turn helping to subsidize and maximize subsistence 
activities in Appalachia. Although the amount of subsistence farming 
per family decreased, the total amount of subsistence farming in the 
region grew through a population explosion. Thus the region's depen-
dence on outside-financed industry grew. 
Preface ix 
This book discusses a particular kind of dependency: economic. 
It does not broach questions concerning cultural or psychological 
dependency. 
In and of itself, economic dependency does not automatically make 
people poor. A much-quoted definition comes from Theotonio Dos 
Santos: 
By dependency we mean a situation in which the economy of certain coun-
tries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to 
which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or 
more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of de-
pendency when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-
sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a 
reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect 
on their immediate development. (Theotonio Dos Santos, quoted in Richard 
White, The Roots of Dependency, xvii.) 
The insight behind dependency theory is that economic development 
can be hampered not only by local obstacles but also by obstacles that 
are external to a region or country. Wherever development has been im-
peded mainly by local obstacles, a path toward development can be il-
luminated by modernization theory, which emphasizes the importing of 
outside values, outside institutions, technology, and capital. But in re-
gions or countries in which the main obstacles to development have 
been external, dependency theory can aid understanding better than can 
modernization theory. 
Economic dependency does not necessarily prevent all forms of de-
velopment. It prevents independent development. Meanwhile it can ac-
tively foster dependent development in some economic sectors-such as 
in Appalachia's extractive sector. In other sectors it can foster undevel-
opment-such as in Appalachia's agriculture, manufacturing, and fi-
nance. Appalachia's extractive industries were (and still are) almost 
entirely dependent on outside capital. This has fostered dependent de-
velopment, with attendant alliances between outside capitalists and a 
major proportion of the region's own elite. But, by contrast, in parts of 
Appalachia that are simply undeveloped, depletion has outweighed any 
form of development (even dependent development) as earlier local 
enterprises have found themselves unable to compete with external 
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enterprises, and as most of those areas' remaining assets have then 
been used to maintain mere subsistence. 
Thinking about Appalachia in this way raises more questions than a 
single book can address. The debate over the source of Appalachia's eco-
nomic problems has been going strong since Night Comes to the Cumber-
lands appeared in 1963, and now even more questions are "on the 
table." The keys to this book are (1) its new three-part subregional 
division of Appalachia, which reflects the sequence that settlement 
followed inside the region; (2) its fusion of behavior with grassroots eco-
nomic conditions to illuminate mentality; and (3) its comparative ap-
proach, drawing on comparisons and examining economic relationships 
between Appalachia and other parts of the United States and the world. 
The Appalachia examined in this book is southern Appalachia, ex-
tending from Virginia and West Virginia south to the northern fringes 
of Georgia and Alabama. (See frontispiece map.) This boundary encom-
passes 190 counties in 7 states and has provided a much-used definition 
of the region since the publication (in 1962) of The Southern Appalachian 
Region: A Survey, edited by Thomas R. Ford. I will divide the counties 
into three subregions-Older Appalachia, Intermediate Appalachia, 
and Newer Appalachia-reflecting the sequence in which the various 
parts of the region became well settled and passed beyond their initial 
frontier conditions. 
Many mountain people, archivists, librarians, friends, and others 
have furthered this study. It is a pleasure to thank my Brandeis Uni-
versity advisor Stephen A. Schuker (now of the University of Virginia) 
and his two colleagues on the dissertation committee, Donald Worster 
(now of the University of Kansas) and the late Frank Freidel. Others at 
and around Brandeis who advised me include Rudolph Binion, James 
Matthew Gallman and Thomas Pegram (both now at Loyola College in 
Baltimore), John S. Hill (now at Ohio State), June Namias (now at 
the University of Alaska in Anchorage), John E. Schrecker, and Alan 
Taylor (now at Boston University). My typing at Brandeis was effi-
ciently handled by Elaine Herrmann, and my typing in West Virginia 
by David Imhoff. 
Among Appalachian specialists, Robert D. Mitchell and Altina L. 
Waller have helped me more than I can ever hope to reciprocate. Many 
other Appalachian specialists have also sustained this project with their 
interest and advice, particularly Dwight B. Billings, H. Tyler Blethen, 
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Martin Crawford, Rodger Cunningham, Ronald DEller, Steve Fisher, 
Lucy K. Gump, John C. Inscoe, Loyal Jones, Anne Mayhew, Gordon 
B. McKinney, James E. Murphy, Mary Beth Pudup, Barbara Ellen 
Smith, Jeff Todd Titon, John Craft Taylor, Paul J. Weingartner, John 
Alexander Williams, and Curtis W. Wood. 
In Lincoln County, West Virginia, I wish to thank Odell Adkins; 
Dorothy Black; Jim and Connie Chojnacki; Ray Elkins; Boyd and Ruth 
Hogbin; Flossie Lawson; Ken and Norris Lucas; Ric McDowell; Wood-
row and Beatrice Mosley; Charles Ott; Charles and Phyllis Pack; the 
Spooner family; Jim and Donna Stone; John, Jan, Seoka, and Matt Sal-
strom; and Home Place, Inc. Others who helped me there have passed 
on: Henry and Anna Baker, Ray Gene Black, Raymond and Freeda 
Black, Hallie and Edith Edwards, Mabel Elkins, Almond and Glena 
Lewis, Rev. Buster Lovejoy, Spec and Virginia McComas, and Nancy 
Murphy. They practiced voluntary reciprocity and explained it to me. 
I appreciate help and ideas from my former colleagues at Appala-
chian Movement Press, especially Charles Berry, Thomas W. Gibbs, 
Miriam Ralston and the staff of MAW Magazine, and Tom Woodruff 
(now of the National Hospital Workers Union). 
At Marshall University I was helped by Alan B. Gould, Barbara R. 
James, Gina Kates, Karen Li Simpkins, and David R. Woodward. 
At West Virginia University I received valuable assistance not only 
from the Appalachian gold mine Ronald L. Lewis but also from his fel-
low historians James Cook, Jeff Cook, Ken Fones-Wolf, John C. Hen-
nen, Wilbert Jenkins (now of Temple University), Emory L. Kemp, 
John Allen Maxwell, John R. McKivigan, Billy Joe Peyton, Paul 
Rakes, Barbara Rasmussen, Thomas Robertson, Phil Ross, John C. 
Super, and Michael E. Workman. At West Virginia University's Col-
lege of Agriculture and Forestry, I was aided by Randy Childs, Dale 
Colyer, Keith Dix, Jerald J. Fletcher, Stacy A. Gartin, Walter Labys, 
Layle D. Lawrence, John Lozier, Edna McBreen, Virgil J. Norton, 
Kerry S. Odell, Dennis K. Smith, Thomas F. Torries, and Steve Zar-
icki. There too the computer specialist Amy VanZant moved things 
along. 
Among librarians, especially helpful were Richard Crawford at the 
National Archives, Kim Iconis at Antioch College Library, Cora Teel 
and Leslie Brown at Marshall University Library, Jo. B. Brown at West 
Virginia University Library, and the staff librarians at WVU's remark 
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able West Virginia and Regional History archive collection: David 
Bartlett, John Cuthbert, Harold Forbes, Randall Gooden, Martha 
Neville, Christy Venham, David Ware, and Daniel Williams. Scholar-
ship is a communal enterprise. 
During the rewriting stage, grants from the West Virginia Human-
ities Council and the Appalachian Studies fund of Berea College proved 
invaluable. 
And finally, I wish to thank my present colleagues at the Mountain-
eer Policy Institute, especially Linda Cunningham, Richard diPretoro, 
Andrew Maier, Tom and Judy Rodd, Steven Schrom, and Joan Sims. 
The result is dedicated to my parents and daughter. 
Introduction: The Issue 
The issue is not whether analysis of regional differences . . . . should 
remain value free, but whose values and what values underlie the state-
ment that one region suffers from regional disparity in comparison with 
another. 
-Ralph Matthews, The Creation of Regional Dependency 
As of 1840, southern Appalachia figured as one of the most self-
sufficient regions of the United States. By 1940 it had become one of 
the country's least self-sufficient regions. 
Between 1880 and 1930 the southern mountains experienced a rapid 
transition toward industrialization. During that half century, the re-
gion's self-sufficiently in food production waned. Later, when Appala-
chia's industries faltered in the 1930s, the federal government provided 
relief on a massive scale. Relief became so extensive that it brought 
many mountaineers more economic stability than they had known for 
generations-since, or even before, industrialization had begun-but 
in the process it also made many of Appalachia's full-time farm families 
more dependent on regular money income than they had ever been. 
Since the Depression, federal welfare programs have been revived and 
maintained, constituting today a major component of the Appalachian 
region's income. In 1990 in West Virginia, for instance, 23.54 percent 
of total personal income consisted of transfer payments of some kind, 
whereas the overall U.S. average was only 14.98 percent. 1 
This book first surveys the origins of Appalachia's economic depen-
dency within American market relations. 2 Then it examines the exac-
erbation of that dependency through federal political acts. Next it 
discusses why the region's dependency was further increased by indus-
trialization and, finally, why its dependency was not reduced by the 
New Deal of the 1930s. 
Along the way, economic relationships are explored and comparisons 
are broached. For almost a generation now, Appalachian scholars have 
suggested similarities between the economic history of the mountains 
and the economic history of colonial states in the Third World. Polit-
ically, of course, Appalachia has never been a colony in a formal sense. 
The region's disadvantaged position is largely a result of market 
XIV Introduction 
forces-albeit those market forces were partly shaped by political acts 
that discriminated against Appalachia and other financially "periph-
eral'' regions of the United States. 
So rather than colonial, the adjective peripheral best describes Appa-
lachia's economic position. Although it is not on the fringe of the in-
ternational economy but within a "center" capitalist country, 
Appalachia since the middle of the nineteenth century has increasingly 
been relegated to the periphery of America's market economy. 
Today scholars generally accept the designation of Appalachia as an 
economic periphery. But with this adoption of the "center-periphery" 
model, the call for a "decolonization" of Appalachia has by no means 
grown irrelevant. In particular, the 1970s' model of "internal colonial-
ism" has contributed to our understanding. 3 But now we should probe 
further. It is time to search for the economic logic behind Appalachia's 
situation. Keeping in mind the center-periphery model, I think we 
should delve into Appalachia's past and ask questions about the day-
to-day logic of people's economic choices. There are conundrums facing 
Appalachia today that such historical dredging can help us understand. 
Asking about the extent of economic enterprise, economic security, and 
family commitment in the past-and asking whether these things were 
mutually compatible-can help us understand what is happening in 
the region today. Trying to reconstruct the economic logic that under-
laid people's earlier choices might help alert us to unheralded options 
available today. 
Trying to reconstruct earlier generations' economic mentality need 
not be a highly theoretical exercise. We wish access, after all, to the 
thinking of ordinary people. We'd like to see their situation through 
their eyes. In Appalachia's preindustrial era-roughly before 1880-
one obvious fact about farming was that it had to almost entirely pro-
vide the subsistence of the families who were farming. No contradiction 
existed between market farming and this necessary subsistence farm-
ing, for Appalachia's most important farm products were livestock and 
grains, which were just as suitable for supplying outside markets as they 
were for home consumption. 4 
Appalachia's preindustrial era was not monolithic, however. Two dis-
tinct stages can be identified-an earlier (frontier) and a later (postfron-
tier) stage. Frontier preindustrial conditions were quite unlike 
postfrontier conditions that were still preindustrial. Appalachia's ear-
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lier, frontier forests and clearings provided a very easy subsistence and 
relatively easy sources of extra income through hunting, gathering, and 
the raising of marketable livestock. Thus Appalachia's frontier settlers 
could afford to be speculative and entrepreneurial without risking their 
underlying subsistence-whereas under later, postfrontier conditions, 
speculation and enterprise became luxuries that only an emerging elite 
of better-off mountaineers could afford. So an increasing dichotomy be-
tween the wealth and mentality of emerging "upper" and "lower" 
classes marked the later preindustrial stage. Despite no major industri-
alization, a preindustrial transformation had occurred. It resulted from 
four main causes: (1) expansion of the population, (2) depletion of the 
resource base, (3) destruction caused by the Civil War, and (4) federal 
homesteading and banking legislation enacted during the Civil War. 
The earlier and later preindustrial stages are defined primarily by 
conditions, not by dates. The earlier stage began when Appalachia's 
white settlement first began, about 1730, but its termination cannot be 
tidily dated. It ended when and as frontier conditions ended in the re-
gion's various districts. In the Shenandoah Valley, for instance, which 
was where Appalachia's white settlement first began, the frontier stage 
was already over by 1776.5 But in the region's last-settled section-the 
hilly Appalachian Plateau west of the mountains proper-the frontier 
stage did not end until the 1880s. Thus the later preindustrial stage 
was beginning in the Shenandoah Valley by the time of the revolution-
ary war, but it did not reach across the entire Appalachian Plateau until 
after the Civil War. 
Some strands of Appalachia's dependency reach back to the market 
relations that existed even during the beginnings of white settlement in 
the region's wide and fertile valleys. As settlement covered the Great 
Appalachian Valley and frontier conditions steadily receded, and as set-
dement then turned southeastward into the Carolina and Georgia 
mountains and finally turned northwestward into the even less hospi-
table Plateau country, a demographic story flowed smoothly until all of 
Appalachia's frontiers were in use. Then the demographic story became 
one of congestion. Following the Civil War, a veritable population ex-
plosion on the Plateau precipitated Appalachia's own regional "closing 
of the frontier"-the closing of a frontier that long since had grown 
surrounded by thicker settlement. This closing threatened the Plateau 
subregion economically when its population growth barely slowed 
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Table 1. Population Growth in Appalachia's Subregions and in the 
Midwest (the Old Northwest), 1790s-1940s 
Ohio, 
Indiana, 
Illinois, 
Older Intermediate Newer Michigan, & 
Appalachia Appalachia Appalachia Wisconsin 
Decade (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1790s 57.7 58.5 ca.482.6 n.a. 
1800s 21.1 39.0 78.7 433.9 
1810s 23.6 ca. 28.4 108.4 191.1 
1820s 30.1 ca. 65.0 58.0 85.4 
1830s 13.0 ca. 60.0 39.0 99.0 
1840s 27.4 64.0 62.3 54.7 
1850s 13.2 30.5 48.6 53.1 
1860s 6.8 9.6 17.7 31.7 
1870s 34.1 34.7 46.2 22.8 
1880s 20.1 22.3 32.7 20.3 
1890s 19.2 16.1 24.2 18.6 
1900s 15.0 6.4 32.8 14.2 
1910s 12.4 7.1 26.5 17.7 
1920s 11.7 17.5 19.7 17.8 
1930s 10.7 16.7 17.4 5.3 
1940s 13.8 8.8 4.1 14.2 
NOTE: Early figures often approximate due to slight boundary variations. 
SoURCE: United States Censuses of Population, 1790-1950. 
despite signs of an approaching Malthusian crisis .. Because of this, the 
heart of Appalachia's dependency as it has grown to major proportions 
since the Civil War is rooted in the economic life of Appalachia's Plateau 
subregion. 
During the earlier, flowing part of the demographic story, ample 
outlets eX:isted for surplus population. As late as the 1920s, in fact, the 
earlier-settled Valley subregion was still sending many migrants into 
the Plateau subregion. 6 What is loosely called the Great Appalachian 
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Valley (including its parallel valleys) will thus be labeled here Older 
Appalachia, the subregion settled first (see map). 7 In this Older Ap-
palachia, a combination of out-migration and reduced family size dras-
tically slowed the rate of population growth by the turn of the twentieth 
century. By the time World War I finally brought a significant level of 
industrialization to Older Appalachia, a demographic equilibrium had 
been achieved. (See table 1 for decennial population growth rates.) 
The contrast with the Appalachian Plateau, which I will call Newer 
Appalachia (see map), could not have been greater. The Plateau was 
Appalachia's least accessible and last-settled part. No demographic 
equilibrium was even in sight by the time the Plateau's industrialization 
began. Admittedly, industrialization grew extensive here several de-
cades earlier (in the 1880s) than it did in the Older subregion (the 
1910s), but the Plateau's living-standard indicators had begun plum-
meting downward prior to any major industrialization. Plateau Appa-
lachia can illustrate Richard Wilkinson's thesis in his book Poverty and 
Progress that a "population's increasingly exploitable situation ... pro-
vides the basis for the growth of capitalist institutions."8 
What else did it take to get industrialization under way in Appala-
chia's Plateau subregion? Besides the fall that occurred there in many 
people's living standards, that subregion held magnificent virgin forests 
and plentiful bituminous coal, much of the coal of high quality by 
steel-making standards. Beyond such resources, industrialization on the 
Plateau also required a capitalist mentality among some at least of the 
local population. The post-1880 era would see capitalist relations of 
production grow wherever industrialization took hold, and it would see 
capitalist attitudes spread among many local people who had some cap-
ital (or, more commonly, who had major land holdings) that they could 
invest in development. 
Meanwhile, among the bulk of the population, which had little more 
than its labor to invest in development, and which thus tended to pur-
sue development by labor-intensive means, the growth of capitalist re-
lations did not inspire much adoption of capitalist values. Indeed, for 
most of Appalachia's people, the industrialization era may well have in-
tensified both the practice and the attitude of voluntary reciprocity 
within their own "family groups." Capitalist relations and local men-
tality were related, of course, but often in Appalachia they were related 
antithetically. As we go on, therefore, the question of mentality will be 
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examined in its own separate chapter (chapter 3), which treats mentality 
separately from the transformation of economic relations. 
Chapter 1 discusses Appalachia's economic situation up to 1860. The 
inauguration of the federal agricultural census in 1840 allows calcula-
tions from then on of Appalachia's agricultural wealth and production 
per capita. During the 1840-1860 period, considerable decline oc-
curred (per capita) in Appalachia's farm wealth and production-par-
ticularly on the Appalachian Plateau (Newer Appalachia). 
Chapter 2, on the 1860-1880 period, finds that Appalachia's per 
capita farm production continued to plummet. Agricultural competi-
tion from the Midwest, which experienced per capita increases in farm 
output during the same period, lowered the ability of Appalachia to sell 
its farm produce. Cheap midwestern food redounded adversely on Ap-
palachia, and that effect was accelerated by the post-1862 federal policy 
of dispensing free western homestead and railroad lands beyond the 
Mississippi River. Appalachia's growing commercial disadvantage was 
further aggravated by the post-1865 federal policy of inhibiting the cre-
ation of currency. Appalachia's farmers increasingly found their options 
narrowed to labor-intensive subsistence farming, which required them 
to continue raising large families at a time when most of America's 
farm families were turning toward more capital-intensive farming that 
allowed smaller families. Subsistence farming can gain no access to cap-
ital, of course, because its products are not sold. Even mere crop loans 
could never be repaid. So uncompetitive did Appalachia become in 
marketing farm produce that well before 1900, the region's nonfarm 
population was being provisioned in large measure from the Midwest. 
Toward the end of chapter 2, I will interpret this agricultural decline 
within W. Arthur Lewis's theory of why capital-poor countries (or in 
our case, regions) often grow economically dependent. 
Chapter 3, as mentioned, discusses mentality. My argument here ap-
plies not only to Appalachia but also to North America generally. 
When the region's (and the continent's) resources were still abundant 
and its population still sparse, a spirit of enterprise was widely diffused. 
This manifested in entrepreneurial labor investments as well as entre-
preneurial capital investments. But then followed a "regression" (in 
terms of our usual one-way model)9 in which growing scarcity forced 
most people to become less enterprising and to concentrate instead on 
achieving their basic subsistence. These two distinct stages-the earlier 
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characterized by an enterprising mentality, the later by rising subsis-
tence problems-correspond to the earlier and later stages into which 
I divide Appalachia's overall preindustrial (pre-1880) era. 
Appalachia's two preindustrial suberas began and ended at different 
times in different areas. The area settled first, the Shenandoah Valley, 
was opened about 1730 when the thirteen colonies were on the verge of 
unprecedented population growth. By 1776, frontier seekers were mov-
ing to adjacent valleys, to central North Carolina, to eastern Tennessee, 
and to central Kentucky, 10 then to western North Carolina, northeast-
ern Alabama, northern Georgia, and, finally, to Appalachia's Plateau 
subregion of western West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and east-central 
Tennessee. As each of those areas saw its frontier stage end it also saw 
entrepreneurial enthusiasm shrink because most people's subsistence 
needs kept growing harder to meet. Trying to understand these people 
and the choices they made is fascinating work. 
Recently our understanding of preindustrial America has been ad-
vanced by a strategy of research and interpretation called the "new rural 
history." Several writers have applied new-rural-history methods to the 
study of Appalachia. One book-length case study concerns the Shenan-
doah Valley, 11 another nibbles at Appalachia's southern edge in 
Georgia, 12 and yet a third applies new-rural-history methods to under-
standing the Hatfield-McCoy feud that troubled the heart of Plateau 
Appalachia in the Tug Fork Valley where West Virginia meets 
Kentucky. 13 
The new-rural-history methods can help us share empathetically in 
the mentality of Appalachia's early people. That does not mean, how-
ever, that old-fashioned political economy can now be cast aside. When 
it comes to political economy, in fact, Appalachian scholarship is still 
surprisingly incomplete-overlooking, for instance, the effect of bank-
ing regulations on the region's development. In the mid-1810s, the 
mid-1830s, and throughout the 1850s, capital was accessible to a larger 
proportion of America's people than it was during the intervening pe-
riods. An authority on public-land sales notes that in the mid-1830s, 
"even squatters along the frontier participated" in the "speculative con-
flagration" going on there. "All expected to profit," he adds. 14 In the 
years 1837-1840, what was called a "free banking movement" ap-
peared in the United States, and, partly as a result, credit was unusually 
easy to obtain in most of the country by the early 1850s. Also during 
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the 1850s, the use of capital in frontier areas tended to be apportioned 
more efficiently than it previously had been. 15 Finally in 1865, how-
ever, Congress abolished the locally regulated creation of banknotes by 
imposing a prohibitive 10 percent federal tax (effective 1 July 1866) on 
the dispersal by any bank of banknotes issued by a non-nationally reg-
ulated bank. 
This restriction of currency-issuing power made the financing of de-
velopment in regions like Appalachia increasingly beholden to centers 
that, thanks to their earlier capital accumulation, were now authorized 
to create a greater percentage of new banknotes. And remember that 
Plateau Appalachia still consisted largely of frontier areas in 1865. 
Thereafter the Plateau (and to a lesser extent even the earliest-settled 
part of Appalachia, the Valley subregion) became increasingly depen-
dent on outside sources for development capital. The Plateau's large 
coal operators, even indigenous ones, depended for capital largely on 
northern investors. Relatively little coal money was controlled within 
Plateau Appalachia except what was distributed as wages. And, at that, 
many miners were paid in company scrip for exclusive use in company 
stores. Thus the self-creation of capital for self-determined development 
was largely denied to Plateau Appalachia by older areas that had in-
sisted on it for themselves in their own early years but were now fed-
erally granted a preponderant right to issue money for (and reap interest 
and profits from) the rest of the country. 
Although capital for industrialization came mainly from outside Ap-
palachia, the labor for it came primarily from the region's poorer farm-
ers, supplemented by large newcomer minorities of southern blacks and 
European immigrants. After the Civil War, Appalachia's growing num-
ber of hard-pressed farmers deviated from the course of action that such 
farmers tended to follow elsewhere in the United States. Elsewhere, 
most hard-pressed farmers were producing fewer products for their own 
subsistence needs. and were producing more to sell-or else were aban-
doning farming altogether and migrating to wage jobs in the nation's 
cities. In Appalachia, by contrast, wage jobs came to farmers in the 
countryside. Many of the region's farmers accepted low-paying jobs of-
fered them near home by timber and coal operators, and then, to sup-
plement this income, they continued subsistence farming. From their 
own perspective, they probably saw themselves as starting wage work in 
order to supplement their farm income. In any case, their strategy of 
. The Issue xxi 
economic development emphasized labor investment rather than em-
phasizing the capital investment for which capitalism reserves its larg-
est rewards. Within their own local subsistence-barter-and-borrow 
systems, by contrast, the most beneficial form of economic investment 
had been (and remained) labor investment rather than capital 
investment. 16 
When I speak of Appalachia's low-paid labor in this book, bear also 
in mind that most of Appalachia's people were embedded in localized 
economic systems propelled by subsistence agriculture and reciprocity. 
Thus they at least valued labor highly. When they brought their labor 
into the new coal mines-literally into the bowels of capitalist enter-
prise-mountain farmers were bringing something they valued more 
highly than did their employers. Gradually they realized this, and their 
initial loyalty to their employers melted away. They came to work 
merely for the wages that work brought. Class antagonism then took 
root in Appalachia-though it often exhibited peculiarities as the re-
gion's two economic systems with their respective value systems coex-
isted, sometimes in a state of mutual incomprehension. 
Not all of the incomprehension has been dispelled. Daniel Vickers 
recently commented that "our knowledge of economic behavior and so-
cial structure in early America has far outdistanced our understanding 
of the values that infused them." 17 In the 1990s our growing awareness 
of problems caused by the industrial revolution has prompted us to pon-
der why industrialization occurred in the first place. Our own personal 
commitment to "limits to growth" or, alternately, to "entrepreneurship" 
may well influence our personal evaluation of the industrial revolution. 
But today's hindsight does not necessarily give us any insight into the 
values held by early Americans themselves-even by those early Amer-
icans who immersed themselves in commerce or who initiated America's 
industrialization. Daniel Vickers points out that an "obsession with 
competency troubled early Americans far more than worries about the 
legitimacy of commerce." (A "competency" was defined as a resource 
base adequate to support one's self or one's family.) And Vickers adds 
that although a competency was a "superficially benign ideal," it "was, 
in fact, the source of deep social tensions that . . . people managed 
only with difficulty to control." 18 
Similarly, David F. Weiman speaks of a "fundamental tension among 
rural households between their bourgeois ethic of private accumulation 
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and the kin and communal relations that structured their private eco-
nomic activities." 19 That is why, to rethink Appalachia's economic his-
tory, I am separating questions about mentality from descriptions of 
behavior. How Appalachia became an arena for capitalism can only be 
explained by describing behavior. Changes in mentality accompanied 
the behavioral changes, but they did not cause them. For instance, 
within a subsistence-barter-and-borrow economic environment, entre-
preneurs tended to invest labor rather than capital. The reasons capital 
investment nonetheless became more profitable in Appalachia than la-
bor investment have little to do with values, with mentality. The rea-
sons concern behavior. 
Appalachia was filled with people whose values-values such as vol-
untary reciprocity-kept their subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems 
going. Let me hasten to emphasize, however, that Appalachia's local 
subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems did not deprive people of re-
wards for enterprise. Auspicious conditions could make those people 
just as entrepreneurial as John D. Rockefeller. I plan to show in chapter 
2 that Devil Anse Hatfield, of feuding fame, was highly entrepreneurial 
although he never handled more than a pittance of money. 
In that case, you may ask, what causes subsistence-barter-and-
borrow systems to pervade certain areas (such as early Appalachia) in-
stead of the capitalist system? The cause is simply a paucity of money 
in those areas. We could call subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems 
mere expedients-if we understand that capitalism too is merely an 
expedient. And within capitalism, just as within the low-money sys-
tems, objective conditions can inspire a preoccupation with providing 
subsistence and family security. When that is what people need-
when survival strategies demand priority-capitalists lose their enter-
prising spirit as fast as Primitive Baptists do. Within the capitalist sys-
tem, capital can be merely a means to acquire one's subsistence, just as 
(contrariwise) within a subsistence-barter-and-borrow system labor can 
be used to ~aximize one's profits. 20 It remains nonetheless important 
that far less wealth can be amassed within the low-money systems than 
within capitalism. 
In brief, then, a defining characteristic of a subsistence-barter-and-
borrow system is its paucity of money. And the economic mentality 
within such a system will not necessarily be "subsistence-oriented" but 
will respond to objective conditions. What has happened over time in 
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Appalachia is a shift from an initial splurge of enterprise to a later pre-
occupation (at least among most people) with merely maintaining sub-
sistence. But concurrently, although this may sound contradictory, 
Appalachia's people have increasingly abandoned their subsistence-
barter-and-borrow systems and increasingly adopted the capitalist sys-
tem. In other words, despite the shift toward a subsistence-oriented 
mentality, the region at the same time has used increasing quantities of 
money and thereby has undergone a transformation to capitalism. 
Meanwhile (to add another nuance), the federal banknote-issuing tax 
that was legislated in 1865 inhibited local control over the region's cap-
italist transformation and favored its control by outsiders. 
Michael Merrill has estimated that as of 1800, only about one-
quarter of America's economic exchanges, as measured by value, oc-
curred in commercial markets. 21 In Appalachia that level may not have 
been reached even by the time of the Civil War. Furthermore, much or 
most of that commercial one-quarter of the region's total exchanges was 
conducted through barter, without money changing hands. And this 
pattern was reinforced by the 1865 termination of state-bank curren-
cies. So when the region's industrialization began to reach major pro-
portions in the 1880s, locally issued money could finance only a small 
part of the new production and marketing investments that then 
occurred. 
Thus it is hardly surprising that Appalachia's transformation toward 
capitalism depended on outside capital. Many studies of the region end 
their analysis in the 1920s when its capitalist transformation peaked. 
This book does not stop there but moves on to look at the New Deal's 
effects. A new era began in the 1930s, marked by major changes in the 
region's industrial conditions. There was the unionization of labor, 
prompting unionized industries to mechanize more, and thereby per-
petuating the massive unemployment that had begun when the Depres-
sion struck. Beyond those industrial changes, the 1930s also brought 
less-noticed changes in Appalachia's agricultural life. 
The Depression's effects differed in different regions of the United 
States, and its effects in Appalachia differed considerably from its ef-
fects in most of the rest of the country. Its effects, in fact, were not the 
same everywhere within Appalachia. Because many of Appalachia's full-
time farm families were subsistence farmers producing most of their 
own consumption items, or else bartering for locally produced con-
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sumption goods, those families needed little money to maintain their 
living standards. Not only as minimal buyers but also as minimal sell-
ers, such full-time subsistence farmers were only minimally affected by 
market conditions and thus by the Depression. 22 Some of Appalachia's 
full-time subsistence farmers found the great drought of 1930-1931 a 
worse ordeal than they found the Dep~ession. 23 
At the other extreme within the region (not geographically but eco-
nomically) stood full-time wage earners. Many of these people worked 
in raw-material industries, especially in bituminous coal mining. By 
contrast with Appalachia's full-time subsistence farmers, the region's 
full-time miners were among those Americans hardest hit by the De-
pression. Most Appalachian miners did a little supplemental farming 
on the side, and this helped them cushion what they suffered from par-
tial or total unemployment, but coal mining was one ofthe industries 
most adversely affected by the Depression-partly because coal was in-
timately tied to two of the country's hardest-hit economic sectors, pro-
ducer goods and construction materials, and also because mining 
entailed high fixed costs that continued even when the mines were in-
active. Full-time coal miners who lacked jobs needed all the money re-
lief they received and often could have used more. 
As for the New Deal's effects on the region, they mixed benefits with 
harm. Briefly, New Deal programs committed four types of harm. 
First, because Appalachia's wage workers frequently supplemented 
their wage income with subsistence farming and bartering, they did not 
need as much wage income as most workers elsewhere in the United 
States. Therefore the wage (and price) supports mandated by the Na-
tional Recovery Administration (NRA) harmed the competitive posi-
tion of Appalachia's industries. Second, the acreage limitations and 
subsidy payments established by the Agricultural Adjustment Admin-
istration (AAA) helped capital-intensive farmers at the expense of labor-
intensive farmers, thus helping regions like the Midwest at the expense 
of Appalachia. Third, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) rein-
forced Appalachia's growing exclusion from production for markets by 
paying wages higher than many of the region's private producers could 
afford to pay. And finally, the money influx into Appalachia's farming 
areas that was financed by the WPA and other relief programs put some 
of the transactions that had formerly used barter on a cash basis, espe-
cially among the region's full-time subsistence farmers. This change to 
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cash. transactions diminished the amount of industrial labor power that 
was subsidized by Appalachia's subsistence agriculture, further weak-
ening the region's ability to compete in America's market economy. As 
Marjorie Griffin Cohen points out, "The existence of subsistence pro-
duction serves a variety of functions, but its primary importance for the 
capitalist sector is in supplying and maintaining a labour force at prices 
which permit capital accumulation in this sector."24 
This suggests only part of what followed from New Deal interven-
tion. The New Deal did provide some benefits for Appalachia, because 
another part of the story is that many of the region's coal and textile 
operators had not been able to pay their workers a fully family-
supporting wage. The great expansion of those industries in the late-
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been possible only because 
many of their workers maintained ties to agriculture, particularly to 
subsistence agriculture. 25 And partly because of this, the agricultural 
demands that were made on mountain and Piedmont land had grown 
extremely destructive by the 1920s. Erosion and soil depletion were 
threatening to denude many farmed hillsides beyond the point. at which 
they could support even the reforestation they desperately needed. 26 
Thus the New Deal did confer benefits on Appalachia over and above 
simply feeding people. The New Deal's money injections, though they 
harmed the region's textile and coal industries, helped to save its land 
by making many people less dependent on farming their land. So a 
trade-off was involved. 
This does not mean that if industries had stayed away from Appa-
lachia the land would have received exemplary treatment. A self-
defeating agriculture had been practiced since white settlers first started 
arriving. It had begun with the mismarriage of colonial American 
farming customs to the region's unusually hilly topography, and it was 
compounded by the tradition of bequeathing land through partible in-
heritance (i.e., division among all the heirs, or at least among all male 
heirs). And yet, although pressure on the land's productive capaciry of-
ten yielded diminishing returns, most mountaineers resisted migration. 
They stayed put, eventually enduring impoverishment and injuring 
the land. They remained primarily because they valued proximity to 
their parents and siblings more than they valued individual economic 
advancement. Although most mountaineers lived in nuclear-family 
households, their basic economic unit was the multigenerational family. 
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Their family orientation was not comparable to a fully communitar-
ian life-style-as exemplified, say, by the traditional village communes 
of Russia. Rural Appalachia's basic socioeconomic group was much 
smaller, composed, as one eastern Kentucky study has found, of "two, 
three, or more family-households that were particularly solidary and 
bonded together by strong ties of mutual friendship, and frequent vis-
iting exchanges, as well as by ties of kinship. These were primarily 
groups of siblings' families or of siblings and their parental families." 
Beyond these family groups, the same study found, there was "little co-
operation in common tasks for the good of the whole neighborhood. 
Few interfamily economic relationships, such as borrowing farm imple-
ments or exchanging labor, existed."27 A similarly pronounced "famil-
ism," accompanied by a comparable lack of community cooperation, 
has likewise been discovered by West Virginia case studies28 and by a 
North Carolina case study. 29 
According to the Depression-era union organizer Jim Garland-
whose family went back five generations in southeastern Kentucky-a 
decline of wider community solidarity had begun quite early. Garland 
writes that "when there remained no more unclaimed farmland to take 
up, ... two classes of people emerged .... Thus, even before the coal 
operators came into the region, mountain society had begun to 
disintegrate." 30 
In the late nineteenth century, as the living standard of many moun-
tain families fell, members of those families often went to work for 
wages that were lower than the wages paid for comparable jobs else-
where in the United States. Had the region's agriculture not already 
been strained-had impoverishment not already threatened some farm 
families-wages could not have been scaled low, and in that case much 
less industrialization would have been feasible in Appalachia. The 
mountain products, primarily timber and coal, were very heavy. Trans-
porting them to markets, usually markets in the North, was expen-
sive. But because these resource-extraction jobs kept most Appalachian 
workers in rural areas where they could continue farming as a sideline 
(supplementing their meager pay with home production), Appalachia's 
coal was generally able to undersell northern coal until 1933, when the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA) sponsored wage-and-price 
supports that destroyed the region's advantage. 
Admittedly, Appalachia's coal-mining areas would have needed 
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Depression-time relief payments even without the NRA's policies. The 
coal areas had already become heavily money-dependent before the De-
pression began, and what they desperately needed during the Depres-
sion was money. Consequently, major welfare provision was the only 
humane federal policy possible for Appalachia's coal areas in 1933 (and 
earlier, for that matter, despite the delay until 1933). 
As for those quite different Appalachian areas where little or no coal 
was mined and where the predominant occupation was still subsistence 
farming, my findings suggest that federal relief (including the work re-
lief furnished under the WPA) produced a result there that was less 
clearly beneficial. There the 1930s' influx of relief money tended to un-
dermine local subsistence-barter-and-borrow networks by making the 
possession of money a precondition for an increased proportion of local 
transactions. 
Meanwhile, a change was occurring during the New Deal era not 
only in the scale but also in the rationale of government intervention. 
The creation of consumer purchasing power became a major motive for 
providing relief (welfare) payments. Genuine human concern character-
ized the New Deal, but that cannot be the sole criterion for assaying a 
historical evaluation of its long-term effects on Appalachia. 
Indeed (this may as well be explicit), today's theories are inevitably 
the criteria by which the cogency of yesterday's theories and the conse-
quences of yesterday's practices must be gauged. This study's use of the-
ory is eclectic, drawing on both neoclassical and neo-Marxist ideas. 
Without theory of some sort, sense cannot be made. Now in the 1990s, 
the nation is growing less and less willing to maintain Appalachia in a 
state of dependence on transfer payments indefinitely. My hope is that 
a rethinking of Appalachia's past, including a reexamination of the con-
scious choices that helped to shape its past, can help us envision a future 
that is within our power of choice today. 
Admittedly the New Deal itself had come out of a rethinking pro-
cess. Neoclassical economists had failed to predict the Depression and 
could prescribe no cure for it, so seemingly the Depression had refuted 
neoclassical economics. In fact it had not, but it did inspire new de-
partures in neoclassical theory, including in 1946 the first full formu-
lation of the center-periphery model by the Argentine economist Raul 
Prebisch. 31 (Prior to Prebisch, the terms center, periphery, and dependency 
had been used by Werner Sombart in the 1920s, but only in passing.)32 
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Argentina, whose central bank Prebisch spent the 1930s organizing 
and directing, presented a classic case of economic dependency. During 
World War I, however, and again during the 1930s Depression, a policy 
of import substitution was forced on Argentina and its dependency 
shrank. Prebisch's figures told him that his country thereby thrived. 
Unlike Argentina, unfortunately, Appalachia cannot legally estab-
lish its own central bank, but it can benefit from what Raul Prebisch 
learned while starting Argentina's. By 193 7 Prebisch was questioning 
the classical assumption that export-led growth was required in order to 
develop an undeveloped country. Prebisch had seen Argentina's greatest 
industrial strides occur when its exports were at their lowest-first 
during World War I and then again during the Depression. During 
both periOds, self-sufficiency through a process of import substitution 
had been forced on Argentina. In hindsight, great benefits from import 
substitution became clear to Prebisch. 
By the late 1940s, Prebisch was attacking the classical axiom that an 
international "comparative advantage" necessarily follows for any coun-
try that achieves lower production costs. What actually happens, said 
Prebisch, is that the economically "center" countries can afford to fi-
nance technological innovations (thus increasing their productivity per 
worker) without causing any fall in prices, and this allows those center 
countries to increase wages as they increase what economists call the 
average product, or average output, of labor. They can do this, says 
Prebisch, because they control virtually all of the world's capital. But 
by contrast, at the periphery, where far less capital is controlled, a new 
technology often does pull prices down, for labor at the periphery is too 
job hungry and unorganized to gain a share of technology's benefits. 
The difference between the periphery's low labor costs and the center's 
high labor costs confers an absolute advantage in favor of the center, 
despite the periphery's comparative advantage in trade competition. 
Prebisch admitted that world economic upswings tended to raise prices 
and wages at the periphery as well as at the center; but when down-
swings came, he said, the resistance to any lowering of incomes was 
more effective at the center, because labor unions were stronger there 
and more money was available for wages. 33 To this explanation, others 
have added that because the center's products tend to be more differ-
entiable than are the products of the periphery, the center's products can 
command relatively monopolistic prices from the periphery. 34 
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Prebisch's 1950 United Nations report contains figures showing that 
between the 1870s and 1938, the relative value of the primary products 
(raw materials) that Great Britain imported from the rest of the world 
fell so far that by 1938 "an average of58.6 per cent more primary prod-
ucts was needed to buy the same amount of finished [British) 
manufactures."35 Producers at the periphery had to buy manufactured 
goods at whatever price they could get them, and yet their own raw 
products almost invariably seemed to fall in price whenever a new tech-
nology (or a good harvest, or any other cause) made their products 
cheaper to produce. 36 
Such were the origins of dependency theory. It was an application of 
neoclassical principles to questions that had gone unasked until world 
economic relations came under scrutiny from vantage points in the 
Third World. Since the 1960s, debate about dependency has been dom-
inated by neo-Marxists, but some crucial insights have also been con-
tributed by a neoclassical West Indian economist, W. Arthur Lewis. 
While working for the United Nations, Lewis began realizing that 
terms of trade between countries result primarily from the potential 
each country possesses to produce necessities that both it and its trading 
partners share in consuming. Lewis points out that all countries share in 
consuming food, and he asks how much food (per capita) any given poor 
country can produce for its own comumption. Lewis asks, in other words, 
how much productivity per capita exists in the subsistence agriculture of 
a capital-poor country, and how much productivity per capita exists in 
such a country's other domestic food production (that is, in its food pro-
duction for its internal markets). If a country has few capital resources, 
says Lewis-and in addition its non-export (domestic) agriculture limps 
along with low productivity-then whatever that country exports will 
tend to be sold for relatively low prices, even if it exports manufactured 
goods and even if it. achieves high productivity in turning out its ex-
ports, whether they be agricultural or manufactured. 37 (The Philip-
pines furnish a manufacturing illustration of this that is still glaring in 
the 1990s.) 
Like Prebisch, Lewis studied economic relations between separate 
countries, not between regions within the same country. Nevertheless, 
his insights cast light on relations between the northern United States 
and Appalachia. Lewis is explicit that less-developed countries (and 
here I read "regions," thinking of Appalachia's coal) "cannot escape ... 
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unfavorable terms of trade by increasing productivity in the commodi-
ties they export, since this will simply reduce the prices of such com-
modities." The surest way for a less-developed country (or region) to 
achieve trade parity with a developed country (region) is to equal its per 
capita production of food for local consumption. As Lewis puts it, "The 
factoral terms of trade (that is, terms of trade per "factor," including per 
worker} can be improved only by raising . . . productivity in the com-
mon commodity, domestic foodstuffs." 38 
What Lewis is saying here becomes clearer if we place his insights 
within the hypothetical "stages of economic growth" postulated by Walt 
W. Rostow. Rostow defined five stages of growth: ( 1) the traditional 
society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the take-off, (4) the drive 
to maturity, and (5) the age of mass-consumption. 
In Rostow's schema, an economy generally achieves the precondi-
tions for take-off by importing capital investments. 39 Here, however, 
dependency often soars. Historically, foreign capital investments have 
usually been made for the purpose of growing food to export or extract-
ing raw materials to export. In addition, foreign investment has often 
financed construction of the infrastructure (such as railroads, roads, 
ports, telegraph lines, etc.) that is required to grow, extract, and trans-
port those export products. As Rostow asserted concerning his stage of 
preconditions for take-off, when "investment increases {it is] notably in 
transport, communications, and in raw materials in which other nations 
may have an economic interest."40 
In thinking about Appalachia, of course, we have to think of its re-
lations with other U.S. regions, not with other countries. The point is 
that investment decisions are made by the investors. Most major invest-
ment in Appalachia comes from outside the region. A great many lo-
cally desirable investments have never been made simply because they 
would have returned no profit to outsiders. A case of this sort was high-
lighted in the 1970s when U.S. Steel Company ended seven decades of 
coal mining in southern West Virginia's McDowell County. The county 
seat of several thousand people, the town of Welch, had spent its U.S. 
Steel-dominated decades as one of the largest U.S. cities to lack treat-
ment for its raw sewage-which still today in fact flows raw into 
the Tug Fork River. In 1990 the county's officials agreed to allow 
massive garbage imports into McDowell County in exchange for the 
treatment of Welch's sewage by a waste management firm based in 
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Philadelphia. 41 Citizens have organized against the garbage imports, 
but as of 1993 a final decision has not been reached. 
McDowell County's dilemma may be worse than most, but, at best, 
an economy in Rostow's preconditions stage-investing its labor wher-
ever outsiders are willing to invest capital-will grow dependent on 
outside investors. So what will propel a preconditions-stage economy to 
the take-off stage-what will propel it to self-sustaining growth? 
Rostow hypothesized that a take-off can be defined by "the rate of 
effective investment and savings" within a society. When effective in-
vestment and savings within a society exceed 10 percent of the "national 
income" (here, for our analysis, we should think of Appalachia's inter-
nal regional income), Rostow considered a take-off virtually assured. He 
pointed out, however, that certain modernizing attitudes are necessary 
before a society's investment rate can rise to 10 percent of its income. 
And historically those modernizing attitudes have arisen not so much 
because of economic goals as because of political goals. In Rostow's 
words, "The building of an effective centralized national state . . . was 
a decisive aspect of the preconditions period; and it was, almost uni-
versally, a necessary condition for take-off."42 
Where does this leave a preconditions-stage region that lies within 
the same nation-state as the mature-stage region that controls most of 
its investment decisions? Appalachia has no legal grounds for defending 
its economy from control by the economy of the North. But in Ros-
tovian terms, Appalachia has been stuck in its preconditions stage for 
over a century now, its take-off still apparently as remote as it was more 
than one hundred years ago when its major industrialization began. 43 
Let's look again at agriculture. In W. Arthur Lewis's schema, agri-
culture is crucial. It is also prominent in Rostow's preconditions for 
take-off. Rostow said that "in the first instance, comparative advantage 
lay in agriculture and the production of food-stuffs and raw materials for 
export." The way forward, he said, lay in finding "an economic setting 
in which a shift from agriculture and trade to manufacturing was 
possible.''44 Such a shift does not consist of agriculture and trade dis-
continuing, of course, but of manufacturing joining them. As manu-
facturing is added and the take-off proceeds, said Rostow, "agriculture 
is commercialized."4~ 
Here W. Arthur Lewis would doubtless interject that much Third 
World agriculture has been commercialized prior to any signs of a take-
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off, and, indeed, without a take-off following afterwards. But Lewis 
would agree with Rostow's dictum that "revolutionary changes in agri-
cultural productivity are an essential condition for successful take-
off."46 For Lewis, -however, it is specifically agricultural productivity 
for domestic consumption that, in the absence of financial wealth, is 
fundamental to prosperity. Lewis finds that agricultural productivity 
for export can easily become self-defeating. 
One important success story Rostow had trouble fitting into his 
schem·a was that of Japan since the 1860s. Japan's economic success 
makes better sense if analyzed in Lewis's terms, for Japan's agri-
cultural productivity gains have been considerable since at least 
the 1880s, 47 and those gains have not served export markets. Rostow 
called Japan's economy mature by 1940, but he nonetheless wondered 
if one really should "rate as mature an economy with so labour-
intensive an agricultural sector. The answer is affirmative," he went 
on, "only if one is prepared to take as given-outside the definition 
of maturity-a society's decision about its population size." Japanese 
agriculture, Rostow decided, with its "extraordinary refinement in 
the use of both water and chemical fertilizers, does indeed reflect 
a high form of modern technological achievement, even if modern 
farm machinery, designed to save labour, is capable of only limit-
ed use."48 
This makes sense, but Rostow missed an important nuance here 
when he supposed that "a high form of modern technological achieve-
ment" in agriculture allowed Japan's economy to reach maturity despite 
labor-intensive farming methods. In the light of the progress Japan has 
continued achieving since Rostow wrote ( 1961), it may well be that a 
long-term advantage has accrued to Japan's economy specifically because 
a large proportion of its population remained so long in agriculture. 
Japan managed, for much longer than Appalachia managed, to keep 
subsidizing its industry with pervasive subsistence agriculture. There-
sult in both cases was low-paid industrial labor-but it continued 
much longer in Japan than in Appalachia. An additional difference is 
that Japan's low-wage labor was exploited within a national develop-
ment plan. 49 During the Meiji period (1868-1912), 'Japan's main 
asset seemed to be its abundant reserves of cheap labor"-so 
industrialization expert Tom Kemp tells us. 50 And well past the Meiji 
period Japanese agriculture continued on a self-sustaining basis. 
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Thus the role played by Japan's agriculture in supplying its indus-
trial sector with subsidized labor was not frittered away, as it was in 
Appalachia's case. 
In Appalachia, by contrast, the agricultural sector was only tempo-
rarily able to contribute very many workers who needed only low 
wages. During Appalachia's industrializing era ( 1880-1930), the re-
gion's subsistence reproduction of labor power dwindled per capita as a 
result of land-destroying farming and timbering practices. Then, dur-
ing the New Deal, many of Appalachia's full-time subsistence farmers 
began to depend on money that they received from the federal govern-
ment, particularly for working on projects of the Works Progress Ad-
ministration (WPA). This added up to a considerable reduction of low-
paid labor, and at that time it was generally considered progress. 
Indeed, subsistence farming itself was considered a drag on the econ-
omy by the school of thought that dominated New Deal economic pol-
icy making. In the 1920s, subsistence farms had held half of the U.S. 
farm population. Liberal economists lamented subsistence agriculture's 
small money contribution to the industrial sector (its low level of pur-
chases) while ignoring subsistence agriculture's massive contribution of 
low-paid labor to the industrial sector. 51 
Japan's longer-lasting subsistence sector is only one of several ways in 
which Japan's path to economic independence diverged from Appala-
chia's path to dependency. The era when Japan was closed to Westerners 
(1641-1854) prepared that country well, ironically, for economic suc-
cess under Western-style capitalism. On the eve of its industrialization, 
Japan was equipped very differently from Appalachia for what was com-
ing. The demographic contrast could hardly have been greater. Japan 
had achieved virtually zero population growth. After multiplying two 
and a half times from 1600 to 1720, Japan's population leveled off and 
grew hardly at all from 1720 to 1868-at which point the Meiji res-
toration opened the way for industrialization. This near-zero population 
growth was achieved despite labor-intensive Japanese farming. Most of 
Japan's farm families were relatively small, and they endured grueling 
workloads. 
That same century and a half ( 17 20-1868) also formed the prelude 
to Appalachia's industrialization, but, in Appalachia's case, large fam-
ilies continued to predominate. Like most Appalachians, most Japanese 
were subsistence farmers at that time, but unlike Appalachia's farm 
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families, Japanese farm families found that they could increase their per 
capita income by raising fewer children. 52 
The significance of rural Japan's low population growth was that 
families could make ends meet, generation after generation, without 
having access to new land (as Appalachians did have access while their 
frontier lasted) and without excessively eroding and depleting their re-
source base53 (as Appalachians tended to do after their new land ran 
out). Thus Japan's agricultural sector could continue almost indefi-
nitely to hold a large proportion of Japan's overall population-and as 
a result it could continue almost indefinitely to perform the subsistence 
reproduction of labor power that helped keep industrial wages low. 
How did Japan's success in this regard come about? During the mid-
nineteenth century, the average Japanese farm household was self-
sufficient in grain and grew a surplus of grain for the market. 
Furthermore, 20 to 25 percent of Japan's farmers carried on a supple-
mental occupation of one sort or another, generally a small business. 54 
This gave them economic flexibility. 
Two decades later, in 1872, almost 75 percent of Japan's working 
population was still in the agricultural sector. 55 Many of these people 
still practiced trades or ran small businesses on the side. Soon a growing 
number of them would become wage workers to supplement their farm 
income-but they would not be pressured into wage labor by the spec-
ter of impoverishment (as many of Appalachia's families were). The 
standard of living on Japan's farms remained high enough to indirectly 
cause frequent labor shortages in industries such as silk reeling, cotton 
spinning, and coal mining. Skilled labor for Japan's heavy industry 
continued to be inadequate as late as the 1930s. Thus although Japanese 
agriculture retained "excess labor" while industry went short of help, 
most "excess" farm people manifestly considered themselves better off 
by maintaining at least roots where they were-better off than they en-
visioned themselves becoming if they left agriculture completely for 
full-time wage work. 
Japan's industries kept raising pay and improving conditions to pry 
workers loose from the farms, yet a pattern of "dual employment" en-
trenched itself. By 1920 a full 63.3 percent of Japan's farmers, lum-
berjacks, and fishermen were also practicing a secondary occupation. 56 
This continued giving them economic flexibility. As of 1975, 62.2 per-
cent of Japan's farm families were deriving more than half their income 
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from off-the-farm sources, and the viability of farm families' dual-
employment practices made their disposable income 13.1 percent 
higher than the disposable income of nonfarm Japanese families. 57 
Walt W. Rostow, as we have seen, wondered in 1961 whether we 
should really "rate as mature an economy with so labour-intensive an 
agricultural sector" as Japan's. Rostow did grudgingly rate Japan's 
economy as mature by 1940. But he did not realize that a large agri-
cultural sector-assuming that it is self-sufficient-forms an economic 
asset. Over thirty years have passed since Rostow wrote. Knowing the 
competitive position of Japan today in world trade, it seems timely to 
compare Japan's and Appalachia's rural economies. Among major non-
socialist industrial countries, Japan as of 1970 still retained the largest 
percentage of its work force in agriculture-dose to 20 percent, 
whereas only 3.8 percent of U.S. workers then remained in 
agriculture. 58 
Of course, a large percentage of a population cannot stay in agri-
culture if the land is abused as it was in much of Appalachia. Indeed, 
where the rural population is rapidly growing, as it was in Newer Ap-
palachia, soil conservation is difficult to practice. Even with the help of 
a land ethic like Japan's, the Japanese countryside doubtlessly would 
have deteriorated if its population growth had resembled Newer Appa-
lachia's. Fortunately for Japan, its population growth remained virtu-
ally nil until industrialization began creating new economic sectors that 
could support additional population. 59 
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that while Japan conserved 
and replenished its hillside topsoil, Appalachia let much of its topsoil 
wash away. Finally the 1930s' New Deal agencies intervened by initi-
ating financial incentives for soil conservation, but some of the best 
methods of hill farming are still being overlooked in Appalachia. Ap-
palachia, in this regard, is yet to grow "richer by Asia."60 (In chapters 
6 and 7, I will discuss forest-type "tree crops" that the New Deal re-
jected and that Appalachia's farm experts are still ignoring.) 
At a subtler level, Japan's subsistence labor reproduction was sus-
tained by an appreciative attitude toward labor that was very different 
from how labor has been regarded in most of the United States since the 
Civil War. Each case has harbored its own logic. Japan's restricted land 
base and scarce resources cried out for highly proficient labor-whereas 
America's frontier conditions and abundant resources barely penalized 
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wasteful and skill-less work habits. On Appalachia's subsistence farms, 
however, where labor was sustained largely by its own direct products 
(rather than by money-bought products) and where money scarcity 
prompted a flourishing system of moneyless labor exchanges, labor was 
generally valued above capital, and in fact labor was considered the fun-
dament of low-money economic development. Unfortunately, the ad-
vantages derived from Appalachia's subsistence labor reproduction were 
not kept within Appalachia-they were diffused outward into the entire 
American economy, and there Appalachia's valuable contribution of 
low-cost labor was valued very low, if not indeed denigrated. 
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century America has increasingly ignored 
labor's contribution to development while extolling capital's role. 
I'd like to stress this last point, because once we see some of the rea-
sons America's capital became highly valued and its labor came to be 
taken for granted, we will also be able to distinguish today's still-
dominant capital centricity from our own considered choice of values-
from our own personal choice of values. We can realize then that the 
dispersement of labor and capital under contract obligations is not basic 
to all economic life but only to one type of economic system. And we 
will not thereby be renouncing the spirit of enterprise, which is as in-
separable from what is good as from what is bad about America. En-
terprise can take as many forms as there are economic systems. 
With that said, all the propositions needed to construct a general 
theory of Appalachia's path to economic dependency have been 
broached. It is time ro apply them. 
1 
Early Settlement and 
Self-Sufficiency, 17 30-1860 
Precapitalist economies have an internal logic and solidity which should 
not be underestimated. . . . So long as the direct producers retained di-
rect access to their means of [economic} reproduction, they would not 
voluntarily turn to specialization, unless there previously had been mas-
sive improvements in the security of the food supply. . . . {But on the 
other hand, direct producers} could, relatively easily, find themselves 
without access to the land required for their reproduction simply as a re-
sult of the demographic growth and parcelization of holdings which were 
the unintended outcomes of previous generations of peasants pursuing 
their individually rational patterns of reproduction and inheritance. 
-Robert Brenner, "The Social Basis of Economic Development" 
The settlement of North America, including the settlement of Appa-
lachia, occasioned major examples of what Robert Brenner calls "mas-
sive improvements in the security of the food supply." Between 1714 
and 1775, for example, thousands of rent-racked flax and linen pro-
ducers abandoned their tiny leaseholds in Northern Ireland and flooded 
across the Atlantic to America, where many or most of them "lit out for 
the territories" of that day. Their venturesome settlement of Older Ap-
palachia multiplied their direct access to their means of economic 
reproduction. 
But why, then, did their descendants eventually find themselves eco-
nomically dependent on other American regions? Here the four main 
causes already mentioned in the Introduction bear repeating: (1) the ex-
pansion of population, (2) the depletion of resources, (3) the destruction 
attendant on the Civil War, and (4) federal homestead and banking leg-
islation enacted during the Civil War. 
How these four causes affected the various areas within Appalachia 
was determined largely by each area's position in the sequence of the 
region's settlement. And the sequence of settlement, in turn, was de-
termined mainly by geography. As Frederick Jackson Turner once put 
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it, early American settlers poured "their plastic pioneer life into geo-
graphic moulds. "1 
Appalachia's permanent white settlement began in the late 1720s in 
the Shenandoah Valley and continued rapidly southwestward with little 
topographic obstruction, soon spilling over into the rest of the Valley of 
Virginia-into what is called the upper valley-and continuing with it 
in the same southwesterly direction. Those two fertile troughs, the 
Shenandoah and the rest of the Valley of Virginia, together extend for 
several hundred miles and at points they widen to sixty miles-encom-
passing a vast amount of land. But both valleys, underlain by lime-
stone, proved so favorable for colonial agriculture that their first 
settlement wave peopled their vastness in little more than a single gen-
eration, by 1776. 2 This scale of settlement was only possible because 
natural increase and transatlantic migration raised population in the 
thirteen colonies more than threefold during that generation, from 
about 630,000 in 1730 to about 2,150,000 in 1770. 3 
Even so, that first wave of Appalachian settlement filled only the 
northern half of the Great Appalachian Valley-which continues south-
westward as the Valley of East Tennessee, and then extends far into 
northeastern Alabama. By the time of the American Revolution, white 
settlement was well under way in East Tennessee, although not in 
northeastern Alabama. 
Broadly defined (as it will be defined in this study), the Great Ap-
palachian Valley includes not only the seldom-obstructed six-hundred-
mile southwesterly course of its major trough but also the many 
similarly long and wide valleys that run parallel to it, mostly to its 
west. Land seekers soon spilled over into those parallel valleys-turn-
ing northwestward out of the Valley of Virginia, for instance, to enter 
the fertile valleys of the New River and its tributary the Greenbrier. 
Here, in the area that would later become southeastern West Virginia, 
the Big Levels of the Greenbrier Valley became an early center for 
cattle raising. 4 
Colonial Virginia applied stringent land-settlement laws, yet, even 
so, many of the official land titles issued by Virginia became targets for 
conflicting claims. Land-ownership questions grew particularly vexed 
in the Shenandoah Valley.) Such manmade obstacles influenced the set-
tlement pattern far less, however, than geography. In Kentucky, too, 
land titles often faced conflicting claims, yet many land seekers took 
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their chances by passing northwestward to Kentucky through the Cum-
berland Gap, located where Virginia joins Tennessee. When the Rev-
olution ended in 1783, Kentucky contained only twelve thousand 
settlers, but by the first national census seven years later, their number 
had grown to about seventy thousand. 
Meanwhile, other land seekers were not entering the Great Appala-
chian Valley at all but were bypassing its northern mouth (which is the 
Shenandoah Valley's northern ingress) and traveling farther up the Po-
tomac River. There they found rich land along the Potomac's two head-
water branches, especially along its south branch in what would later 
become part of northeastern West Virginia. Like the Big Levels of the 
Greenbrier Valley, the South Branch of the Potomac soon became a 
cattle-raising center. 
By 1820 Appalachia contained almost half a million inhabitants-
four-fifths of them in the benign valleys just described. Western North 
Carolina could also boast of some wide and fertile valleys, but these 
were harder of access and higher in altitude. North Carolina's mountain 
section was settled both from the Carolina Piedmont to its east and from 
the Valley of East Tennessee to its west. In far southwestern North 
Carolina, some white pioneers appropriated fields that had previously 
been cultivated by Cherokees, and this occurred also in northern 
Georgia. 6 Nonetheless, from 1800 through to the Civil War, Appala-
chian North Carolina contained only a third as many inhabitants as the 
better-endowed East Tennessee. 
In Kentucky, migration at first left little residue in that state's east-
ern mountain area, which acted mainly as an obstacle to settlement in 
the rest of state. By 1830 eastern Kentucky could not yet claim fifty 
thousand inhabitants. As for northern Georgia, little white settlement 
was allowed there until 1832-five years after gold was discovered in 
the area. White settlement was then allowed concurrently with the 
ousting of Georgia's Cherokees. 7 
Those were still fringe areas, however. As of 1830, three-fifths of 
Appalachia's population remained huddled together in Old Virginia's 
long, fertile valleys and in the Valley of East Tennessee. As of the 1830 
census, East Tennessee's population overtook that of Appalachian Old 
Virginia, but West Virginia (counted here as though it were already a 
separate state) accounted for another one-fifth of the region's total pop-
ulation, and West Virginia's residence pattern was then still heavily 
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weighted toward what would later (during the Civil War) become its 
border with its mother state. Thus as of 1830, about four-fifths of the 
region's population was still concentrated in the Great Appalachian Val-
ley, broadly defined. 8 
Early New England has recently been subjected to scores of case 
studies by practitioners of the "new rural history," but that is not true 
of early Appalachia. Of the book-length new rural histories, only Rob-
ert D. Mitchell's ComTfl#'Cia/ism and Frontier deals extensively with the 
very earliest period of settlement in an Appalachian area. It considers 
the Shenandoah Valley and finds that its first generation of settlers typ-
ically managed to sell less than one-tenth of their total production 
(hunting items included) but that "commercial tendencies were present 
from the beginnings of permanent settlement." As the Shenandoah Val-
ley's population became "larger, more occupationally varied and credit-
dependent . . . the proportion of goods for sale increased typically from 
one-third to one-half or more of total output." Mitchell concludes that 
commercial tendencies were "the most dynamic element in the emerg-
ing pioneer economy."9 
This judgment is consistent with information about the area 
that later became West Virginia. Guns, for instance, were typical of 
the investments pioneers made not merely to provision their fami-
lies but to acquire extra income by selling animal pelts. As of 
1822, when pelts were still being traded at stores in the relatively 
rugged northwestern corner of Older Appalachia, rabbit skins 
sold for two cents each, raccoon skins sold for twenty cents, fox 
skins for fifty cents, deer skins for fourteen cents a pound, bear 
skins for $1.25, and otter skins for $3.00. That trade in peltry 
virtually disappeared there by 1830, however, as fur-bearing animals 
grew scarce. 10 
Some of Appalachia's earliest whites were looking not so much for 
game as for ginseng, the medicinal root coveted by Americans who 
traded with China. Many early pioneers discovered such plentiful gin-
seng that its high exchange value could finance most of their store 
purchases. One merchant family in the Greenbrier Valley of Virginia 
(now of West Virginia) made only 2 percent of its sales in 1784 
on a cash basis. Of its £906 ($4,403) worth of sales that year, 
70 percent were paid for by ginseng root-at the rate of 2s. 6d. 
($0.625) worth of store goods in exchange for each pound of the cus-
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tomers' ginseng. 11 Thus this merchant family acquired almost two and 
a half tons of ginseng in 1784. 
Although ginseng often grew scarce, 12 the forests and the early clear-
ings continued to provide settlers with a very easy subsistence and extra 
income through livestock raising. By 1754 the Shenandoah Valley had 
become well known for its cattle. 13 And prior to the revolutionary war, 
the practice of fattening cattle on corn had become common on the Big 
Levels along the Greenbrier River (near today's Lewisburg, West Vir-
ginia) and also along the South Branch of the Potomac River. By the 
time of the Revolution, lean cattle were already being bought up by 
leading South Branch cattlemen so they could fatten them and drive 
them to market. As early as 1761, a herd of stall-fed cattle were driven 
from this vicinity to Pittsburgh and sold there to provision British 
troops. 14 
The herds of individual owners were not large by today's standards. 
Partial surveys of western Virginia's cattle holdings in the early 1770s 
reveal that the average herd contained about seventeen head and the av-
erage weight per animal was probably only about 375 pounds. None-
theless, in the valley of the Potomac River's south branch (in today's 
Hampshire, Hardy, Grant, and Pendleton counties of northeastern 
West Virginia), cattle raising became more than merely a temporary 
pioneer expedient of extensive farming. Later it would be supple-
mented, but not replaced, by more intensive farming. The valley itself 
was intensively farmed for corn (maize), but the uplands also were rel-
atively fertile and they offered such ideal grazing conditions that stock 
raisers were able to use the valley's corn not only to carry cattle through 
the winters but also to fatten them for market. Furthermore, by 1785 
progressive breeders on the South Branch were improving the quality of 
breeding stock there with cattle imported from Britain. This selective 
breeding, combined with better feeding, soon increased the average 
weight of South Branch cattle. 
In the late 1790s, several South Branch cattlemen moved west, driv-
ing choice cattle with them and settling near present-day Chillicothe in 
the Scioto Valley of south~central Ohio. These cattlemen maintained 
contact with friends and relatives on the South Branch who initially pro-
vided a way station for cattle that were market bound eastward from the 
Scioto Valley. 15 The first recorded cattle drive directly from that part of 
Ohio to eastern markets occurred in 1805. 16 
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Meanwhile, a large absentee landowner reported in 1804 that 
most of the cattle then reaching the markets of Washington, Alex-
andria, and Baltimore originated in the valleys of the Monongahela 
River and its tributary the Cheat River (which included parts of 
today's West Virginia counties of Preston, Tucker, Randolph, Barbour, 
Taylor, Harrison, Marion, and Monongalia). Later the Kanawha River 
valley (now in west-central West Virginia) became a major thorough-
fare for stock drives eastward. According to a woman writing in 
1823, the road along the Kanawha River was then "alive from morning 
till night, with people, horses, cattle, but principally hogs: myriads 
of hogs are driven this way annually, to the east. They commence 
driving in September, and from that [month} till Christmas, you 
can look out no time in the day without seeing a line of hogs." 17 In 
1826, sixty thousand hogs went east to market along this Kanawha 
Turnpike, twenty-six thousand of them within the space of two 
autumn months. 18 
Robert D. Mitchell's judgment that in the early Shenandoah Valley, 
commercial tendencies were "the most dynamic element in the emerg-
ing pioneer economy" is consistent with all of this continued commer-
cialization westward, and also with evidence from an early period in the 
settlement of upcountry Carolina and Georgia. Thriving commercial 
activity during the eighteenth century in North Carolina's Piedmont 
has recently been reconstructed in detail by Daniel B. Thorp, using the 
account book that a rural store-and-tavern-keeping family maintained 
from 1755 to 1775. The account book reveals few money transactions 
and yet mentions frequent export-import trips to Charleston, South 
Carolina-a five-hundred-mile round trip. 19 
Another newly studied ledger is one that was kept from 1782 to 
1794 by a merchant in northeastern Tennessee's present-day Hawkins 
County. Studying that ledger, Lucy K. Gump has found that "about 68 
percent of the credit total was paid [to the merchant} in traditional bar-
ter items. Cash was named in only 7 percent of all payments; however, 
about 19 percent may have had a cash component."20 Most of that mer-
chant's customers paid him in skins, furs, iron, cattle, horses, or salt. 
Lewis Atherton, after examining many country-store account books 
from the 1800-1860 period, wrote of highland farmers in the Carolinas 
and Georgia that "the barter record of their efforts in the field of pro-
duction offers little evidence to sustain the popular impression that in-
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habitants of the Piedmont and mountainous regions of the South were 
shiftless and degenerate." 21 
Thorp, Gump, and Atherton all describe a rural life in which cash 
was scarce and yet considerable quantities of produce were marketed. 
Country merchants established stores farther and farther upcountry in 
order to intercept Piedmont or mountain farmers who were bringing 
down wagonloads of produce for marketing. North Carolina farmers 
brought down wheat, corn, oats, flax and flaxseed, meat and skins, 
lard, feathers, beeswax, brandy, whiskey, and other products. In ex-
change they sought salt, molasses, and other subsistence needs, but 
they also sought trinkets and miscellaneous luxuries, and in addition 
they often wished to go home with money in their pockets. 22 They 
needed a little money to pay their taxes. Beyond that, money could be 
important for people who hoped to acquire land or slaves. 
Neither Thorp nor Atherton dwell on the early livestock trade of the 
Carolina mountains, but other scholars do. By the 1760s cattle were 
being driven from eastern North Carolina to northern market centers 
such as Philadelphia. An average holding of cattle in North Carolina at 
this time was six to sixteen head, but a typical drive northward would 
include much larger numbers. 23 In 1794 a drive of two hundred cattle 
proceeded from Wilkes County, in the Appalachian section of North 
Carolina, north to Washington or beyond. 24 
Not cattle but hogs, however, dominated livestock holdings in the 
Carolina mountains. Whereas a single cow required fully fifteen acres of 
pine forest to survive during the winter months, a hog could survive on 
much less pine forest. 25 In the records of Haywood County (west of the 
Asheville area), nineteen wills and inventories survive from the period 
around 1810. In these, the average holding of hogs numbers twenty-
two. Cattle holdings average only eight head, although three holdings 
list more than twenty cattle. Half of the lists include sheep, but their 
numbers are smaller. And judging from the presence of plows on sixteen 
of the nineteen lists, animal husbandry was not practiced to the exclu-
sion of cultivation. By far the largest cultivated crop was corn, followed 
by oats, wheat, and barley in that order. 26 
The year 1827 marked a breakthrough in the commercial life of 
western North Carolina. In that year the Buncombe Turnpike, largely 
following the French Broad River, reached completion from Greene-
ville, Tennessee through to Greenville, South Carolina. This new 'turn-
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pike greatly facilitated livestock drives out of the mountains toward the 
coastal plain of South Carolina. Each autumn an estimated 150,000 to 
175,000 hogs traveled the Buncombe Turnpike south toward South 
Carolina. With the exception of whiskey distilling, the most profitable 
uses for corn were to either sell it as hog feed or else feed it directly to 
hogs and then sell the hogs. Starting in the 1830s, hotels that were 
originally built to house drovers during the autumn animal drives be-
gan to acquire a second function as summer resorts for wealthy people 
escaping the humid, pestilential lowland summers. 27 
By selling in coastal or at least in urban markets, mountaineers in-
creased their access to money. When they sold their animals and pro-
duce to country merchants, by contrast, they were paid mainly in 
merchandise, which in turn the country merchants had generally ac-
quired from northern wholesalers on credit. 28 Receiving money pay-
ments for their products could be of crucial importance for farmers who 
were intent on major purchases, such as of land or slaves. 
Not that slaves were required for successful farming. During the late 
antebellum period in East Tennessee, so one study has found, "it was 
not the owning of slaves which made [a yeoman] more prosperous," but 
rather, "he was able to buy a few slaves because he was a bit more pros-
perous," and, in fact, many yeomen did desire "to invest their surplus 
in that type of property."29 A look at the U.S. census reveals that the 
aggregate number of slaves in East Tennessee inched upward until the 
time of the Civil War-but it also reveals that slaves as a proportion of 
East Tennessee's total population reached their highest number quite 
early, about 1810. Indeed, in Appalachia's first-settled area, the 
Shenandoah Valley, the proportion of slaves had already passed its peak 
during the 1780s. In the case of western North Carolina, which was 
settled considerably later, slavery proved profitable for most slavehold-
ers right up to the Civil War30 -and yet the proportion of slaves in 
western North Carolina's population peaked thirty years before the war, 
about 1830. In Appalachia as a whole, slaves as a proportion of the total 
population passed their apogee around the early 1820s. At that time 
slaves constituted about 13 percent of Appalachia's population. The 
1820s were also, and perhaps for related reasons, the decade that saw 
Appalachia's overall population expand at its fastest, growing more 
than 40 percent. 31 
What this indicates is that the average Appalachian white family was 
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probably not growing richer during the last generation before the Civil 
War, and may well have been growing poorer. Certainly it was not ab-
olitionism, but cost, that deterred the vast majority of white mountain-
eers from owning slaves. After abolitionism became a lively issue in the 
North in the 1830s, it rapidly became a dead issue throughout the 
South, including the Appalachian South, and even in the border states 
abolitionist sentiment shrank to a remnant. 32 
The declining proportion of slaves in Appalachia's total population is 
only one of several indicators that important elements of the region's per 
capita real wealth were already in decline by the antebellum period. 
Other indicators, as we have noted, are agricultural. The Deep South 
received much of its livestock from Appalachia and the border states. 
Hogs, cattle, and mules were driven out of the mountains in large 
numbers to be sold in the cotton areas of the Deep South, where boom 
periods found many plantations maximizing their cotton profits by 
minimizing the acreage they devoted to such cotton-culture inputs as 
the breeding of plow animals and food animals. By 1840 to 1860, how-
ever, the cotton South's demand for animals had begun to outstrip Ap-
palachia's supply. By then livestock was sometimes so scarce in 
Tennessee that Deep South purchasers had to continue north into Ken-
tucky, or even into Ohio, to acquire their herds. Along the main drov-
ing routes southward, hotels and boarding houses eagerly sought the 
patronage of drovers. Farmers along the way sold feed for the animals 
or opened their fields for a price. 
According to a report at the time, 1859 set a record for livestock 
prices and for the amount of livestock driven on foot out of East 
Tennessee. 33 It is significant, however, that although the work-animal 
count of East Tennessee (and of Appalachia in general) continued to 
grow during the antebellum years in absolute numbers, the count of 
food-providing animals (hogs, sheep, and cattle) was already declining 
in absolute numbers in the earlier-settled parts of Appalachia, includ-
ing East Tennessee. The total bushels of grain produced did continue to 
increase until the Civil War, even in those older parts of the region-
but the all-important fact was that the human population was growing 
faster than virtually every category of agricultural production-faster 
even than the supply of work animals, which, along with food animals, 
could generate cash by sale in the cotton lands. 34 
Thus Appalachia's per capita agricultural production was in decline 
by the time the Civil War dealt it an exogenous blow. At the begin-
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nings of white settlement, agriculture in the region had enjoyed more 
than ample resources, but the course of time had brought steadily nar-
rowing options that the population had answered with a succession of 
expedients-cultivating first the best land in the widest valleys but 
steadily working through to the worst land in the narrowest hollows, 
and then up onto the steep hillsides. 35 
In our customary image, we visualize pioneer families toppling trees 
and uprooting stumps to create arable land, but most Appalachian pi-
oneers made greater use of an Indian method: they burnt the under-
brush and killed larger trees in situ by girdling their trunks. Corn and 
other crops were then planted between the dead but standing trees. Af-
ter several growing seasons, such "fields" were generally abandoned-
or, rather, turned over to stock grazing and firewood gathering-and a 
new section of forest was burnt, girdled, and planted. Most Indians had 
confined these practices to flat bottomlands, but white settlers, as their 
density increased, pushed such slash-and-burn agriculture up onto the 
region's hillsides. 36 
Both the pace and the geographical pattern of settlement are crucial 
in understanding Appalachia's past. In its culture and mentality, Ap-
palachia was a homogenous unit, but economically there emerged three 
Appalachias, three subregions (as we shall continue calling them). The 
three subregions were cleaved from one another not by different prac-
tices but by the fact that farming practices did not change when Ap-
palachia's people ran out of new land on which to apply their customary 
practices. Underlying the resultant economic differences between Ap-
palachia's subregions were their major geographical differences. In 
terms of Frederick Jackson Turner's "moulds," Appalachia's pioneers 
poured the same lifeways into three quite different "moulds"-the Val-
ley, the southeastern Blue Ridge, and the Plateau-and they did so 
mainly in that sequence. 
In each of the three subregions, the earliest frontier settlers achieved 
surpluses far over and above what they needed for self-sufficiency. Prior 
to the Civil War, the South as a whole was basically self-sufficient in 
food. 37 Indeed, its degree of self-sufficiency was probably increasing. 38 
After the Civil War, however, as of 1870, the states of the Deep South 
(South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana) were 
producing only about half as much food per capita as they had produced 
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in 1860-and the Deep South's subsequent rebound in per capita food 
production proved only slight. 39 
Appalachia had only 10.4 percent of its population in slavery as of 
1860,40 and thus the mountain region did not undergo the same degree 
of economic dislocation as emancipation occasioned in the Deep South. 
Nonetheless, during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, food 
production per capita fell drastically throughout Appalachia, particu-
larly in the Plateau subregion (see table 2). This decline may not have 
completely obliterated Appalachia's food self-sufficiency as a region be-
fore the 1880s (when industrialization began its dramatic surge on the 
Plateau), but clearly it did reduce living standards for many of the re-
gion's people, softening them up, as it turned out, for later industrial 
exploitation. 
That the specter of impoverishment can goad people toward 
change is not a new idea. In his Poverty and Progress, Richard Wilkin-
son analyzes much of ancient as well as modern history from that 
perspective. And what Wilkinson concludes about the first factory 
workers-that they "only accepted the rigours of early urban indus-
trial life in the hope of improving their subsistence situation"41-was 
surely no less true of most of the people who went down to toil 
in Appalachia's first underground coal mines. Yet, curiously, this 
has not been the conventional wisdom among Appalachian specialists. 
The dean of Appalachian historians, Ronald Eller, tells us in 
his Miners, Mil/hands, and Mountaineers that "Appalachia on the 
eve of industrialization was a land of scattered, loosely-integrated, 
and self-sufficient island communities." Eller explicitly specifies 
that "the small, marginal farm usually associated with the stereo-
typed picture of [preindustrial} Appalachia was in fact a product of 
modernization.''42 
It is no secret that vast contrasts have existed throughout Appala-
chia's past, and especially in the long, narrow subregion I call Older 
Appalachia. Yet I cannot believe that "self-sufficient" accurately de-
scribes most of the mountain families who turned toward wage labor in 
the decades following the Civil War. Most of them, I suspect, were 
prodded into the mines by subsistence needs. Some of Appalachia's ear-
liest miners were admittedly recruited from outside the region, and oth-
ers had originally been recruited from elsewhere to help build the 
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region's first railroads, but most early Appalachian miners entered the 
mines directly from farms within the region. 43 
Some of these farmers no doubt entered the mines in an enterprising 
spirit-intending to use their labor in the mines (as it could be used on 
the land) to accumulate a degree of surplus wealth. But the data of the 
U.S. Agricultural Census suggests that most farmers who turned to-
ward wage work did so after, not before, their farms began to grow 
marginally by their own standards. The new outside-financed industrial 
development provided many mountaineers with their only alternative to 
long-distance migration. The new local timbering and mining jobs 
helped many of them continue to be-as they wished-landowning 
proprietors of family farms. Plateau Appalachia's per capita farm pro-
duction had been plummeting for at least thirty years before significant 
industrialization began-which rules out the possibility that industri-
alization initiated the region's decline in self-sufficiency. Taking wage 
jobs did, however, reduce many farmers' agricultural activities to part 
time, and many of them then allowed the size of their farms to shrink 
faster than ever-down to sizes that destroyed any hope of regaining 
landed self-sufficiency if their wage jobs vanished. 44 
This is the basic difference between Appalachia and Japan, and it 
forms the basis of the Appalachia-Japan comparison in the Introduc-
tion. With its population size virtually static, rural Japan faced no cri-
sis of subsistence. Japan embarked on industrialization for political 
reasons, whereas Appalachia could only be opened to rapid large-scale 
development because an agricultural subsistence crisis threatened part 
of the population in its Plateau subregion. No such specter of economic 
necessity prodded the Japanese. Prior to industrialization, Japan's pop-
ulation had hardly increased for 150 years. 45 Perhaps Japan's farmers 
were gradually nudged toward wage labor by subsistence needs, but 
they were not prodded by such needs, as some Appalachian farmers 
clearly were. 
In natural-resource endowments, Appalachia was better off than Ja-
pan, but in the crucial areas of self-sufficiency and self-financing, Ap-
palachia was worse off. 46 Japan's first thirty years of industrialization 
were achieved without importing significant amounts of investment 
money. 47 From 1868 to 1898, when Plateau Appalachia's industrial-
ization depended almost entirely on outside investments, Japan found 
its own farmers able to supply funds on a grand scale for investment in 
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schools, factories, roads, harbors, railroads, and the like. Many invest-
ments were placed by the government, and one scholar notes that Ja-
pan's "land tax accounted for 78 percent of ordinary {government} 
revenues (the bulk of total revenues) from 1868 to 1881, and, although 
the figure tended to fall after that, it still stood at 50 percent in 
1891."48 Major investment money could be contributed by Japan's 
farmers, this scholar implies, only because "most peasant families sup-
plied all or nearly all of their own food" and also partly because "com-
mercial values did not penetrate a very large area of {rural} economic 
relations, which remained embedded in custom-bound social groups."49 
The scholar adds that, "had Qapan's} rural population been moving 
away from tradition as rapidly as some other elements of the population, 
it is at least doubtful that so large a rate of investment or so fast a rate 
of modernization could have been sustained."50 
The relative liabilities that faced Appalachia by the time its indus-
trialization got underway form a contrast with the initial self-sufficiency 
of Appalachia's agriculture, and with its people's earlier capacity to pro-
duce a marketable surplus of farm products to fill their other needs. 
Already before the Civil War a rapid fall of food production per capita 
was taking place throughout Appalachia-particularly in the Newer 
subregion but also in the Older and the Intermediate subregions. (For 
the per capita figures, see table 2.) 
Although in Older Appalachia (the Valley) population growth had 
drastically slowed, that had not happened in Newer Appalachia (the 
Plateau). There population grew roughly 62 percent in the 1840s, 49 
percent in the 1850s, and 18 percent in the 1860s. The next leap-of 
46 percent in the 1870s-must be considered the brink of a "frontier 
closing" as far as Appalachia was concerned. (See table 1 for the de-
cennial population growth rates.) 
Table 2 indicates that in the 1850s, farm livestock holdings per cap-
ita began falling much faster in Newer Appalachia than in Older Ap-
palachia. And as farm meat output thus fell per capita, farm grain 
production per capita did not increase to compensate. Instead, as with 
livestock, so with grain: the yields per capita fell. And again they fell 
faster in Newer than in Older Appalachia. 
Farm potato output per capita did hold steady in the Newer subre-
gion during the 1850s. Meanwhile, however, in the Older subregion, it 
was advancing slightly. Finally, judging from butter and cheese figures, 
Table 2. Farm Livestock, Commodities, and Acreage Per Capita of Total Population, with Average Farm Size, 1840-1880 
Total 
Cattle Farm-
(incl. Farm- made Aver-
Dairy Total killed Butter age Farm 
Cows & Horses, Live- Live- Total Other Pota- & To- Farm Acres 
Work Dairy Mules, Work stock stock Grain Corn Grains toes Cheese bacco Size Per 
Hogs Sheep Oxen) Cows Asses Oxen Value Value (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (acres) Capita 
Older Appalachia 
1840 2.58 1.36 1.07 n.a. 0.40 n.a. n.a. n.a. 61.3 36.6 24.7 2.75 n.a. 4.11 n.a. n.a. 
1850 1.92 1.11 0.94 0.29 0.30 0.04 $29.85 $5.73 52.3 33.9 18.5 1.96 11.3 1.39 280 20.2 
1860 I. 51 0.84 0.81 0.27 0.29 0.05 $41.95 $9.06 48.1 32.4 15.7 2.24 12.0 6.69 n.a. n.a. 
1870 0.85 0.76 0.66 0.23 0.23 0.04 $37.80 n.a. 34.6 19.7 14.9 1.32 10.1 2.00 226 18.5 
1880 0.94 0.65 0.65 0.22 0.23 0.02 $26. 17 n.a. 38.0 25.8 12.2 1.45 12.4 3.85 166 16.2 
Intermediate Appalachia 
1840 2.72 0.79 1.16 n.a. 0.27 n.a. n.a. n.a. 46.0 37.5 8.5 2.83 n.a. 1.07 n.a. n.a. 
1850 2.33 0.89 0.92 0.29 0.22 0.06 $23.37 $5.83 41.7 33.2 8.4 3.95 7.4 0.93 303.3 23.1 
1860 1.98 0.71 0.73 0.24 0.23 0.07 $33.26 $8.80 41.8 33.2 8.6 3.85 7.3 3.40 n.a. n.a. 
1870 1.09 0.71 0.61 0.23 0.17 0.07 $25.49 n.a. 28.0 20.1 7.8 1.99 7.9 1.58 182.4 18.9 
1880 l.11 0.54 0.54 0.21 0.17 0.04 $21.10 n.a. 31.8 24.5 7.3 1.65 9.5 4.29 145.4 17.1 
Total 
Cattle Farm-
(incl. Farm- made Aver-
Dairy Total killed Butter age Farm 
Cows & Horses, Live- Live- Total Other Pota- & To- Farm Acres 
Work Dairy Mules, Work stock stock Grain Corn Grains toes Cheese bacco Size Per 
Hogs Sheep Oxen) Cows Asses Oxen Value Value (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (acres) Capita 
Newer Appalachia 
1840 2.73 0.99 1.23 n.a. 0.36 n.a. n.a. n.a. 54.0 42.8 11.2 1.80 n.a. 1. 18 n.a. n.a. 
1850 2.68 1.22 1.02 0.32 0.26 0.09 $21.32 $5.24 47.0 39.9 7.1 2.63 9.6 1.05 350 34.2 
1860 1.70 0.97 0.86 0.24 0.22 0.11 $32.01 $7.12 41.6 35.0 6.6 2.65 11.2 5.29 n.a. n.a. 
1870 1.22 1.04 0.71 0.25 0.21 0.09 $33.54 n.a. 32.5 26.2 6.3 2.54 10.3 4.35 229 26.8 
1880 1.29 0.72 0.69 0.23 0.21 0.05 $25.01 n.a. 37.0 31.2 5.8 2.19 12.4 5.33 173 21.3 
The MidwtJt (Ohio, Indiana, 1/linoiJ, Michigan, and WiJcomin) 
1840 1.90 1.10 0.92 n.a. 0.31 n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.1 29.8 19.4 4.06 n.a. 2.85 n.a. n.a. 
1850 1.44 1.51 0.76 0.28 0.26 0.06 $22.93 $4.69 56.4 39.2 17.2 3.09 15.6 2.73 136 11.0 
1860 1.24 1.00 0.76 0.28 0.30 0.06 $34.11 $6.79 60.9 40.5 20.4 4.06 21.8 5.80 124 10.5 
1870 0.79 1.24 0.59 0.25 0.28 0.02 $49.20 n.a. 55.1 30.4 24.7 4.95 18.5 3.76 115 9.6 
1880 1.21 0.94 0.68 0.27 0.29 0.01 $36.54 n.a. 80.9 52.6 28.3 4.42 21.2 5.20 107 9.4 
--
n.a.: not available 
SoURCE: U.S. Censuses of Population and Agriculture, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880. 
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milk production advanced slightly per capita in both subregions during 
the 1850s, but by no means did it advance enough to compensate in 
protein or calories for the amount of meat lost.~ 1 
Significant here are not only the absolute ratios of livestock and grain 
to total human population but also the rapid rate of decline that is re-
vealed in these decennial ratios. Gone now were the days when ginseng 
covered the hills and bought many of its diggers most of their store pur-
chases. Gone also were the decades (roughly the first one-third of the 
nineteenth century) when the Plateau in particular had offered an easy 
livelihood for livestock raisers. One authority estimates that during the 
early decades of the nineteenth century, "the per capita holdings ·of 
swine in the Cumberland Plateau outranked all other {southern] farm-
ing regions."~2 But by 1840 an agricultural decline per capita had be-
gun throughout Appalachia, and by the Civil War a rapid decline was 
underway-in Newer Appalachia particularly but also in Older and In-
termediate Appalachia. 
Hogs did the best. As late as midcentury, in the region as a whole, 
as many farm hogs were counted as all other farm livestock combined, 
excluding poultry. The overwhelming majority of these hogs ran loose, 
some turning wild as they foraged through the wooded hills carrying 
brands or clipped ears to designate their owners. An old-timer in Clay 
County, in West Virginia's Plateau section, recalled his father's legally 
registered livestock mark as "a crop and two splits off the right {ear] and 
a hole in the left." As late as the 1890s in that county, many people had 
to hunt down their hogs with dogs and guns. Yet under normal con-
ditions hog thieves were uncommon. 53 
Table 2 demonstrates that by 1860, Newer Appalachia had lost 
its overall advantage, for its farm livestock numbers per capita 
were now virtually as low as Older Appalachia's. Note also, however, 
that Older Appalachia's 1860 level had come about through a slow 
and steady decline over the previous twenty years-whereas Newer 
Appalachia had virtually sustained its level in the 1840s but then in 
the 1850s suffered a precipitous fall. Comparing the same set of 
indicators for the Georgia and North Carolina mountains shows that 
per capita agricultural decline proceeded faster there than in Older 
Appalachia but slower than in Newer Appalachia. That is why I 
label the Appalachian sections of those two states as Intermediate 
Appalachia. 
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The picture of faster economic decline in Newer Appalachia is con-
firmed when we glance at farm livestock values as recorded in dollars in 
the latter two of the three antebellum agricultural censuses. (In 1840 no 
dollar values had been recorded for livestock except for poultry.) Al-
though by 1860 the farm livestock numerical count was roughly equal 
per capita in Older and Newer Appalachia, note on table 2 that in dol-
lars the Newer subregion's farm livestock was worth only $32.01 per 
resident, whereas the Older subregion's was valued at $41.95. Some of 
this higher valuation in the Valley subregion was probably attributable 
to better breeding and feeding there. The rest presumably resulted from 
the Valley's easier access to markets. Lest we suppose, however, that the 
dollar-value variance resulted from a higher proportion of stock raised 
for the market in Older Appalachia, it is noteworthy that a comparable 
gap separated the dollar values of livestock slaughtered on farms in the 
two subregions. Newer Appalachia reported only $7. 12 worth of farm 
livestock slaughtered per person in 1860, whereas Older Appalachia re-
ported $9.06 worth. 54 
As for the possibility that in Older Appalachia a large number of 
animals might have been slaughtered locally but then sent elsewhere for 
consumption, a circumstance that would invalidate using slaughter fig-
ures to draw any conclusions about the standard of living, little such 
business existed. Refrigerated transport was still in the future. A small 
amount of meat packing in barrels for distant markets was carried on 
in East Tennessee, but the overwhelming majority of marketed live-
stock was driven on foot to the cotton-growing lands or port cities. 55 So 
every indication supports the conclusion that by 1860 Newer Appala-
chia's supply of livestock was as depleted as that of Older Appalachia, 
and in terms of money was worth considerably less. 
Of course, meat is not all that people eat, but a comparison of the 
three antebellum censuses also reveals a large and continuing fall in Ap-
palachia's grain output per person. And between the two subregions, 
the Plateau's larger per capita loss in farm livestock was accompanied by 
a faster fall in per capita grain production. In 1840 the Plateau's farms 
produced 54 bushels of grain (including corn) per Plateau resident, but 
by 1860 its farms were producing only 41.6 bushels per resident. The 
Valley's farms fared better, beginning in 1840 with 61.3 bushels per 
Valley resident and merely declining by 1860 to 48.1 bushels. 
Corn (maize) accounted for most of Appalachia's grain production, 
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particularly on the Plateau. But from 42.8 bushels of farm corn per 
person in the 1840 census, Newer Appalachia declined by the 1860 cen-
sus to a mere 3 5 bushels per person. And most of this drop was con-
centrated in the 1850s, thus coinciding with the Plateau's precipitate 
fall in farm livestock per person during that decade. Corn was the grain 
generally fed to livestock, and clearly, during the 1850s, Newer Ap-
palachia's production of grain for on-farm use underwent a menacing 
decline. As for the Valley subregion (Older Appalachia), there the per 
capita decline of farm corn production was more gradual and not so 
great-falling only from 36.6 bushels in 1840 to 32.4 bushels in 1860. 
All other farm grain production, considered together, fell by over one-
third per capita in both the Older and the Newer subregions. 56 
This picture of falling per capita grain output is reinforced by the 
census data on farm work animals. Because the work oxen on farms were 
not distinguished in 1840 from other cattle, a full work animal count 
was not made until 1850, when Older Appalachia held 0.34 work an-
imals per person and Newer Appalachia held 0.35 work animals per 
person. Ten years later in 1860, the count in Older Appalachia still re-
vealed 0.34 work animals per person, whereas the count in Newer Ap-
palachia had fallen to 0.33 work animals per person. Thus in 1850 the 
Plateau had been the subregion better endowed with farm work ani-
mals, but by 1860 it had become the subregion worse endowed. 57 And 
remember that Appalachia's work animals were not only used for work 
but also raised and sold to acquire money, as were food animals. 
And indeed, all of the Plateau's livestock figures per capita would 
have been significantly lower if a livestock boom had not prevailed 
throughout the antebellum period in the leg of the Plateau that extends 
down into east-central Tennessee. The boom there presumably serviced 
the livestock needs of plantations west of the mountains. By contrast, 
over on the east side of the mountains during the antebellum decades, 
the Piedmont foothills of the Blue Ridge were relatively livestock poor. 
It is safe to assume that as the Civil War approached, the Piedmont's 
worn-out plantations were no longer creating much demand for 
livestock. 
Meanwhile, for home consumption, less-desired foods drew new at-
tention. Farm potato production, for instance, maintained its per capita 
level during the 1850s in Newer Appalachia despite the population ex-
pansion there, and in Older Appalachia the bushels of potatoes bar-
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vested per capita (counting both Irish and sweet potatoes) even 
increased slightly. 58 The only recorded line of agriculture that expanded 
its per capita production during the 1850s in both Older and Newer 
Appalachia was dairying. Unfortunately, county-by-county census fig-
ures did not distinguish milk cows from other cattle until the 1860 cen-
sus. (As of 1860, 35 percent of Appalachia's nonworking farm cattle 
were dairy cows.) The census did, however, begin reporting farm butter 
and cheese production ten years earlier, in 1850. During the interven-
ing decade of the 1850s, farm butter and cheese production rose, even 
when calculated per capita. It rose 6.2 percent per capita in Older Ap-
palachia and 16.7 percent per capita in Newer Appalachia. Overall 
milk production presumably rose at about these same rates. A portion 
of the increase perhaps resulted from increased milk yields per dairy 
cow, but an increase could also have followed from the milking of 
more cows. 59 
The picture that emerges from all of these figures, considered to-
gether, is not one of complete impoverishment but of belt tightening. 
Appalachia's people did have resources to fall back on. As meat became 
less available, more of the grain crop became available for direct 
human consumption. And although people's average meat protein 
intake dearly fell, milk with its protein evidently continued to be 
plentiful. Meanwhile, potatoes were obviously a continuing starch-
providing staple. 
Appalachia's outlook as of 1860, although perhaps worrisome, was 
not alarming. But then the Civil War struck. 
2 
Accelerated Agricultural Decline 
and Adverse Federal Policy, 
1860-1880 
Human ingenuity would have had difficulty contriving a more perfect 
engine for class and sectional exploitation {than the National Banking 
System): creditors finally obtaining the upper hand as opposed to debt-
ors, and the developed East holding the whip over the undeveloped West 
and South. This tipping of the class and sectional balance of power was, 
in my opinion, the momentous change over the twenty-three-year pe-
riod, 1850-1873. Of course, not all of this shift in the economic balance 
of power can be attributed to changes in the institutional structure of 
banking, but it is significant that the structure of the system greatly 
affected the final result. 
-Robert P. Sharkey, "Commercial Banking" 
The Civil War hurt agriculture far more in the Great Appalachian Val-
ley (Older Appalachia) than on the Appalachian Plateau (Newer Appa-
lachia). Table 2 makes this evident. Despite minimal population 
growth during the 1860s in the Older subregion-about 6.8 percent as 
compared to about 17.7 percent in the Newer subregion-the number 
of farm hogs per person in Older Appalachia was nonetheless cut almost 
in half. In Newer Appalachia, by contrast, farm hogs per person fell by 
less than a third in the war-torn 1860s. 
Paralleling these hog numbers was the supply of feed for fattening 
hogs: farm corn production per capita was down by almost half in the 
Older subregion but by less than a third in the Newer subregion. Even 
the money value of livestock fell per capita in Older Appalachia, despite 
major inflation of the dollar during the 1860s. Further, per capita po-
tato production was down by more than two-fifths in the Older subre-
gion, whereas it held steady in Newer Appalachia. 1 
Figures on the size of farms, however, clearly indicate that agricul-
ture still retained greater potential in Older Appalachia. During the 
years between 1850 and 1880, the average farm in Older Appalachia 
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fell from 280 acres to 166 acres, but that subregion's population in-
crease of 60 percent was significantly cushioned by a 28 percent increase 
in the total amount of land in farms. Thus, although 1850 saw 20.2 
farm acres per capita in Older Appalachia, this had only fallen after 
thirty years to 16.2 farm acres per capita. And the "improved" acreage 
(that is, cultivated acres, cleated pastures, orchards, and the like) per 
capita remained unchanged at 6. 5 acres. 2 
On the Plateau, a less benign picture emerges. Between 1850 and 
1880, the Plateau's population grew a phenomenal 156 percent. This 
was still before a major level of industry appeared. In 1880 only about 
four thousand Plateau residents, well under 1 percent of the population, 
as yet mined coal at any given time. 3 The burgeoning population's de-
mands on agriculture are evident in the Plateau's declining number of 
farm acres per capita-driven from 34.2 acres in 1850 to only 21.3 
acres in 1880. Whereas in 1850 the Plateau's average farm had con-
tained 350 acres (much larger than the Valley's average), by 1880 that 
size had fallen by mote than half to 173 acres. Thus the average farm 
among the narrow hollows and steep hillsides of the Plateau was by 
1880 a scant seven acres larger than the average farm in the wide, 
limestone-based valleys and on the graded uplands of Older Appala-
chia. On the Plateau, improved acreage had to be increased from 4. 3 
acres per capita in 1850 to 5.3 acres per capita in 1880. 4 This increase 
of improved acreage meant more work for farm families, but it did not 
imply that they were consequently better off. Investigating a place fic-
titiously called "Beech Creek" in eastern Kentucky (part of the Plateau 
subregion), Paul J. Weingartner finds that from 1850 to 1880 the value 
of the average farm fell 25 percent-although by 1880 a higher per-
centage of land per farm was improved. This decrease in farm values, 
combined with the increase in the percentage of improved land, sug-
gests to Weingartner that the productive value of the land was probably 
decreasing from 1850 to 1880. 5 
The Civil War's assault upon southern livestock had not spared dairy 
cows, but the Plateau's relative immunity from Civil War depredations 
made possible the milking of mote cows per Plateau resident in 1870 
than in 1860.6 Judging from butter and cheese figures, however, by 
1870 each cow was giving less milk (see table 2). 7 Perhaps that is partly 
why interest in livestock breeding increased after the war, 8 but small 
farmers hesitated to breed cattle solely for their milk-producing poten-
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tial. Among blooded cattle, small farmers generally preferred breeds 
that would prove good for beef as well as for milk-such as Herefords 
and Shorthorns-although their milk yields could rarely equal those of 
the best milkers, such as Guernseys, Holsteins, and Jerseys. 9 A Short-
horn cow had versatility. It could be milked, butchered, or sold for ei-
ther purpose. 
The mountainous island of frontier land within the eastern United 
States was clearly, by this time, a frontier in its final phase of closing. 
Yet the large labor demands of its subsistence agriculture continued to 
inspire large families, and the custom of partible inheritance continued 
to subdivide farm holdings. More and more of Appalachia's people were 
thus beginning to find themselves in a lower class, wedged between the 
proverbial rock and a hard place. Thus pinioned, and despite their pre-
ponderant Civil War loyalty to the Union, they now received an exog-
enous blow through federal homestead legislation and other federal 
grants of western land. As far back as 1846 a federal homestead bill had 
come before Congress. In 1852, as new midwestern railroads prolifer-
ated, a federal homestead bill passed in the House of Representatives, 
but easterners managed to defeat that bill in the Senate. Some eastern-
ers had correctly perceived that agricultural surpluses from the West 
would work to hold down food prices and thus make profitable farming 
harder to achieve in the East. 10 
In the House of Representatives, the 1852 Homestead Bill had 
passed with 107 votes in favor and 56 votes against. Appalachia's fifteen 
congressmen split evenly on the bill, seven voting for it, seven against, 
and one abstaining. Those Appalachian congressmen who represented, 
on balance, Older Appalachia tended to vote in favor of providing west-
ern homestead land, whereas those who predominantly represented 
Newer Appalachia tended to vote on the negative side. Congressmen 
from Intermediate Appalachia (the Georgia and North Carolina moun-
tains) also tended to oppose the 1852 Homestead Bill. 11 
The threat was genuine. During the 1850s, railroad milage in the 
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin would in-
crease from 1,275 to 9,616 miles. Agriculture would boom in those 
states, and by 1860, an estimated three-fifths by value of their major 
agricultural products were being shipped east-where food prices, al-
though they did not begin to drop, nonetheless ceased to rise in measure 
with the rapid rate of urbanization then underway in the East. 12 
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Notwithstanding this threat to eastern agriculture, eastern trade and 
manufacturing interests persisted in supporting free western homestead 
grants, allying on this issue with westerners. n Early in 1860 a weak 
homestead bill managed to pass both houses of Congress, but President 
James Buchanan, a Pennsylvanian, vetoed it. Later in 1860, however, 
an Illinoisan was elected president. 
Recall that the decline of per capita food output during the 1850s 
had been particularly adverse in Newer Appalachia, the Plateau. But in 
the five midwestern states at that time, exactly the opposite was hap-
pening. Despite the Midwest's far faster urbanization, its per capita 
food output was expanding in the 1850s. 14 Its farm grain production 
grew 4. 5 bushels per capita (an 8 percent rise). The number of farm 
work animals (horses, mules, asses, and work oxen) increased 12.2 per-
cent per capita. Farm cattle (and also dairy cows within that category) 
held even, but butter and cheese production grew 39.6 percent per cap-
ita (see table 2). 15 
American agriculture clearly crossed a watershed, if not with the 
1862 Homestead Act per se, then with its application to lands ever far-
ther west. In the 1870s, U.S. land in farms increased 31 percent and 
farm output jumped a full 53 percent. During that decade, the U.S. 
population increased less than half as fast as farm output. 16 As a result, 
the 1870s became a decade of severe distress for farmers, and the 1880s 
brought little improvement. Federal land grants to railroads were sus-
pended in 1871, but their effects continued. At some point in the 1870s 
or 1880s, as larger and larger agricultural surpluses glutted the Amer-
ican market, it should have become obvious that the well-being of all 
American farmers, even of new immigrants, depended on also suspend-
ing the operation of the Homestead Act before the High Plains were 
invaded by farmers whose produce would jeopardize returns for every-
one already farming. 17 And, in fact, by the late nineteenth century, al-
most the entire East would become uncompetitive in producing the 
main crops that the Midwest and Plains produced for market. One ma-
jor exception to this was that Virginia's section of the Great Appala-
chian Valley still managed to supply grains and meat to neighboring 
cities as cheaply as those could be supplied from the Midwest and 
Plains. 18 West Virginia's market agriculture, however, faced a crisis 
when it could not compete with midwestern products after 1873. 19 
Concurrently, industrial developments that paid low wages began pro-
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liferating in West Virginia. And even in fertile East Tennessee, grain 
imports from the Midwest were making locally grown grain hard to 
market in Knoxville by the 1890s. 20 Soon low-wage industrialization 
would spring up there too in the form of textile mills. 
The Homestead Act and the railroad land grants thus helped to has-
ten Appalachia's economic dependency by artificially (politically) low-
ering the cost of producing market staples on the Plains. Visualize the 
typical midwestern farmer and consider how much he already differed, 
by 1860, from the typical Appalachian farmer. They admittedly shared 
some similarities. Both still maintained a high measure of self-
sufficiency. 21 Both, furthermore, were generally independent producers 
who owned their own land and their own means of production. Each 
was thus a free agent. But their economic outlooks were already diverg-
ing drastically. The midwestern farmer, with his expanse of prairie 
loam, was perfectly situated to exploit new fruits of technology such as 
the mechanical reaper and the thresher. The thresher sold for as little as 
thirty to forty dollars, and as early as 1840 its use had become wide-
spread even in states with a rolling topography, such as Tennessee-
with the significant exception in that state of East Tennessee. 22 For most 
Appalachian farmers, the thresher was simply not worth its price, for it 
could not increase the average mountain farmer's money income as 
much as it would cost him in money outlay. 
Appalachia's farmers thus mechanized at a far slower rate than most 
farmers elsewhere in the United States. In the Midwest by 1850 the 
average farm held $82.53 worth of farming implements, and in non-
Appalachian Kentucky the average farm held $75.18 worth, whereas 
the average on eastern Kentucky's farms was only $27.75 worth. 23 And 
then during the next thirty years, while the average value of farm im-
plements on midwestern farms rose to $121.60, the average value on 
non-Appalachian Kentucky farms fell to $67.02, and that on Appala-
chian Kentucky's farms fell to $23.71. 24 
The midwestern farmer, with his land's prime fertility and easy 
workability, and with his access via railroads to national and world mar-
kets, was becoming an excellent object for investment by eastern cap-
italists. Most midwestern farmers possessed plentiful land for market 
farming and merely faced the question of whether to work it labor in-
tensively or capital intensively. The suitability of their land for machine 
farming increasingly pushed them toward capital-intensive methods. 
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Meanwhile, the opening of the Plains on westward through land give-
aways and cheap transportation-combined with the new labor-saving 
farm machines-relegated Appalachia's farm families all the more de-
cisively toward subsistence farming alone. And subsistence agriculture, 
as already mentioned, was denied capital investment because it pro-
duced no cash income from which interest could be paid or capital could 
be repaid. 
Prior to the Civil War, eastern capital had helped to finance the ex-
port from Appalachia of its agricultural surpluses. 25 After the Civil 
War, when little or no net farm surplus remained to export from the 
region, eastern investment was by no means withheld from Appalachia. 
Rather, outside investment began to take new forms, such as timbering 
and mining, and under those new forms the mountaineer found himself 
no longer an independent producer but a wage-earning employee. 26 
By 1880 the poorest strata of the Plateau's people were finding that 
they must use new economic options if they wished to remain in place. 
Somewhat more than four thousand Appalachians were mining coal at 
some point in the course of that year-although only about four thou-
sand at any given time. 27 Also by 1880, several thousand Plateau res-
idents were cutting timber for wages on a seasonal or occasional basis. 
This is not to say that expedients within agriculture were completely 
exhausted. The postbellum years saw continuing use of slash-and-burn 
methods to clear hillsides that were then cultivated in grain for a few 
years until returned, via a pasture phase, to woodland. But now pop-
ulation pressure was such that abandoned fields had to be reused sooner. 
Less time was allowed them to recover to woodland before their turn 
came for reslashing and reburning. Such overuse of slash-and-burn 
techniques could trigger severe soil erosion. 28 
Livestock raising continued vital for both subsistence and marketing, 
but after the Civil War the "open range" tradition came under increas-
ing attack by large landowners. As early as the 1790s almost two hun-
dred landowners on the South Branch of the Potomac (now in 
northeastern West Virginia) had petitioned the Virginia General As-
sembly to forbid hogs from running at large. That request from land-
owners had been refused. 29 Small holders and landless people fiercely 
defended the open range, upon which their livelihood often depended. 
Not until the 1830s, forty years later, did Virginia begin to evolve state 
legislation that allowed local option laws that in turn would permit the 
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fencing of more than just crops. South Carolina, indeed, protected the 
open range (by positive legislation) until well after the Civil War. And, 
similarly, not until late in the nineteenth century did Tennessee permit 
the fencing of more than crop land. 30 Alabama had a local-option law 
from 1866 onward and Georgia from 1872 onward, but it was 1890 or 
later before the fencing in of livestock was required in any substantial 
part of the Alabama or Georgia mountains. 31 Similarly in West Vir-
ginia, as of the 1890s, livestock owners could register their distinctive 
ear markings with the clerk of their County Court, and those ear mark-
ings constituted legal proof of ownership even if livestock wandered 
across county lines. 32 
The imposition of fencing constituted a major setback for small 
farmers, depriving their livestock of many acres of "mast" (mainly 
acorns and chestnuts), which still at that time fell in abundance from 
Appalachia's forests. An indication of how plentifully the Plateau's vir-
gin hardwood forests produced mast has been preserved by an early 
1890s tree count on 12,263 acres in West Virginia's Wayne and Mingo 
counties (see table 3). The count revealed an average of six large oak 
trees per acre, each measuring at least a foot and a half in diameter at 
four feet above the ground. Ominously, this count was not made to es-
timate mast production but to identify profitable timber. Besides the 
six large oak trees, an average of five and a half other marketable trees 
were found per acre. 33 
Although the destruction of such forests merely awaited the arrival of 
railway spur lines amidst their fastness, the timber industry did not se-
riously inhibit livestock production in most of Appalachia until after 
the turn of the century. Less timber was cut in Appalachia before 1900 
than would later be cut during the four years of World War I. 34 One 
old-time timber surveyor in Clay County in the Plateau section of West 
Virginia recalled that "during and immediately after the {First] World 
War, a lot of people tried to get into the lumber business. There were 
small mills scattered all over the country."35 In the South overall be-
tween 1880 and 1924, the volume of standing timber was reduced by an 
estimated 90 percent. 36 
Congress in 1911 passed the Weeks Act authorizing the establish-
ment of federal forest reserves in the states. (Until then federal forest 
reserves had been established only in U.S. territories.) This made pos-
sible Appalachian timber preservation-although a 1922 "exchange 
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Table 3. Tree Count in Virgin Hardwood Forest, Wayne and Mingo 
Counties, West Virginia, Early 1890s 
Count of Hardwoods Count of Softwoods 
White Oaks 24,760 Tulip-Poplars 12,450 
Chestnut Oaks 38,848 Pines 3,472 
Black Oaks 8,525 Lindens 2,325 
Red Oaks 943 Cucumbers 240 
Hickories 21,298 Buckeyes 28 
Chestnuts 7,681 Ashes 271 
Locusts 1,996 Hemlocks 903 
White Maples 1,588 Total Count of 
Sugar Maples 450 Softwood Trees 19,689 
Birches 1,344 
Gums 1,044 
Black Walnuts 393 
Sycamores 13 
Total Count of 
Hardwood Trees 108,878 
NOTE: The count was confined to trees measuring at least 18 inches in diameter at 4 feet 
above the ground-with the exception of hickories, locusts, and black walnuts, which were 
included if their diameter at that height measured at least 10 inches. The count was made 
on 12,263 acres (almost 20 square miles) in Wayne and Mingo counties, West Virginia, in 
the watershed of the West Fork of Twelve Pole Creek. The altitude ranged from 650 to 
1, 000 feet above sea level. 
SoURCE: Summers, The Mountain Stale, 30-32. 
law" allowed the Interior Department to provide lumber companies 
with good timber lands in exchange for cut-over lands. 37 
Because Appalachia's wholesale deforestation for commercial timber 
was thus an early twentieth-century phenomenon, it cannot be blamed 
for the region's nineteenth-century agricultural decline. The dairy 
products increase that accompanied overall livestock decline in the 
1850s (see table 2) shows that fully fifty years before the region's virgin 
forests were devastated, a plentitude of meat protein could no longer be 
taken for granted by Appalachia's people. Ideally, that 1850s turn to-
ward dairy protein would have involved providing better (even if less) 
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grazing land for milk cows, as well as feeding them more grain. But 
increased milk production could also be gained by milking more cows 
from a herd or, as a last resort, by milking each cow longer after each 
of its calvings. 
As for other agricultural options, an increase of grain production 
promised farmers greater economic flexibility than did the production 
of crops like tobacco or cotton, which offered little use at home and 
which could only be marketed as plant products. A crib of corn, by 
contrast, could either be sold as such or distilled into whiskey and then 
sold. Or it could be consumed by the farm family or fed to livestock. If 
fed to livestock, the animals could then in turn be milked, eaten, or 
sold. In the post bellum South, the value of livestock tended to fluctuate 
with the market value of cotton, 38 but nonetheless, the diverse uses of 
grain and livestock fostered less dependence than did purely cash crops 
such as tobacco and cotton. Cash crops that lacked home uses maxi-
mized a farm family's reliance on conditions beyond its control. Simi-
larly, whenever a grain or livestock farmer turned to wage labor 
(timbering, coal mining, etc.) he likewise tended to increase his depen-
dence on conditions beyond his own control. 
Steven Hahn has shown that postbellum farmers in the Georgia 
Piedmont increased their production of cotton in tandem with their in-
creasing need for merchandise advances from local storekeepers. 39 
Hahn shows that the farmers involved in this situation were primarily 
trying to meet their families' subsistence needs rather than trying to 
maximize their financial return. 40 In the process, these Georgia Pied-
mont farmers increased their dependence on outside market forces be-
yond their own control. 
In the cotton belt, the role of merchandise "advances" provided by 
local storekeepers was heightened by the 1865 congressional act that 
terminated state bank notes. 41 Without that law, the direct provision of 
crop loans by banking institutions would have spread far more widely in 
the cotton South-and the high-interest merchandise advances of store-
keepers would have been that much less. But the 1865 law stymied 
southern banking from "atomizing" in tandem with the post-Civil War 
atomization of southern farming units. Merchandise provided by thou-
sands of local storekeepers became the main source of crop loans to 
southern farmers. As one economist puts it, "Deposits and checks had 
not been widely used in the South in antebellum times. With state bank 
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notes taxed out of existence and few national banks in the territory of 
the South circulating their own promissory notes [i.e., banknotes}, this 
• • • d lad f b d "42 pnmltlve an usury- en system o arter prospere . 
After the creation of local banknotes was curtailed in 1865, an in-
creased proportion of locally used capital was imported. Imported cap-
ital was less likely than local capital to finance local markets, and 
particularly to finance local markets that were supplied by local pro-
duction. Local production with outside financial backing tended to be 
export oriented. Hardest hit by this trend were areas with a high ca-
pacity for production but a low level of accumulated wealth with which 
to back the issuing of banknotes and loans-areas that, in short, were 
still rapidly developing frontiers. Frontier areas, such as much of Pla-
teau Appalachia remained in 1865, offered greater productive capacity 
per capita than did older areas, but frontier areas were also less endowed 
with the accumulated financial reserves that after 1865 were required as 
backing for banknotes. 43 
Until West Virginia was created in 1863, no single state was pre-
dominantly Appalachian, and this doubtlessly helped to restrict the re-
gion's independent financial resources. Within Virginia's state politics 
prior to the Civil War, for instance, banking discrimination was one of 
the main grievances of western Virginians. By 1810 western Virginia 
contained more than one hundred thousand people, and yet 'not a single 
bank was allowed to open there. When unchartered "private banks" 
stepped into this breech by accepting deposits and issuing banknotes, 
the Virginia legislature in Richmond levied heavy fines that squelched 
them. Finally, under western pressure, a Wheeling bank was chartered 
in 1817 and was authorized to establish branches at Morgantown, 
Clarksburg, and Wellsburg. Another western Virginia bank was notal-
lowed, however, until 1834.44 
An equally typical alignment occurred in early Tennessee when the 
1819 financial panic inspired pressure from the Nashville basin and 
western Tennessee for the establishment of an easy-money bank to re-
lieve debtors, but the proposal was defeated by opposition from Ten-
nessee's then most developed section, East Tennessee. 45 
By the time the next great panic struck in 1837, the Nashville ba-
sin's development had surged ahead of East Tennessee's. When East 
Tennessee pressed in 1838 for an easy-money state bank to finance in-
ternal improvements, western Tennessee joined that cause. But this 
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new bank plan was opposed in the state legislature by representatives 
from the Nashville basin, which by then had grown well developed. 46 
The federal crackdown on state-regulated banknotes came in 1865. 
How significant was it? In the received wisdom, its significance was vi-
tiated by a change in the method of issuing loans-by no longer issuing 
most loans in the form of newly created banknotes but in the form of 
bank deposits that could then be drawn out by writing checks. 47 Un-
fortunately, such new bank-deposit loans circumvented the 1865 crack-
down much more exclusively for the benefit of individuals who actually 
received those loans than the pre-1865 cash loans had operated. Before 
1865 just as afterwards, the relatively rich (or at least the enterprising) 
received most of the loans made. But loans made in cash had directly 
benefited nonborrowers (the general population) because cash changed 
hands not only in large transactions, like checks, but changed hands at 
all levels of economic exchange. The beauty of plentiful cash had been 
that some of it had trickled down to almost everyone in its vicinity. 
Checks changed hands only between the relatively rich, whereas cash 
had changed hands between virtually everyone. 
When state-chartered banks were effectively prohibited from issuing 
banknotes, many of them, if sufficiently large, then acquired charters as 
national banks in order to regain this right. But Congress had set a 
limit on the overall amount of banknotes that national banks as a body 
could issue. This limit of $300 million was quickly approached by east-
ern banks alone (generally the first to be chartered), and banks in other 
regions, if and when they too eventually received national charters, were 
left with the dregs of the banknote quota. 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of money-creating 
rights in the decades following the Civil War. From 1869 to 1899, the 
U.S. population nearly doubled, farm production more than doubled, 
and the value of manufactures (calculated in constant prices) grew six 
times. 48 Despite all this growth, circulating cash failed even to double 
during those thirty years. Calculated per capita, circulating cash fell 
about 10 percent in the United States from 1865 to 1890.49 Two very 
important changes were involved here. One was that now loans by state 
banks could no longer take the form of newly issued banknotes, for 
state banks were now permitted to create new money only in the form 
of deposits against which their borrowers could then write checks. And 
the other important change was that Congress failed to authorize na-
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tional banks to accept real estate in any form as collateral for loans-a 
de facto prohibition against national-bank mortgages that stayed in ef-
fect until 1914. Because the assets of Appalachia's local people were pri-
marily real estate assets (mainly land, minerals, and timber), 
Appalachians qualified for relatively little credit from the only banks 
that could issue banknotes, national banks. 
But how about greenbacks? By 1865 about $450 million in U.S. 
government greenbacks were circulating, and by 1879 this had dropped 
only to about $350 million. Nonetheless-and despite the growth of 
gold and silver specie that had begun with the California gold rush-
cash growth soon fell far behind America's rapid overall financial 
growth. When the Civil War ended, the United States held only $1.50 
in deposits for every dollar of cash; but by 1914 deposits would rise to 
$9 for every cash dollar. 50 Even national banks, although they were al-
lowed to issue loans in cash, could reap more profit by issuing loans in 
the form of checking 'deposits. Behind national bank notes the govern-
ment required 111 percent U.S. bond ownership, but the government 
required no significant reserves behind deposits in national banks. 51 
This encouraged even national banks to expand checking-deposit loans 
more readily than banknote loans. 
What this all added up to was a new financial system in the United 
States. Marking the break with the pre-Civil War system was the fact 
that whereas all forms of cash were interchangeable, bank checks were 
not automatically changeable into cash. A check-issuing bank would 
convert its own checks into cash, but other banks would generally ac-
cept checks only on deposit. Thus checks were an inconvenience for 
people without their own bank accounts in which to deposit them. Easy 
money still existed in the form of bank accounts, but no longer in the 
form of banknotes. This amounted to easy money for the rich but not 
for the poor. Before the Civil War there had been no such trend. From 
1834 to 1860 the circulating cash had, in fact, grown faster than all 
forms of bank deposits, rising 251 percent while bank deposits had 
risen only 204 percent. 52 
The postbellum cash drought and concurrent deposit boom affected 
people's lives. Altina Waller's 1988 book Feud furnishes a detailed ac-
count of one preindustrial mountain entrepreneur-Devil Anse Hat-
field-who was hobbled by the postbellum cash drought and whose 
assets were eventually bought up by people who had plenty of money at 
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their disposal. Devil Anse Hatfield held several thousand acres of tim-
berland through most of the 1870s and 1880s, but he lacked any good 
way to capitalize either his holdings or his crew's labor, and he was 
forced out of business. 
This occurred in the heart of Plateau Appalachia on the West Vir-
ginia side of the Tug Fork River, which separates West Virginia from 
Kentucky. When first starting his timber business in 1869, Hatfield 
lacked any significant money to invest in it. He operated on credit in 
the form of store merchandise, promising in 1872, for instance, to 
make a large delivery of poplar logs on the Tug Fork's spring 1873 
floodwaters in exchange for advances of food and supplies from a store-
keeper, John Smith. Devil Anse was unusual for his generation of Tug 
Fork Hatfields in that he did not inherit title to sufficient land to pro-
vide a comfortable subsistence for his family. So some personal belt 
tightening probably helped motivate him to embark on his timber busi-
ness. But he was also clearly trying to make more profit than his fam-
ily's subsistence required. 53 
Feud integrates the events of the Hatfield-McCoy feud with the twists 
and turns of Devil Anse Hatfield's timber business. By December 
1887, his business had suffered many reverses and he could continue 
operations only by mortgaging much of his land to a Logan, West Vir-
ginia, merchant, thereby fending off other merchants who were suing 
him for nonpayment of previous debts. At that point a coalition of Ken-
tucky McCoys-instigated by Devil Anse's former land rival Perry 
Cline-strategically chose to harass the Hatfields, culminating in the 
January 1888 Battle of Grapevine Creek. This trouble evidently pre-
vented timber deliveries that would have enabled Devil Anse to liqui-
date his December 1887 mortgage, and he had to sell his timberlands 
to prevent their seizure for debt. Had these financial pressures not 
prompted him to sell out, he could have awaited a much higher price, 
because the Norfolk and Western Railway had announced a plan to 
place rails along either the Tug Fork or the Guyandotte River. (The 
Guyandotte flowed forty miles east of the Tug.) Later in 1888 the Nor-
folk and Western began surveying a Tug Fork route, and early in 1889 
it announced its choice of that route. 54 
Devil Anse Hatfield's behavior was extremely market oriented, but 
what was he thinking? Was he entrepreneurial? Did he, as I claim, wish 
to make more profit than his family's subsistence required? The book 
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Feud tells us that Devil Anse's "shift in emphasis" from farming to tim-
bering was demonstrated by his need to purchase corn in 1873. And "a 
list of personal items charged at Smith's store," it says, "reveals Anse's 
interest in what might in the mountains be considered luxury items-
fancy bonnets and combs for his wife and daughters, gold watches, and 
'fine' boots, frock coats, and hats for himself and his men." But the 
book immediately adds a not-merely-profit-minded interpretation of all 
this, because "this lavish expenditure for clothes and personal posses-
sions indicated a concern with appearance that reflected [Devil Anse's] 
desire to enhance his status in the community."55 
Evidence like this, however, shows that entrepreneurial thinking was 
not confined to only one "class" in Appalachia's history. In. those Gilded 
Age years after the Civil War, what was increasingly limited to one class 
was entrepreneurial success. About the same time Devil Anse Hatfield 
had to sell out, three Wheeling capitalists bought about 2,000 acres in 
the Tug Fork area for less than $3,000. A mere three years later, in 
1891, they were able to sell 1,568 standing poplar trees on that land for 
$7,840. 56 Such cases were typical. Wheeling had several national 
banks, and Wheelingites with large financial assets could use those as-
sets as collateral to borrow more money, and then could invest that loan 
money in developing and marketing assets which themselves were in-
admissible as national-bank collateral. Through such outside funds en-
tering the Tug Fork Valley, general land values there rose more than 
400 percent from 1890 to 1892. 57 
But why did Devil Anse Hatfield not borrow money from, at any 
rate, a state bank instead of acquiring merchandise on credit and bor-
rowing money from merchants? He lived in what is now (since 1895) 
Mingo County. In Hatfield's day Mingo was still part of Logan County, 
and Logan County had no bank at all until 1893, five years after Devil 
Anse was forced out of business. His affairs had often taken him to the 
county seat, the town of Logan, 58 but Logan itself had no bank until 
1900. 59 
As in the Deep South during the same period, banking failed to "at-
omize" in Appalachia after state-chartered banks lost the power to issue 
banknotes. Branch banks could usefully have provided some banking 
services in small towns, but federal law prohibited national banks to 
operate branches, and only two Appalachian states, Virginia and Geor-
gia, allowed state banks to do so. 60 
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At this same time, wage labor was proliferating in Plateau Appala-
chia. The shortage there of cash not only influenced the way low-money 
entrepreneurs such as Devil Anse Hatfield carried on their businesses 
but also influenced the lives of wage earners. Some wage workers were 
paid primarily or exclusively "in kind" (in goods), and most ofthe rest 
were issued company scrip that could command goods only at company 
stores. Coal operators' use of company scrip allowed company stores to 
charge artificially high prices, but such price gouging was just an aux-
iliary feature (which many companies did practice). The main reason 
coal companies began paying wages in company scrip was because nei-
ther they nor their banks possessed enough cash for payroll purposes. 61 
About two-thirds of coal's market value consisted of wages at that time 
(see table 4). Coal companies sold their coal to railroads, manufactur-
ers, and wholesalers who generally paid for it by check. After depos-
iting those checks in their own banks, the coal companies could in turn 
write their own checks to their suppliers, including to the wholesalers 
who provisioned their company stores. Generally coal companies could 
not draw sufficient cash from their banks to pay wages in cash, for the 
banks generally lacked access to that much cash-enough to turn most 
of the region's gross coal income into cash. Nor could the coal compa-
nies generally pay their employees by issuing checks, for their banks 
lacked sufficient cash to redeem the checks. Company scrips served, in 
effect, as each company's private checks, each company store playing 
the part of an "in kind" redemption bank. 
Company scrip, company store-such a system may not have 
sounded very enticing to a prospective employee. As the nineteenth 
century ended, however, many hard-pressed Appalachian farm families 
lacked any alternatives they considered more attractive, and they turned 
to such wage labor to supplement their farming. The context in which 
such farm families allotted their work was the living standard that they 
could have sustained had they continued only to farm. As compared 
with farm families' "stand pat" option and its declining living standard, 
even a low wage-whether it was paid in cash, in "kind," or in com-
pany scrip-could be attractive if it made possible merely a slight im-
provement in a farm family's living standard. As James C. Scott points 
out in The Moral Economy of the Pea.rant, "Because labor is often the only 
factor of production the peasant possesses in relative abundance, he may 
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Table 4. Bituminous Coal Value, Wages, and Number of Workers 
1870-1902 
Average 
number of 
employees at 
Value per ton Wages paid Wages as% any time 
($) per ton($) of coal value (est.) 
Older Appalachia 
1870 1.45 0.95 65 796 
1880 0.91 0.49 53 2,193 
1890• 0.91 0.68 74 5,576 
1902 .. 0.95 0.60 63 15,275 
Newer Appalachia 
1870 2.15 1.36 63 846 
1880 1.33 0.76 57 3,940 
1890• 0.97 0.68 75 10,841 
1902 .. 1.06 0.67 63 21,412 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wiscomin 
1870 2.26 1.30 58 15,330 
1880 1.38 0.93 68 38,104 
1890 0.97 0.72 74 50,711 
1902•• 1.10 0.81 74 84,657 
• Several counties with small production omitted by census (data incomplete). 
•• Counties below 200,000 tons omitted by census (maximum: 7% of Appalachian out-
put). 
SoURCE: 1870 Census, vol. 3; 1880 Census, vol. 15; 1890 Census, vol. 7; and 1902 Cen-
sus Bureau Special Report on Mines and Quarries. 
have to move into labor-absorbing activities with extremely low returns 
until subsistence demands are met.''62 
What table 4 sets forth is one consequence of this. In 1870, when 
less than 750,000 long tons of coal were mined in Appalachia, 65 per-
cent of that coal's selling price was passed on to employees as wages in 
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Older Appalachia and, in Newer Appalachia, 63 percent was passed on 
as wages. By 1880, however, wage earners' share of coal proceeds had 
fallen to 53 percent in Older Appalachia and to 57 percent in Newer 
Appalachia. 63 
Table 4 also shows that the average price commanded by Appalachian 
coal likewise fell between 1870 and 1880. But the fact that wages (per 
ton) fell faster than coal's market value suggests that the origin of Ap-
palachia's worsening position vis-a-vis the buyers of its coal lay in the 
willingness of many of its people to work cheaply. Put differently, had 
Appalachians held out for higher wages, less coal would have been 
mined in Appalachia, but it would have commanded a higher price 
when marketed. 
Wage demands were low in Appalachia because the region's income 
from agriculture was low. In West Virginia, for instance, 1880 saw in-
come from farming (including from farm labor) averaging only $144 
per year, whereas income from non-agricultural work averaged $539 
per year. By 1900, farming income averaged $150 while nonfarming 
income averaged $481-within which average West Virginia coal-
mining income stood at $45 1 that year. 64 
W. Arthur Lewis cites similar examples from his studies of Third 
World development problems. In one example, Lewis compares Nige-
ria's underdevelopment with the successful development achieved by 
Australia. According to Lewis, "The market price gave the Nigerian for 
his peanuts a 700-lbs.-of-grain-per-acre level of living, and the Austra-
lian for his wool a 1600-lbs.-of-grain-per-acre level of living, not be-
cause of differences in competence, nor because of marginal utilities or 
productiveness in peanuts or wool, but because these were the respective 
amounts of food that their cousins could produce on the family farms." 
Lewis is explicit that "low productivity in food set the factoral terms of 
trade" (that is, the terms of trade per "factor," such as per worker) and 
he points out that not only peanuts and wool but also "minerals fall into 
this competing set .... Mineral-bearing lands were not infinitely elas-
tic, but the labor force was."65 
To see Lewis's principle at work on its positive side-in favor of the 
independent producer of a satisfying subsistence (whether actual or only 
potential)-we need not look all the way to Australia but merely back 
to the American Midwest in the 1850s. According to the 1860 U.S. 
Census, "At Cincinnati in 1848 and 1849, (which was the beginning of 
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the greatest railroad enterprises,) the average price of hogs was $3 per 
hundred {pounds of dressed pork]. In 1860 and 1861 it was double 
that .... The cheap prices of the west have gradually approximated to 
the high prices of the ease, and chis solely in consequence of cheapening 
the cost of transportation, which inures to the benefit of the farmer.''66 
Why did these transportation benefits inure to the benefit of the 
farmer? Why did the price of food rise in the Midwest where it was 
being produced rather than falling where it was being consumed-in 
cities such as New York City and Philadelphia? Why did the Midwest, 
and particularly its farmers, reap most of the benefit from the plum-
meting cost of shipments co and from its region? 
Over the entire period from 1816 to 1860, the average prices of Cin-
cinnati's major exports rose dramatically in relation to the prices of Cin-
cinnati's major imports. From 1816 co 1860, that midwestern city's 
terms of trade on its major exports and imports improved more chan 
200 percent. 67 In the Midwest overall by 1860, a given amount of farm 
produce could buy more than twice the amount of manufactured goods 
that it had been able to buy in 1816. 68 And it was mainly the individual 
farmer who reaped these profits. The antebellum prices paid for live 
hogs in Cincinnati amounted to about 80 percent of the eventual whole-
sale value of the packed pork and lard. Furthermore, the packers gen-
erally paid farmers or drovers in cash for their live hogs, not in any form 
of scrip. 69 Likewise in the Chicago market, farmers corralled the lion's 
share of proceeds. As of 1860, farmers received 84 percent of the whole-
sale value of Chicago's leading nine farm commodities. 70 
Why were the Midwest's falling transportation costs thus translated 
into higher income for midwestern farmers rather than causing lower 
prices for live hogs and for packed pork? Raul Prebisch, whose ideas we 
glanced at in the Introduction, would have said chat this occurred be-
cause midwestern agriculture had access to plentiful capital. Because 
plentiful capital was available (so Prebisch would have said), techno-
logical innovations could be made in the Midwest and productivity per 
worker could be increased there without triggering a fall in prices-
allowing instead an income increase for midwestern farmers. 
The W. Arthur Lewis answer would be somewhat different-not 
contradictory but describing the situation from a grassroots perspective. 
Lewis would say that the midwestern farmer would not have raised food 
for market unless he and his family could thereby live at a higher 
38 Appalachia's Path to Dependency 
standard than they would have obtained by using their land to provide 
only their own subsistence. Lewis illustrates the economic principle at 
work here-the principle that basically determines the terms of trade 
between countries or regions-by saying that "if tea had been a tem-
perate rather than a tropical crop its price would have been perhaps five 
times as high as it was. And if wool had been a tropical rather than a 
temperate crop it would have been had for perhaps one-fifth of the rul-
ing price."71 In other words, whatever hinders a capital-poor country 
from adequately feeding itself will, by that very fact, reduce the price at 
which its people will likely be willing to sell their produce on the mar-
ket. (And it will also reduce the price at which they'll tend to sell their 
labor, which by extension lowers the price of what they produce.) And 
here the hindrance under which farmers have labored in the tropics-
the tropics' paucity of topsoil-is matched by certain self-defeating 
practices that characterized Appalachian agriculture, such as planting 
hillsides with soil-depleting, erosion-accelerating crops such as corn. 
Thus Appalachia acquired disadvantageous terms of trade for the 
same sorts of reasons that many tropical countries did. Another illus-
tration used by W. Arthur Lewis makes the similarity still clearer. In 
sugar cane production, says Lewis, 
productivity is extremely high by any biological standard. . . . Output per acre 
has about trebled over the course of the last 75 years, a rate of growth of pro-
ductivity which is unparalleled . . . by the wheat industry. Nevertheless work-
ers in the sugar industry continue to walk barefooted and to live in shacks, 
while workers in wheat enjoy among the highest living standards in the 
world. . . . The subsistence sectors of tropical economies are able to release 
however many workers the sugar industry may want, at wages which are low, 
because tropical food production per head is low. However vastly productive the 
sugar industry may become, the benefit accrues chiefly to industrial purchasers 
in the form of lower prices for sugar. (The capitalists who invest in "sugar do not 
come into the argument because their earnings are determined not by produc-
tivity in sugar but by the general rate of profit on capital . . . ). . . . The 
prices of tropical commercial crops [for export} will always permit only sub-
sistence wages until, for a change, capital and knowledge are put at the dis-
posal of the subsistence producers to increase the productivity of tropical food 
production for home consumption. This analysis applies to all tropical com-
mercial products [for export} of which an unlimited supply can be produced 
because unlimited natural resources exist-in relation to demand. 72 
Accelerated Agricultural Decline 39 
How can Lewis's analysis of tropical export products help us see the 
position of Appalachia's export producers? As the option of wage work 
arose in Appalachia, Lewis would say, and as farmers increasingly 
availed themselves of export-oriented timbering and mining jobs, they 
were acting in the knowledge that greater poverty faced them if they 
continued merely to farm and did not accept the wage jobs. Wages of 
ten cents an hour exerted more attraction on a family that might go 
hungry without them than wages of twenty cents an hour exerted on a 
family doing quite well simply by farming. A dollar-a-day job might be 
more attractive in Appalachia than a two-dollar-a-day job in the Mid-
west. A midwestern farmer would have scrutinized a two-dollar-a-day 
offer, knowing that greater prosperity probably awaited him if he chose 
instead to operate as a free agent, farming for the market as an inde-
pendent producer. 73 Even before the government began dispensing free 
land under the Homestead Act, the pay for a day's common labor in 
1861 in southeastern Iowa was able to buy five bushels of corn or forty 
pounds of pork. 74 These high purchasing-power wages for common la-
bor resulted from the strong market position of landowning farmers in 
the Midwest. Midwestern farm owners' strong market position enabled 
midwestern farm hands in turn to exact high-living-standard wages 
from those farmers. And the midwestern farm owner's strong market 
position was itself undergirded by the fact that if the market prices of-
fered for his farm products dropped, he could still remain quite pros-
perous by resorting to subsistence farming alone. That was the basic 
foundation of the midwestern farmer's prosperity-the fact that if all 
else failed, subsistence farming alone would keep him prosperous. (And 
it helped that state laws were passed virtually everywhere to guarantee 
home places, and to guarantee enough land to maintain subsistence, 
against seizure to pay debts.)75 
Reading this in the other direction-reading it upward from the 
midwestern farmer's attractive subsistence-farming option-we find 
not only that the prices of farm products rose in the Midwest during the 
1850s (indeed, the California gold rush could have caused some of that 
price rise by pouring $320 million worth of specie into the U.S. econ-
omy by 1855)76 but that later a rising share of the proceeds from mid-
western coal mining went into the wages of midwestern miners. While 
Appalachia's miners were receiving a steadily smaller portion of the 
value of their coal output-11 percent less by 1880 than the portion 
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they had gotten in 1870-exactly the opposite was happening in the 
Midwest. By 1880 midwestern miners were receiving a 17 percent 
larger portion of what their coal sold for than they had received in 1870 
(see table 4). 77 The fact that the wages of midwestern miners per ton of 
coal fell slower than the price of midwestern coal indicates that those 
wages were in fact helping to hold up the coal price. As a result, it 
became advantageous for coal operators to mine coal elsewhere-in Ap-
palachia, for instance, where weaker wage demands prevailed. 
Why then did Appalachia's farmer-miners stay put? Why did they 
not move to the Midwest, where both farming and mining paid better, 
or indeed continue farther west and file a homestead claim? Some did 
avail themselves of those alternatives, but most people stayed in Appa-
lachia despite the far lower income available there. 78 What motivated 
them to stay? Their behavior belied Frederick Jackson Turner's claim 
that "men would not accept inferior wages and a permanent position of 
social subordination when this promised [homestead} land . . . was 
theirs for the taking.''79 
To this question, Appalachian ethnographic studies have furnished a 
clear answer. Most of those who stayed in Appalachia harbored motives 
that were not dominated by individual economic aspirations. And later, 
when World War I created a spate of jobs outside the region, immi-
grants and blacks did emigrate out of the region in large numbers to fill 
those jobs, 80 whereas proportionally fewer of Appalachia's native whites 
did so. The mass migration of Appalachian whites began only when 
World War II created such extensive outside labor opportunities that 
nuclear families could migrate as parts of extended family units, as 
parts of what mountain sociologists call "family groups.''81 All this is 
meat for the next chapter, which concerns economic mentality. 
But before even broaching the question of mentality, it is clear that 
many Appalachian wage earners initially could live at a higher material 
level by working for a pittance (while farming on the side) than 
they could by simply farming without taking a wage job. This insight 
is important. 
3 
Rural Appalachia's 
Subsistence-Barter-and-Borrow 
Systems 
The "borrowing system" allowed scarce tools, labor, and products to 
circulate to the benefit of all and responded to the ongoing neighbor-
hood need for exchange and mutual assistance. People utilized this 
neighborly ne~work for most of the transactions necessary to the practice 
of farming. To have productive implements "and not be willing to share 
them in some sort with the whole community is an unpardonable 
crime," Caroline Kirkland warned prospective emigrants. "Your wheel-
barrows, your shovels, your utensils of all sorts, belong, not to yourself, 
but to the public, who do not think it necessary even to ask a loan, but 
take it for granted." Outsiders, unversed in these customs, frequently 
misunderstood. 
-John Mack Faragher, Sugar Creek 
A scholar has remarked that the greatest success achieved by America's 
massive effort to export economic development to the Third World "was 
the attention it focussed on the transformation of our own early 
economy." 1 This may be so, but, contrariwise, one of the ideas that has 
hindered America's success in exporting development has also hindered 
scholarly understanding of early America. This is the idea that all de-
velopment has to be measurable by the same yardstick. 
The same economic goals have been pursued in different ways, and 
"development" has meant different things to people who have pursued 
similar goals in different ways. People have pursued similar goals by 
such different means that at times they have viewed each others' behav-
ior with incomprehension .. Thus I am less sanguine than the above 
scholar who implies that recent studies of America's early economy have 
increased our understanding of our own economic development. Admit-
tedly, in the much-studied New England region, the thinking of early 
farm families has been reconstructed quite imaginatively by some schol-
ars. Several New England case studies have scrutinized barter. One of 
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them shows that central Massachusetts farm families, after bartering 
mainly among themselves for generations, began bartering more and 
more with storekeepers and thereby, like flies entering a spider's web, 
became entangled in the outside world's capitalist economy. 2 
In this book so far I have asked why so many descendants of the free-
holding, prosperous farmers of early nineteenth-century Appalachia be-
came coal miners, and also why they became poorer. Those two 
questions are connected, but how? Did the farmers become poorer be-
fore entering the mines, or did their living standard fall only after they 
became miners? This is the main question I have posed thus far, and, 
without denying the likelihood of many exceptions, I have concluded 
that Appalachian farmers who turned to wage labor generally did so 
because as full-time farmers they were growing poorer. This does not 
mean they were already impoverished but merely that their living stan-
dard was falling. They may not have sunk to a condition that they 
would have called "impoverishment," but perhaps they saw its specter 
in their future. Because the living standard they could sustain on their 
farms was falling, they felt constrained to accept wages that made pos-
sible-when combined with continued farming by other family mem-
bers if not by themselves-a living standard perhaps only slightly 
higher. 
This book is not attempting to make any assessment of an Appala-
chian character type. It is trying to identify economic opportunities 
(and constraints) as they evolved over the course of Appalachia's history. 
It is also looking for relationships and comparisons beyond Appala-
chia-for relationships that helped shape Appalachia's economic oppor-
tunities (and its constraints), and for comparisons that provide a means 
of measurement. Doing this requires evaluating economic opportunities 
and constraints through the eyes of those who experienced them. 
Why were Appalachia's people willing to work for low wages? Pri-
marily because of subsistence needs. Surely some of them, however, em-
braced wage work in an enterprising spirit. Appalachia's traditional 
subsistence-barter-and-borrow relations, based on voluntary, rather 
than contracted, reciprocity, encouraged many of the region's early 
wage workers to expect that they would receive more than merely their 
wages. Often they expected their loyal service to morally obligate their 
employers to meet whatever needs they had. labor, after all, was then 
still the most pervasive form of investment in Appalachia's economy, 
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and generally, after volunteering one's labor, one could confidently 
await return favors. 
Of course, the new wage work was not actually volunteer work, but 
Appalachian wage workers often liked to feel that they were still vol-
unteers. An early firebrick manufacturer reminiscing about eastern 
Kentucky wrote that "I cannot forget the loyal, able and efficient work-
ers I found in this district. They were not only willing to render good 
service but they proved to be the best friends I ever had .... They were 
ready to come at any hour of the night or day and spurned the offer of 
pay. We will never forget the safety we felt among these mountaineers."3 
In such an atmosphere, an enterprising spirit of investing labor may 
well have played a supplemental part in manning mines and logging 
operations-drawing some people into wage labor who were not driven 
to it. Once they were so employed, however, they probably began seeing 
their position from a new perspective. Many or most of them could not 
support their families solely on the wages timber or coal operators were 
paying. The more mature workers, especially those with families, usu-
ally had recourse to other means. Often they still held land, although 
probably over the years their land had undergone depletion and subdi-
vision. Because Appalachia's timber and mining operations were rural, 
most of the region's wage earners (even nonlandowners) had little dif-
ficulty in practicing agriculture on some scale part time. 
For such wage earners, as for full-time farmers, agriculture contin-
ued to be of the capital-poor, labor-intensive sort that benefited from 
large families. This was particularly so in Appalachia's Plateau subre-
gion (Newer Appalachia). Demographic stabilization eluded the Plateau 
partly because of its industrialization. Plateau farmers could continue 
raising the large families still demanded by their continuing subsistence 
agriculture, and, thanks to rural industries, they could hope that their 
children, when grown, could acquire wage jobs and remain close by. 
In the less-industrialized Older Appalachia, meanwhile, the avail-
ability of fewer wage jobs with which to supplement farm income 
meant that people who wished to continue living there rurally had to 
gravitate toward a more mechanized and capitalized agriculture. There 
a large family would more likely force a painful choice on the next gen-
eration-the choice either to migrate or to subdivide the land further. 
The point of mechanizing and capitalizing was to produce just as much 
output from a farm with fewer hands, and thus to need fewer children. 
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Such money investment demanded, however, a money return, so the 
agriculture of Older Appalachia perforce drew closer to the American 
norm than did the bifurcated economic life that by 1900 was common-
place on the Plateau. 4 
The Plateau's pattern of work allocation grew bifurcated to an ex-
ceptional degree, and this was not the Plateau's only economic abnor-
mality. Another exceptional circumstance followed from the Plateau's 
role as the last large frontier area in the eastern United States. The ex-
ploitation of frontier economic opportunities (through land speculation, 
for instance) had required initiative, versatility, and often a supply of 
capital. Those pioneers who achieved a level of comfort and high status 
often stayed put. In numerous Appalachian areas, many of the very ear-
liest pioneer families became leading citizens right ·where they had 
pioneered. 5 But less successful early pioneers, or their children, tended 
to move on to the next frontier to seek some new speculative bonanza. 
Meanwhile, later settlers with lower economic expectations arrived and 
expanded the enterprises already underway-people who realized that 
speculative gains were no longer likely but who were willing to accept 
a moderate subsistence in exchange for security. 6 
Such a process characterized the opening and settlement of many 
frontier regions, and in Appalachia there exists evidence of an ambitious 
and speculative mentality not only among many of the pioneers who 
pushed down the Great Appalachian Valley in the eighteenth century 
but also among many of those who scattered into the Plateau country 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Such pioneers could, at first, afford to be speculative. Nature's 
bounty provided them a relatively easy self-sufficiency. To be com-
pletely subsistence oriented would have been redundant. Even if their 
speculations failed, as often happened because markets were distant, 
they could easily maintain their underlying subsistence. 
Those who directly followed the pioneers generally found less op-
portunity to acquire riches and status. Subsistence continued secure, 
however, for this second wave of settlers. The products they traded to 
acquire merchandise and money were products they drew from their sur-
plus production. Eventually population expansion, resource depletion, 
Civil War destruction, and Civil War legislation combined to force liv-
ing standards down for most Appalachians, but even then they did not 
totally abandon agriculture-like market-excluded farmers elsewhere 
were doing by migrating to city wage jobs. Rather, wage jobs came to 
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them, especially in the Plateau subregion (Newer Appalachia). This in-
augurated Plateau Appalachia's exceptional incidence of part-time 
farming, which by the 1920s would reach mass proportions. 7 
This also defined the point at which the region's entrepreneurs ceased 
to replicate their previous pattern-their pattern of repeated migration 
in search of new speculative bonanzas. The Plateau's population boom 
in the 1870s, which by the 1880s was closing this "internal frontier" of 
the eastern United States, came at a time when no easy new frontier 
remained to be opened elsewhere, even in the West. Homestead land 
was available, of course, but by the 1880s there remained only a remote 
chance to acquire a fortune from scratch in the West. The average new-
comer without capital stood little chance of acquiring wealth in the fin-
de-siecle West. 
Yet even when all frontiers disappear, not everyone grows subsistence 
oriented. As" the Plateau frontier closed, some people stayed entrepre-
neurial. They stayed in place and continued speculating. Although 
most of the investment capital for mil)ing development came from the 
northern United States, some of Appalachia's early coal operators, and 
many of its land and mineral buyers, were drawn from among those lo-
cal people who could afford entrepreneurial risks. 8 From earlier-settled 
areas, those frontier entrepreneurs who remained unsatisfied with their 
gains had generally moved on. But as the frontier disappeared, this op-
tion lost its allure. From the Appalachian Plateau-as likewise from the 
Rocky Mountains and from the far Northwest-there remained no fur-
ther beckoning destination. In these last three frontiers of the contigu-
ous United States, trapped frontier entrepreneurs turned from 
exploiting mainly resources (and their future potential) to exploiting 
their fellows as well. As a consequence, each of these final frontiers soon 
saw class war. 9 
Such, in outline, was the early Appalachian experience. What can it 
tell us about mentality? Among the "new rural historians," a debate 
about the mentality of early America's farmers has persisted since the 
late 1970s, inspiring many case studies. James T. Lemon and others 
have claimed that early American farmers were generally enterprise ori-
ented, whereas James A. Henretta and others have contended that early 
American farmers were generally subsistence and security oriented. 10 
Unfortunately this mentality debate has been rooted in ideology. 
Louis Hartz's famous 1955 book The Liberal Tradition in America 
claimed that from about 1800 onward, virtually everyone in America 
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had "the mentality of an independent entrepreneur.'' 11 Liberal scholars 
such as James T. Lemon have agreed and have sought evidence for an 
even earlier transformation of the average American to "economic man." 
And plenty of evidence has been found-not often of any transforma-
tion to "economic man," but evidence of economic men avidly pursuing 
wealth in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America. 
One scholar, for example, has discovered acquisitive entrepreneur-
ship yielding striking success stories on the northwest Connecticut fron-
ti~r in the mid-eighteenth century. 12 Probing back further, another 
scholar has found that early "eighteenth-century economic possibilities 
released ambition" among Connecticut farmers. 13 Still another scholar 
has found evidence, in the mid- to late seventeenth century, of an ac-
quisitive and speculative spirit pervading newly settled parts of the 
Connecticut River Valley in central Massachusetts. 14 And a truly pio-
neering scholar has shown that profit-minded entrepreneurs even fi-
nanced the founding of most of the earliest Massachusetts towns. 15 
Meanwhile, on the radical side of the argument-as ammunition 
against this "acquisitive" version of early American mentality-schol-
ars have concentrated on showing that well into the nineteenth century, 
typical American farmers were preoccupied with their families' subsis-
tence and security needs, and that thus they could only have given, at 
most, secondary attention to achieving speculative gains, because such 
gains (at least under nineteenth-century conditions in the East) would 
have required speculating dangerously with the land they needed for 
subsistence. 16 
This ideologically inspired controversy between "liberal" and "radi-
cal" new rural historians has thus debated the goals pursued by early 
American farmers. If the economic goal of most early American farmers 
was merely to subsist in comfort and amity-to maintain a "compe-
tency"-then those ordinary farmers would deserve none of the credit 
that liberals wish to bestow on them: the credit for spreading capital-
ism. But by the same token, they also would deserve none of the rad-
icals' blame for spreading capitalism (blame that the radicals wish to 
place elsewhere). In dozens of case studies, members of the radical 
school have argued that almost all early American farmers were sub-
sistence oriented. The products that they marketed, so the radicals cor-
reedy point out, were drawn mostly from surpluses of what they raised 
for their own subsistence. Only after American capitalism had grown 
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highly developed, with an elaborate transportation and communication 
infrastructure, only then did most American farmers become market 
oriented and perhaps entrepreneurial-but then only because the mar-
ket had grown so pervasive that it left them no other way to maintain 
their home subsistence. 
This radical interpretation of rural American mentality has been 
challenged by the liberals, who claim that entrepreneurial attitudes pre-
dominated among American farmers from an early date-perhaps as 
early as the mid-1600s. 17 
But by thus focusing on the question of when a subsistence mentality 
gave way to a spirit of enterprise, the debate about mentality has un-
critically been mingled with an older debate about how capitalism came 
about. Confusion has resulted. Self-sufficiency and enterprise can too 
uncritically be defined as opposite orientations. Anything can be called 
opposites in the realm of mentality. In the material world, however, 
self-sufficiency and enterprise make natural companions. A secure sub-
sistence encourages enterprise. But on America's East Coast since at 
least the mid-eighteenth century, subsistence has been growing ever 
harder to achieve through agriculture. And that pattern has been rep-
licated as each successive frontier has filled with people. In mentality, 
therefore, most American farmers have grown steadily less enterpris-
ing-increasingly more preoccupied with achieving their subsistence 
needs and maintaining their family security. 
In Appalachia's early period, subsistence came easily and an entre-
preneurial attitude was common. There were no major markets close by, 
and grain in particular was hard to export from the region, but by feed-
ing grain to livestock, Appalachia's farmers managed to export large 
numbers of animals every autumn from the early 1800s until the Civil 
War. Secure in their subsistence, Appalachia's early farmers tended to 
be actively acquisitive. 
After the Civil War, when a subsistence crisis began threatening the 
Plateau subregion, market relations continued to expand even there-
but that expansion wa5 driven less by acquisitiveness than by subsis-
tence needs. 
In early settled parts of the region-particularly in the Great Ap-
palachian Valley, which stretches from northern Virginia to northern 
Alabama-population growth had drastically slowed by the postbellum 
period (see table 1), and most farms there remained large enough to 
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satisfy farm families' rising money requirements through increased cash 
cropping. In the Plateau subregion, by contrast, population expanded 
286 percent from 1840 to 1880, and from 1850 to 1880 the size of the 
average farm shrank by more than half. 18 Many Plateau farm families 
began facing a stark choice between wage work and migration-and 
they tended to choose wage work, meanwhile continuing to farm 
part time. 
Throughout this sequence, basic economic goals tended gradually to 
shift from acquisition toward subsistence because opportunities for ac-
quisition were growing less enticing and home subsistence needs more 
demanding. Goals changed in response to conditions. And conditions 
were deteriorating partly because farming practices remained un-
changed. One farm specialist speaks accurately of "the Southern Ap-
palachians where agriculture had changed little since pioneer times." 19 
Such absence of behavioral change contributed to the region's problems. 
To date, most of the new rural historians have studied New England 
or the mid-Atlantic region. But because Appalachia's capitalist era be-
gan much more recently than capitalism's rise in the East, perhaps ex-
amining Appalachia's economic data and probing its people's mentality 
might help to settle the new rural history debate. Weighing the com-
mitment of rural people to long-term family security is difficult. James 
A. Henretta, a radical, admits that economic gain was important to 
farmers even though their dominant goal was usually to maintain sub-
sistence and security. 20 Similarly, James T. Lemon, a liberal, does not 
deny that Pennsylvania's early farmers sought material success in order 
to benefit their families as well as benefiting themselves as 
individuals. 21 And another liberal, Stephen Innes, admits that a "mar-
ket orientation did not connote a fully competitive, maximizing ethic. 
Free men and women in early America did 'accumulate,' but they did 
not 'maximize,' particularly at the expense of their neighbors."22 
Thus, to study the strength of economic "familism" versus individual 
(or nuclear family) acquisitiveness will require studying situations in 
which family goals were incompatible with acquisitive goals-
situations in which people had to choose between them. Such a choice 
has faced thousands of Appalachian people, and many or most have 
chosen family goals over individual (or nuclear family) economic gain. 
They have chosen to remain in the vicinity of their parents and sib-
lings-thereby gaining economic security through their loyalty to their 
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family. Only when economic opportunities outside the region became 
so massive that individuals and nuclear families could migrate as part of 
extended family units, only then (during World War II) did truly mass 
migration of native-born whites begin from twentieth-century 
Appalachia. 23 
The mentalite debate between liberals and radicals has thus far not 
proven very enlightening on its own terms. Something striking about 
the debate, however, is that the examples used to illustrate widespread 
enterprise or acquisitiveness usually date from the very early phase of a 
region's settlement, whereas the evidence presented to prove a subsis-
tence or family-security orientation generally dates from later periods 
when settlement has grown relatively thick. This accords with a sce-
nario in which an early profusion of entrepreneurial thinking was fol-
lowed by a fall in the proportion of the population that could afford the 
luxury of entrepreneurial risks. 
Chapter 1 documented widespread enterprise among early Appala-
chian pioneers whose subsistence base was plentiful. As the bulk of the 
region's people found themselves having to work harder and harder sim-
ply to maintain their basic subsistence, the spirit of enterprise grew in-
creasingly restricted to the region's land-rich elite. 
After the Civil War it was not so much enterprise as subsistence 
needs that brought poorer Appalachians into the timber camps and the 
mines. And the same applies to those mountaineers who migrated to 
Piedmont textile jobs (who, according to one source, numbered about 
750,000 by 1922). 24 A 1927 study of Piedmont textile workers reports 
that "great droves of help from the mountains {were} brought down by 
the labor scouts from the mills during the. temporary shortage of labor 
in the first decade of the twentieth century." Those textile-mill recruits 
were relatively enterprising, but the 1927 study found that they "were 
almost invariably doomed to discontent and homesickness. Many of 
them returned to the mountains." 
In contrast to these enterprising recruits, says the 1927 study, were 
other mountaineers "on whose shoulders fortune had laid a heavy 
hand." Such hard-pressed mountaineers had "been steadily migrating 
since the early mills to the present [1927}." Unlike the eager workers 
who were actively recruited but who often returned home, these people 
who left the mountains through necessity left them "with mingled emo-
tions," yet these hard-pressed mountaineers tended to stay permanently 
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at the mills. 25 Evidently they possessed no adequate economic niche to 
which to return in the mountains. 
I think this textile-migration example can help sift substance from 
ideology in the mentalite debate. The liberals and the radicals have ap-
parently fallen foul of each other through a shared misconception. 
Those who study the early history of a given region usually report an 
enterprising spirit among the general run of early settlers, whereas 
· those who study conditions in the same region later usually find the 
mass of inhabitants unambitious. Each camp can document its find-
ings. Their disagreement seems to stem from a faulty model that both 
camps use to interpret their data. The students of early settlement ap-
parently assume that any society that is already entrepreneurial by, say, 
1680 will automatically become much more entrepreneurial by 1860-
whereas those who actually conduct research about the same locality in 
1860 evidently assume that the subsistence orientation that they find 
dominant in 1860 must consequently have been all the more pervasive 
earlier, especially way back in 1680. 
An observer of this scholarly debate might wonder if dialectical 
thinking died out with Marx. Believing that most Americans now ex-
hibit an enterprising mentality, which they do not, scholars have been 
probing the American past to determine when the American psyche 
metamorphosed and from what sort of cocoon today's presumed entre-
preneurism emerged. 
America has admittedly undergone a transition to capitalist eco-
nomic relations since white settlement began, and especially since the 
Civil War. But does a transition to capitalism actually evoke more en-
terprise from most people? This seems unlikely if we define the capi-
talist transition as a process of land, tools, machinery, and other factors 
of production becoming the property of people who do not directly 
work them. Rather, the proportion of people who feel entrepreneurial 
would be more likely to decrease when a decreasing proportion of the 
population can use its own land, tools, and machinery to supply mar-
kets-and when an increasing proportion of the population must thus 
forego the profits of enterprise. 
Those who saw a connection between self-ownership (or its future 
likeliness) and a spirit of enterprise included Abraham Lincoln. In 1861 
Lincoln set forth an economic ideal of "men with their families-wives, 
sons, and daughters-work[ing] for themselves, on their farms, in 
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their houses, and in their shops taking the whole product to them-
selves." Lincoln argued that "many independent men, everywhere in 
these States, a few years back in their lives, were hired laborers. The 
prudent, penniless beginner in the world labors for wages awhile, saves 
a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his 
own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to 
help him. This is the just and generous and prosperous system which 
opens the way to all-gives hope to all, and consequent energy and 
progress and improvement of condition to all. "26 Lincoln went so far as 
to imply that capital should be denied legal equality with labor. "La-
bor," he said, "is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only 
the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first 
existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher 
consideration.''27 
An extreme instance of expanding self-ownership of land, tools, and 
profits occurred in the eighteenth century when tens of thousands of 
rent-racked flax-and-linen producers left tiny leaseholds in Northern 
Ireland, sailed for the middle colonies of British America, and poured 
down the spacious and bountiful Great Appalachian Valley. How so 
many heirs of those enterprising independent producers eventually grew 
entangled in a web of dependency while the heirs of other enterprising 
independent producers managed to escape that fate (as in the case of 
midwestern farmers) is a question this book is trying to answer. 
In Appalachia's preindustrial era, enterprise was exerted more often 
within subsistence-barter-and-borrow economic systems than within the 
capitalist system. This distinction is crucial. Despite Appalachia's con-
siderable market activity, not enough money circulated in the region for 
most of its economic transactions, or even most of its market transac-
tions, to involve money. Instead, assets were generally held in less-
liquid forms-in land primarily, in slaves to some extent, in productive 
durables such as tools, in consumption items stored for future use or 
barter, and in an ubiquitous money-of-account that reflected the eco-
nomic status of every individual, household, and family group vis-a-vis 
every other individual, household, and family group with whom it ex-
changed labor or goods. 28 
Within such subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems no less than 
within the capitalist system, conditions were sometimes favorable for ac-
quiring profits (albeit limited), and at other times, by contraSt, condi-
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tions threatened the basic components of subsistence. When a profit 
seemed in the offing, enterprise tended to manifest, but any threat to 
subsistence naturally demanded priority. Thus not everyone involved in 
subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems was subsistence oriented, and, 
contrariwise, not everyone involved in the capitalist system was enter-
prise oriented. 
Between the two systems, values differed profoundly-for values are 
evaluations of behavior. Enterprise could enhance profit and status 
within either system, but enterprise required different behavior between 
the two systems (as also did subsistence-aimed efforts), and thus the 
mingling of the two systems entailed clashing evaluations of behavior. 
The same goal could be pursued within either economic system, but the 
means of pursuing it differed. Exchanges in which money was involved 
often proved incompatible with transactions void of money. It was hard 
to acquire very much money without violating some of the behavior 
evaluations that perpetuated subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems. 
As David F. Weiman puts it, "Market integration ... required there-
placement of kin and communal bonds with contractual relations based 
solely on the exchange of private property. This transformation often 
sparked intense social . . . struggles over . . . even the nature of the 
obligations between parents and their children."29 Such dilemmas have 
troubled many a mountaineer. 
Subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems perforce operated wherever 
money was scarce. Within those systems, labor power (plus land on 
which to use it) constituted the primary form of wealth. To acquire la-
bor power, one propagated children, adopted children, or bought or 
leased slaves. However, as agriculturally productive land grew scarcer, 
and as money increasingly entered Appalachia from outside the region, 
labor was bartered less and was increasingly hired. Labor continued 
abundant, but because much of it was now paid for by outside money-
or by food and other merchandise imported to company stores-less of 
the wealth that it produced stayed in the local area or in the region. Had 
agriculturally productive land been as expandable as the labor supply, 
wage labor need never have grown common in Appalachia. The increas-
ing paucity of available land forced labor to leave self-employment and 
enter the market. Because labor entered the market in abundance, it 
could command only a low wage. Labor still produced wealth, but no 
longer primarily for the labOrer or his family. 
Subsistence-Barter-and-Borrow 53 
In West Virginia's Kanawha County, many miners who farmed part 
time were still living quite well as of 1896. A touring organizer for the 
United Mine Workers reported that "there does not exist the hunger 
and suffering here that is found in (other coal fields] .... Every spot 
of ground seems to have received attention from the plow or spade, the 
houses resemble the homes of the market gardener. . . . This explains 
their comparatively comfortable position. They raise all the vegetables 
that they require and this assures them that the wolf shall be kept from 
the door.'' 30 
Employers could obtain the services of these part-time farmers 
cheaply because even a low wage enabled they and their families to live 
better than they would have lived without it. When we heed the econ-
omist W. Arthur Lewis, however, we also see that because the moun-
taineers who remained full-time farmers were generally growing poorer, 
those who became miners were likewise destined to grow poorer. 31 The 
level of wages for which they were willing to work was essentially es-
tablished by the living standard that they could have sustained had they 
stayed on farms and not resorted to wage labor. That mental calculation 
on their part was what placed West Virginia's average miner's income at 
$451 a year in 1900, when that state's average income from farming 
was $150. 32 
As farmers entered the mines, they may or may not have reflected 
about their newly increased dependence on outside forces beyond 
their control. Many of them viewed mining as merely a temporary ex-
pedient-as a way station in their own progression (their "economic 
development," as they perhaps viewed it) toward a secure landed pro-
prietorship that they would eventually be able to sustain without wage 
labor. As late as 1932, when Homer Morris interviewed 956 unem-
ployed miners in Kentucky and West Virginia, 48 percent said they 
wanted to return to farming. Only 11 percent said that they wished to 
return to mining. 33 
Many such farmer-miners were calculating within different economic 
systems than the system of their employers-and eventually their em-
ployers' system prevailed. This resulted, however, not only because of a 
ruthlessness undeniably inherent in capitalism but also because a self-
defeating factor lurked in Appalachia's subsistence-barter-and-borrow 
systems. Subsistence agriculture's inherent labor intensivity inspired the 
begetting of more children than ultimately there could be land for. 
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Land acquisitions by coal and timber companies admittedly hastened 
the decline of Appalachia's internal economy, but basically the region 
grew economically subsumed because there was not enough land to pro-
vide subsistence for all. the adults whose labor on the land had earlier 
been useful when they were children-and who in turn parented more 
children who could likewise help to work the land but to whom even 
less ·land could later be provided when they in turn reached adult-
hood. 34 In Newer Appalachia the custom of partible inheritance, which 
divided land among all heirs, continued a rapid subdivision of land-
holdings until about the turn of the twentieth century. 
Meanwhile, however, many people in the 1880-1930 era still did 
hold enough land to virtually ignore the money system. These full-time 
subsistence farmers practiced systems of economic relations based inside 
the region-based, indeed, in their own local neighborhoods-and 
their systems could operate more or less autonomously so long as the 
total landholdings among the participants continued to remain ade-
quate to support competencies. Their systems were characterized by an 
incessant borrowing and bartering of both objects and labor. To par-
ticipate usually required a small amount of money, but the money re-
quirement was not onerous. Lacking money raised only a minor obstacle 
to participation in these systems, and that is what made them largely 
autonomous vis-a-vis the outside world. As noted above, in eastern 
Kentucky as of 1880, well before major industrialization began there, 
the average farm held only $23.71 worth of farm implements or 
machinery. 35 Even this scale of investment often proved unnecessary for 
heirs. And afterward, just a few dollars annually could suffice for taxes 
and for miscellaneous expenses that circumstances required in money 
form. (Fig. 1 diagrams such a system and its relationship to the money 
system.) 
The only serious obstacle-serious especially for young people ap-
proaching adulthood-was that these subsistence-barter-and-borrow 
systems required the use of enough land to support competencies. But 
given adequate land (which grew more problematical for each new gen-
eration), Appalachian families practicing subsistence farming full time 
could stay virtually autonomous vis-a-vis economic forces beyond their 
localities. 
Not that Appalachia's full-time subsistence farmers were self-
sufficient as separate family households. They rarely were. The typical 
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age earnings used to buy 
tools, farm implements, and 
other productive durables--
plus a few consumer items, 
such as salt. 
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family household used more tools and equipment than it personally 
owned and had access to more animals and produce than it personally 
raised. It combined a degree of literal self-sufficiency with a prodigious 
amount of barter and borrowing of both objects and labor. The barter 
and borrowing did not occur with equal frequency between all residents 
of a locality but flourished instead primarily within what Appalachian 
sociologists call "family groups." 
Folklore can tell us much about the nonmonetized economic ex-
changes of traditional Appalachia. The region's gossip networks are 
well known. The unspoken assumption is that everyone will offer the 
neighbors some account of his or her material life. An economic func-
tion lurking in this "snoopiness" (or friendliness) is revealed by the eco-
nomic proposals that often follow on the heels of prying questions. If 
questioning reveals that a useful implement is lying idle, the questioner 
might ask to borrow it-and might also hint that help would be ap-
preciated in using it. It is understood that the borrower will later lend 
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something in return, or volunteer labor when it might prove useful, or 
perhaps contribute goods at some mutually convenient time. Whereas 
a mainly subsistence farm family might contribute mostly labor within 
these systems, a primarily commercial farm family might more readily 
lend out equipment. 
In barter relations, no double standard of prices generally exists be-
tween "use value" and "exchange value." The fact that an object can be 
useful to one's neighbors does not generally lower the price for which 
one is likely to exchange it. When barter occurs between neighbors, 
prices are generally no lower than market prices. What does occur, 
however, is that the forms and the timespans of acceptable payment are 
stretched. 
The workings of subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems are not ob-
scure to the people who operate them, but they are hard to compare 
with money transactions. Money is clearly the most universal and most 
transportable asset to possess, but these attributes often hold limited 
appeal for people who plan to stay where they are and who share with 
their fellow "locals" a very specific environment worked with specific 
implements. Further, any generalizations about wealth or poverty based 
on annual per capita income-even if income "in kind" is included-
reflect urban assumptions about what constitutes a standard of living. 
If comparisons are to be made, we need a formula that not only adds in 
a dollar figure for income acquired "in kind" (including home products) 
but also adds in the income that is not needed-because borrowing has 
performed its function. Pervasive borrowing not only reduces the need 
for money income but also reduces the need for home production and 
bartering. All other things being equal, frequent acts of borrowing 
tended to enhance a family's living standard. 36 
Within a subsistence-barter-and-borrow system, several or more 
households have access to every tool or implement possessed by any one 
of them. Consumption goods are borrowed and replaced as convenient, 
but larger savings can be achieved by borrowing productive goods such 
as tools and implements. Such productive goods are still borrowed and 
reborrowed (as well as being traded and retraded) throughout the Ap-
palachian region. 37 Lending out a possession can be thought of as a 
form of leasing in exchange for a return favor, implied if not explicit. In 
money-system terms, we could call this a way of selling objects piece-
meal to other people who, through their return favors, share in paying 
' 
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amortized attrition costs that otherwise might prove too expensive for 
the objects' nominal owners. 
Of course, money too circulates at a certain rate, but this does not 
create advantages for subsistence farm families equal to what they gain 
from the circulation of useful objects. Money is not of direct use to a 
farmer (as farmer) while he or she holds it. A tool or a plow, besides its 
exchange value, has direct productive value. Appalachia's full-time 
subsistence farm families, having little need for an asset as liquid as 
money, have held productive goods that they have kept surprisingly liq-
uid though frequent barter and borrowing. 
But are Appalachia's subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems truly 
systems? They are not completely self-contained systems (as fig. 1 il-
lustrates), but they can enjoy considerable autonomy. All known sys-
tems overlap with other systems in some way. The capitalist system 
managed to expand so successfully partly because it received low-
wage labor, supplied to it far below cost by subsistence-barter-and-
borrow systems. 
And, conversely, in two crucial respects Appalachia's subsistence-
barter-and-borrow systems depend on the market system. First of all, 
the barter aspect of Appalachia's internal systems depend on the market 
to provide price levels. As Karl Polanyi points out, "Unless [a market} 
pattern is present, at least in patches, the propensity to barter will find 
insufficient scope: it cannot produce prices .... The principle of barter 
depends for its effectiveness on the market pattern."38 Secondly, Appa-
lachia's subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems depend on the market 
for a relatively small but crucially important input of money itself-
money with which storekeepers, if not subsistence farmers directly, can 
buy productive goods and consumer items that are locally used but are 
not locally produced. 
Disappointingly, voluntary reciprocity in Appalachian life has not 
yet been studied from an economic perspective. One of Appalachia's 
best social histories, Mountain Families in Transition, does lucidly reveal 
the social implications of continuous barter and borrowing, 39 but in 
making economic calculations, that book, like others, merely supple-
ments monetized income with the money equivalent of a farm's subsis-
tence in-kind production. 40 The fact is, however, that money and 
money equivalents cannot accurately measure economic value in a 
money-poor but barter-and-borrowing-rich environment. Barter 
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heightens liquidity, and borrowing reduces the amount of income 
needed in any form. Until a method is devised that will render 
subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems quantitatively comparable to the 
money system, we possess little ability to estimate the real income, even 
today, of a region like Appalachia. 41 Without a method of quantifying, 
we can make ethnographic comparisons aplenty, but we cannot make 
accurate economic comparisons between low-money systems and high-
money systems. And therefore social scientists will perhaps continue 
puzzling over the supposedly "senseless"42 (or to their partisans, "self-
less") attributes of Appalachian behavior. And scholars will perhaps 
continue confusing ways of life with standards of living. 
Today we might smile at a turn-of-the-century mining engineer's 
statement that Appalachian mountaineers ~ere "supremely unconscious 
of their own misery."43 But how would we evaluate the 1940 declaration 
by a socialist economist that "extreme poverty comparable to that of the 
poorest sharecropper, is all that the 'self-sufficing' farm can provide"?44 
No less a thinker than Rupert Vance has confused ways of life with 
standards of living. Writing in 1962, Vance noted that the New Deal's 
"standards made at least half the population in certain Appalachian ar-
eas eligible for relief" and that this "introduced the people to the money 
economy arid increased their wants. The depression, then," he went on, 
"actually served to raise standards for many families in the region who 
had lacked contact with the American standard of living." Vance has-
tened to add that the Depression "left the region with a high rate of 
relief and a low basis for economic security," but he let stand his equa-
tion of "the American standard of living" with a raised standard and not 
merely with "the money economy."45 
Equally inadequate seems a more recent judgment by Jack Temple 
Kirby. By 1960, Kirby tells us, "millions of acres of [Appalachian] land 
were abandoned. The shabby remains of semisubsistence life on remote 
family farms were abandoned, too, or mercifully executed at last by the 
manifold outside forces of the commercial world, its demands of effi-
ciency and specialization, and the cash nexus." Kirby does not tell us 
what should have replaced that "semisubsistence life on remote family 
farms." He questions the viability of an alternative that hundreds of 
thousands of mountaineers tried: "Tantalizing hopes of stable work in 
industries old and new were dimmed, if not dashed, by the vagaries of 
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the world marketplace."46 In view of this, it seems worthwhile to ex-
plore ways of reviving and upgrading "semisubsistence life on remote 
family farms." 
Appalachia's economic problems have not basically been caused by 
the region's familism or by its subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems. 
These were rational expedients under the prevailing conditions, and 
they would have been as consistent with small families as they were with 
large families. Likewise, they would have been as consistent with con-
structive farming practices as they were with destructive ones. In and of 
themselves they did not cause Appalachia's economic problems. 
The vast scale of money's penetration into Appalachian farming ar-
eas, during and since the New Deal, has weakened but not obliterated 
the region's subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems. Today many moun-
taineers look primarily to corporate employers or to the government for 
their sustenance. This has had many social and cultural consequences-
and those kinds of consequences have already been delineated by others. 
Much insight has already been gained from social and cultural perspec-
tives about the decline of traditional life. 47 My point in this chapter is 
that Appalachia's traditional life was perpetuated not so much by a 
"family system" or by a "community system" as it was by a certain type 
of economic system, and I have tried to set forth in economic terms the 
reasons for that system's decline. The decline of voluntary reciprocity in 
rural Appalachia can obviously be described in social and cultural 
terms as well as in economic terms, but only an economic analysis can 
explain why voluntary reciprocity has waned. 
4 
Labor-intensive Mining and 
the Subsistence Reproduction 
of Labor Power, 1880-1930 
(Although) we are rich in energy, rich in industry, rich in perseverance, 
rich in stout hearts and brawny arms, we are poor in money. 
-David P. Brown, quoted in Grace Palladino, 
"The Poor Man's Fight" 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, several colonial coun-
tries in various parts of the world experienced phenomenal population 
growth. One explanation now advanced for this is that an increased out-
put was required from the inhabitants of those countries if they wished 
to maintain their previous living standards. Often, production for ex-
port was added to the already extant production for subsistence and in-
ternal trade-inspiring many local people to increase the size of their 
families to keep up with their enlarged workloads. 
In rural eighteenth-century Northern Ireland, for example, children 
were set to spinning linen from flax as early as age four or five. 1 Sim-
ilarly, in nineteenth-century Java (another scene, like Northern Ireland, 
of a population "explosion"), children could become net rice produc-
ers-producing more rice than they consumed-as early as age seven. 2 
If a typical family could live better by having more children, need we 
look further to explain a population explosion? 
During the industrialization of Plateau Appalachia a similar situa-
tion prevailed. The Plateau's rapid natural population increase between 
1880 and 1930 shared common features with both Northern Ireland 
and Java. Part of the work of Plateau Appalachia's children occurred in 
export-oriented activities (like Northern Ireland's flax-spinning child 
labor). Appalachia's export-oriented child labor took place largely in 
and around its coal mines, and it flourished into the 1920s. 3 Mainly, 
however; Plateau Appalachia's children paid their way (thereby prompt-
ing their parents to raise more children) with work in the subsistence 
sector-like the work of Java's children. Crandall Shifflett mentions 
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that "as early as five or six years of age, boys and girls began to help 
out" on Appalachia's farms. 4 
The analogy between Appalachia and Java has its limits. Java's 
Dutch-imposed nineteenth-century "culture system" required forced 
(unpaid) labor in that island's export sector as a percentage of all adult 
labor. Children were exempt from the labor-force calculations that de-
termined each village's quota of export crops, so children came to rep-
resent a larger economic asset to their parents than purely market 
conditions would have made them. By contrast, the coal-mining indus-
try of Appalachia, like the flax-and-linen business of Northern Ireland, 
required labor in amounts determined directly by market conditions. 
The point to note is that large families were not rendered economically 
obsolete in Appalachia by the onset of industrialization. Large families 
had helped to hasten the region's industrialization, but in turn indus-
trialization helped to perpetuate large families. 
The phrase "subsistence reproduction of labor power" refers to raising 
children on home-grown food and other supplies-a pattern that not 
only pervaded Appalachia's farm areas but also contributed to main-
taining families in coal camps. Large gardens abounded, and livestock 
was pervasive not only where miners owned their own homesteads but 
also in many company towns. As late as 1924, by one conservative es-
timate, more than 50 percent of West Virginia's miners raised gardens 
as well as kept cows, hogs, or poultry. A better-researched 1923 report 
found that in West Virginia's Raleigh County, more than 70 percent of 
the miners planted gardens and kept livestock of some sort. Black and 
immigrant miners maintained agricultural activities as well as native 
white miners. Many coal companies presented annual cash or in-kind 
awards to the miners who were judged to have the most productive and 
attractive gardens. A northeastern West Virginia coal company re-
minded its miners in 1918 that in each of its coal towns "the first prize 
is three month's free house re_nt, the second prize is two month's free 
house rent, and the third prize is one month's free house rent."5 
A pattern of development subsidized by subsistence labor reproduc-
tion was prefigured as early as the 1860s by at least one entrepreneur-
a Kanawha County, West Virginia, developer who wrote: 
During a series of topographical and geological surveys on the Elk and Coal 
Rivers, my attention was called to numerous spots that I conceived would make 
62 Appalachia's Path to Dependency 
beautiful farms. Gentle slopes, flat-top ridges, and level dells were frequently 
met with. . . . Being interested in the resources of Kanawha, and having in 
view one of its fundamental principles of development-population-I deter-
mined to try an experiment .... I selected a spot .... As an inducement to 
my first pioneer tenant, I offered to let him have fifty acres, rent free, for five 
years, and after he had got his log-house built, fields enclosed, and road cut for 
a way out, he should have a lease for twenty-one years at thirty dollars a year 
rent. I soon found a tenant and thus far I can report the experiment eminently 
successful. . . . This small trial shows very conclusively that if immigration is 
judiciously encouraged, and land-owners induced to be more liberal in their 
concessions to the industrious laboring classes, thousands of acres of our back 
forest lands may be brought into a profitable state of cultivation, thus . . . in-
creasing our population. . . . 
Many persons will be inclined to remark: "This is all very well in theory, 
but in practice will it pay?" Now let us see. These lands, on an average, can be 
purchased for less than four dollars per acre . . . 6 
The writer proceeded to show that the plan would pay quite well, 
even if the entrepreneur had to borrow money to buy the land which 
would then be leased to settlers. There was also the consideration that 
because this was coal-bearing land, the new settlers would be fulfilling 
"one of its fundamental principles of development-population." Al-
though this entrepreneur did not explicitly predict that tenant-settlers 
would be forced to supplement their farming with wage labor, none-
theless the small size of the first tract he leased out (fifty acres) virtually 
assured that the leaseholder would indeed be forced toward wage labor. 
This forward-looking entrepreneur of the 1860s proved prescient. 
Combining subsistence agriculture with industrial wage labor made 
Appalachian Plateau enterprises boom for more than a generation-
from 1880 to 1920-and benefits accrued to workers as well as to op-
erators and owners. Nor was the government blind to the benefits 
derived from such dual employment. Mter 1914's Smith-Lever Act, the 
federal government began to encourage agriculture among miners. One 
authority records that in Plateau West Virginia, "Mingo county, almost 
entirely dependent on coal mining, was one of the early counties to raise 
local funds and request a county agent .... He and other agents who 
followed him in Mingo and other counties in the coal fields, helped in-
crease production through better gardens, a few milk cows and goats, 
pigs, and chickens. . . . The county agents found the mine superin-
tendents generally anxious and appreciative of their services."7 
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During and after World War I, the average value of gardens was es-
timated in several of West Virginia's coal towns and ranged between 10 
and 20 percent of the average miner's wages, even during the high-wage 
period of 1917-1920. 8 Livestock added further in-kind income. In 1918 
a trade journal of the coal industry surmised that in northern West Vir-
ginia "the growing of gardens . . . probably helps to account for the 
rapid strides made by the region in the production department."9 
Throughout the 1880-1920 period, the Plateau subregion not only 
attracted migrants but also maintained a high rate of population in-
crease through large families. Such population growth without indus-
trialization would have fostered "surplus population" in Malthus's 
sense, but, as long as boom conditions prevailed, all seemed well. It 
was only during the cutthroat coal competition of the 1920s that most 
miners and their families began facing poverty, and it was only after 
the Great Crash of 1929 that policy makers began viewing a large 
portion of Appalachia's population as "surplus." Plateau Appalachia, 
with its symbiosis of subsistence farming and rural industrialization, 
maintained into its post-1880 boom decades, and through them, a 
faster natural increase of population than any other section of the United 
States. As of 1920 the average American mother who was married to a 
miner had given birth to 4. 3 children-an average higher than among 
mothers married to men in any other occupation. Mothers married to 
farmers followed second in the occupational scale with an average of 
3.8 births. 10 
Counties that lay very few miles apart could be worlds apart demo-
graphically if they lay on opposite sides of the Allegheny Front that di-
vides Valley Appalachia from Plateau Appalachia. Valley Appalachia's 
demographic stability is reflected, for example, in West Virginia's Mon-
roe County-although it lies barely southeast of the Allegheny Front. 
Settlement began here about 1760. By 1800 Monroe County held 
4, 188 people, and by 1860 it held 10,75 7. From 1880 to 1930, the 
county's average farm size declined only from 192 acres to 122 acres. 
No industrialization occurred here, and the year 1920's population of 
13,141 has not wavered much since. 11 A recent study by historian Bar-
bara Rasmussen compares Monroe County with West Virginia's Clay 
County, which lies only fifty miles to the northwest but is located in the 
Plateau subregion (Newer Appalachia). Here recorded settlement did not 
begin until about 1809, and as late as 1860 Clay County's population 
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had only reached 1, 787. Then, however, it surged upward. Although 
coal mining remained insignificant in Clay County until the 1890s, the 
county's population grew 22.9 percent in the 1860s, 57.6 percent in 
the 1870s, and 34.6 percent in the 1880s, before climbing 77 percent 
in the 1890s. After that, populationgrowth slowed but did not cease. 12 
Such a rapid increase of population before and during Plateau Ap-
palachia's industrialization helps to explain why so many of that sub-
region's people must now either live on transfer payments or migrate 
elsewhere. With myriad subsistence farms, Plateau Appalachia in par-
ticular (and Valley Appalachia to a lesser degree) constituted an eco-
nomic staging area that raised hundreds of thousands of future wage 
earners largely outside the money economy, and, in the same manner, 
supported hundreds of thousands of worn-out workers until they died. 13 
When we ask how Appalachia was economically transformed, we are 
asking how control of its resources was transferred from the nonindus-
trial economic sector to the industrial sector. In other words, we are 
asking how capital has been created within the region. A key means of 
this resource transfer, this capital accumulation, occurred through the 
movement of labor power from the nonindustrial to the industrial sec-
tor. And making possible this redirection of labor allocation was sub-
sistence farming. In the already quoted words of a Canadian scholar, 
"On the periphery of capitalist development, [capital accumulation} is 
highly dependent on the existence of subsistence production in agricul-
ture. The existence of subsistence production serves a variety of func-
tions, but its primary importance for the capitalist sector is in 
supplying and maintaining a labour force at prices which permit capital 
accumulation in this sector." 14 Although Appalachian workers gener-
ally made their contribution to capital accumulation within their own 
region, most of the resultant capital was accumulated in the North. 
Anyone who visited purely agricultural sections of Appalachia dur-
ing the twentieth century's first three decades would have found the re-
gion's preindustrial way of life apparently in full swing. Many men in 
their prime years, however, would have been absent, for they were 
"working out," generally at mining or logging. Women in their prime 
years were often running the home and looking after elders as well as 
raising children. 15 
The full implications of such "working out" lifeways have only 
gradually been explored by economists. After World War II, the 
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Dutch economist J. H. Boeke put forward the idea that many colonial 
countries contained two separate socioeconomic systems. On one hand 
was a capitalist, modernizing sector whose partiCipants embraced 
Western values; on the other hand a precapitalist sector continued to 
pursue traditional goals and maintain traditional values. 16 A well-
known application of this model to Appalachia is Jack Weller's book 
Yesterday's People. 
A number of Third World economists based case studies on Boeke's 
concept of a "dual economy," but for others it did not sit right. Critics 
of the theory could easily demonstrate that economic behavior within 
the traditional sectors was often profoundly changed if a capitalist sector 
existed in the same country, or even in a neighboring country. Thus, 
where Boeke had seen only "pockets" of market-oriented activity, his 
critics could often document that remote, tradition-oriented villagers 
were producing commodities for those markets or were traveling to the 
markets to sell their labor. Those people were practicing dual employ-
ment, just as many Appalachian people were doing. 
Writing in 1960, Jonathan Levin modified Boeke's thesis, redia-
graming the dual economy as not modern versus traditional but as ex-
port versus domestic. Levin argued that domestic (traditional) sectors 
are not "backward" per se, but that they become backward if the new 
capitalist sectors are based mainly on exports and if export earnings are 
not brought back and reinvested in the domestic economic sectors. 17 
This line of reasoning prompted a Latin American specialist named 
Andre Gunder Frank to talk of "the development of underdevelop-
ment." Frank thesis was that the capitalist development of a center (or 
core) will automatically foster the underdevelopment of its economic 
hinterland or periphery. He suggested that the process of "primary cap-
italist accumulation" has historically been dependent on the" 'noncap-
italist' work of family members or others {that helps to} support the 
wage earner" by providing one or more of the "vital processes that are 
necessary for the continued supply of labor power to capital." 18 
'As in many Third Wodd colonies, .subsistence-style child rearing 
and aging continued in Appalachian long after many of Appalachia's 
rural breadwinners were employed, at least occasionally if not perma-
nently, away from their home farms. In other words, many people found 
that during their prime work years they had to deny some or all of their 
labor to the agriculture that had not only succored they themselves but 
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that still was largely supporting their spouses, children, and elders. 
The writings of Jonathan Levin and Andre Gunder Frank explain how 
this "subsistence reproduction of labor power" underwrites low-wage, 
labor-intensive production methods, and how it prompts employers to 
sweat workers destructively in their prime years, leaving them physical 
wrecks to be later sustained by subsistence agriculture back at their 
home locations. 19 
Some 1910 and 1920 figures will help to suggest the extent of Ap-
palachia's reproduction of labor power at that time relative to its extent 
in the United States as a whole. According to the 1910 census, only 
43.9 percent of the total U.S. population, urban as well as rural, was 
then aged twenty or under. But in 1910 in Older Appalachia (the Valley 
subregion), 48.3 percent of the total population was aged twenty or 
less. And in Newer Appalachia (the Plateau subregion), 53.2 percent of 
the total population was aged twenty or under. 
Ten years later, in 1920, only 42.4 percent of the total U.S. popu-
lation was aged twenty or under. In Older Appalachia, meanwhile, the 
proportion had risen slightly: 49.9 percent were now aged twenty or 
under. And the 1920 figure for Newer Appalachia was still a very high 
53. 1 percent of the population aged twenty or younger. 20 
In other words, Appalachia's adults were parenting far more children 
than were most American adults. For every 1,000 U.S. adults in 1910 
there were 783 children aged twenty or under-but for every 1,000 
adults on the Appalachian Plateau there were 1, 13 7 children. By 1920 
the U.S. proportion had fallen to 736 children per 1,000 adults, but 
the Appalachian Plateau proportion had hardly fallen, standing at 
1,132 children per 1,000 adults. 
These figures reflect, of course, the reproduction of labor power re-
gardless of how that was accomplished-whether by subsistence farm-
ing or otherwise. Indeed, most of the rural United States in the 1880-
1900 period was still reproducing labor power largely through home 
production rather than through money purchases. Part of the higher 
percentage of children in Appalachia was a result of the larger propor-
tion there of rural population. But another factor was that in Appala-
chia, farming was less capital intensive than it was elsewhere in the 
United States. Subsistence farming, lacking access to investment cap-
ital, was inherently labor intensive and, by that token, tended to foster 
a demographic tableau skewed toward youth. A major exception to such 
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demographic skewing as a result of subsistence farming was Japan from 
the 1720s to the 1860s, but we have already noted the grueling labor 
that small family sizes required from Japan's subsistence farmers. 
The special characteristics of the Plateau economy tipped the age 
"imbalance" furthest there. Outside Appalachia, and particularly out-
side Plateau Appalachia, the rural United States tended to export a large 
percentage of its matured youth. As migrants with no further economic 
ties to their subsistence background, these workers then generally had 
to be paid a fully family-supporting wage. Rural Appalachia, by con-
trast, kept (until about 1942) a far higher percentage of its matured 
youth than the rural areas of other regions. It kept them not so much as 
full-time farmers than as wage workers who, together with their fam-
ilies, supplemented their meager paychecks with subsistence agricul-
ture. Although the farm population of Appalachia grew only 5 percent 
between 1900 and 1930, the region's rural but nonfarm population rose 
more than 75 percent, and most of these rural nonfarm people kept one 
foot in supsistence agriculture despite not qualifying as farm house-
holds by the census definition. 21 
Because labor-intensive farming prompted the raising of large fam-
ilies, Appalachia provided America's industrial sector with more than 
· its share of workers. And by subsidizing these workers with home pro-
duction, it subsidized the U.S. economy's industrial sector. But Appa-
lachia's function as a labor "staging area" for industry did not 
automatically relegate it to an inferior status politically. Had Appala-
chia been a colony politically, regional regulations could have been es-
tablished to institutionalize and perpetuate its subsistence reproduction 
of labor for the benefit of other regions in the United States. Elsewhere 
in the world, travel passes and work certificates have successfully been 
used to such effect. Someone "working out" who lacked a valid pass 
could have been ordered back to his Appalachian "homeland" or sum-
marily jailed. 22 
South African-type "pass laws" were politically untenable to regu-
late U.S. citizens, but the pill that Appalachia's people had to swal-
low was also bitter medicine. For the more that Appalachia's people 
once contributed to the United States in subsistence labor reproduc-
tion, the more they have had to pay since 1940 in migration away from 
home. From 1940 to 1960, net migration from the region totalled 
1, 700,000. 23 
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Was any alternative possible? Had something been done differently, 
might some of those 1, 700,000 people have been able to maintain their 
mountain lives? To help answer this, we can look at a very different 
pattern of interaction between subsistence farming and industrialization 
that occurred in Taiwan. In the process, some comparisons will be pos-
sible. Taiwan's industrialization has occurred largely since 1949, and 
like the industrialization that occurred earlier in both Appalachia and 
Japan, it has been heavily subsidized by subsistence labor reproduction. 
And Taiwan's case has resembled Japan's in the resultant benefits stay-
ing at home. This is the opposite of Appalachia's case, however, for the 
benefits from Appalachia's subsidized labor have been dispersed 
throughout the United States. 
During the fifty years before 1945, Taiwan was a colony of Japan,. 
and its economy was shaped by Japanese investments. What the Japa-
nese wanted from Taiwan, however, was not at all what northern U.S. 
investors have wanted from Appalachia. The Japanese wanted a food 
product, rice, which also constituted much of the Taiwanese diet. Ag-
riculture's crucial role in Taiwan's twentieth-century development be-
gan with rice-growing innovations that Japanese economists established 
in Taiwan before 1945, and it continued as the Taiwanese, building on 
that strong rice-growing base, industrialized their country after 1949. 
Besides rice-growing innovations, the Japanese also established a power 
industry in Taiwan and built up other infrastructure such as roads and 
railroads, but most of that was destroyed during World War II. 
Taiwan had come under Japanese rule in 1895, a spoil of the Sino-
Japanese War. Some limited Japanese initiatives began soon, and then· 
after Japan's 1918 rice riots, the Japanese instituted a crash program to 
heighten Taiwan's rice productivity and to export the surplus rice to Ja-
pan. Biological and chemical innovations were established that in-
creased the labor demands on Taiwan's farmers per unit of land. This 
contrasts with the tractor-and-mechanization innovations that at that 
very time were starting to depopulate most U.S. farms, but it parallels 
Appalachia's rural population rise. Taiwan's rural areas, like Appala-
chia's, were gaining population. Taiwan's rural families continued to 
need their sons and daughters just as did Appalachia's. And in both cases 
subsistence farming was subsidizing the production of an export prod-
uct. But Taiwan's export product (rice) was produced by self-employed 
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farmers and it was their own primary food staple, whereas Appalachia's 
export (coal) was produced for wages and was locally little used. 
Taiwan's farm families faced rising outlays for fertilizer and irriga-
tion, but their rice productivity grew faster than their costs, providing 
families with a heightened living standard. 24 Taiwanese farm families' 
average propensity to consume dropped from 96 percent of their current 
income during the 1911-1915 era to only 88 percent by 1936-1940. 
Thus, by the time of World War II, about 12 percent ofTaiwan's farm-
family income was being saved. 
In 1911 the Taiwanese-rural and urban together-had consumed 
84 percent of their total food production. By 1940 they were consuming 
only 58 percent of it, and yet they were consuming more calories per 
person than they had in 1911. They were also consuming more of the 
basic nonfood goods and acquiring more education. 
Meanwhile, in sharp contrast with Appalachia's experience during 
those years (1911-1940), Taiwan's industrial labor force was growing 
far slower than its total population-for Taiwan's export production 
was keeping its people busy producing a basic food crop, whereas Ap-
palachia's was mainly extracting and exporting coal and thus transfer-
ring labor pell-mell into the industrial sector. 
Between 1911 and 1960, Taiwan's agriculture provided a net real 
capital outflow to the rest of its economy, and did so at an increasing 
rate. By 1960, Taiwanese farm families' average propensity to consume 
was down to 71 percent and their savings rate was up to 29 percent. 25 
The Japanese had not set out to enhance Taiwan's well-being but, 
rather, Japan's own well-being. Until 1945, the surplus from Taiwan's 
rapidly increasing rice productivity was exported to Japan. Indeed, be-
tween the early 1910s and the early 1940s, the amount of rice available 
for consumption in Taiwan fell by 24 percent per person. Caloric intake 
rose because sweet potato consumption quadrupled per person and the 
availability of pork (Taiwan's principal meat) rose per person by half. 
Even per capita sugar consumption do~bled, and vegetable and fruit 
consumption also evidently increased. When Japanese rule ended in 
194 5, the Taiwanese tossed sweet potatoes out of their pantries and into 
their livestock fodder. And the island's food exports dropped from the 
1936-1940 level of 42 percent of food production down to a postwar 
level of only 6 percent. 26 
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Since 1945, Taiwan has been able to keep almost all of its rice for 
domestic consumption. What is striking, however, is that after 1945 
the proportion of the rice crop that farm families put on the market fell 
below the level they had marketed way back in 1911, before Japan's 
significant interference had even begun. Not only was Taiwan now 
keeping more of its rice for domestic in-country consumption, but its 
farm families were keeping more of their home-grown rice for actual 
home consumption. As compared with the years 1911-1915, the years 
1956-1960 saw 28 percent more consumption on the home farm of 
food that was produced on the home farm. 27 
What was happening? For one thing, a major land reform in the 
early 1950s freed many Taiwanese farm families from the need to sell 
most of their rice crop in order to pay rent. Further, a very pro-farmer 
ceiling was set on land rents, and often they were made payable in 
kind (e.g., in rice). Also, after 1948 the government was both boost-
ing rice output and husbanding financial resources by trading fertilizer 
to farmers in exchange for rice at a pro-farmer ratio. Sometimes the 
government also provided farm families with cotton cloth and other 
necessities in exchange for rice. 28 Such bartering reduced Taiwan's need 
to create money. 
Two scholars speak of the years "between the early 1950s and the late 
1960s to early 1970s" as displaying a "remarkable success achieved by 
Taiwan in eliminating poverty and malnutrition."29 And yet Taiwan's 
farm population was increasing between 1946 and 1969 from 3.5 mil-
lion to more than 6 million, and the island's average farm size was fall-
ing from about 5 acres down to less than 2.5 acres. Already by 1960, 
37 percent of Taiwan's farms held less than one and one-quarter acres-
and yet less than 35 percent of the income of those small-farm families 
came from off-the-farm sources. 30 Can we imagine an agriculture that 
productive in Appalachia? This favorable food trend accompanying Tai-
wan's post-World War II industrialization contrasts dramatically with 
the threatening subsistence crisis that earlier had hastened Appalachia's 
industrialization. When Taiwan's industrialization took off in the 
1950s, its subsistence farming was vibrantly healthy, unlike the wor-
risome subsistence situation that had existed when Appalachia's indus-
trialization took off. 31 The two scholars who wrote of Taiwan 
"eliminating poverty and malnutrition" between "the early 1950s and 
the late 1960s to early 1970s" provide a simple explanation for why that 
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happened. They call it "an especially clear example of the effectiveness 
of the labor supply/demand situation in leading to widespread increase 
in returns to labor." 32 
In other words, it was only after Taiwan's domestic food supply was 
guaranteed that the country industrialized. As early as 1952, Taiwan 
was exporting more than five times more processed food, beverage, and 
tobacco goods than it was importing. And as late as 1986, it was still 
exporting almost twice the value of those consumption goods that it was 
importing. 33 Clearly, Taiwan's domestic food supply continued secure. 
Here was a country whose population far more than doubled from 1952 
to 1986,34 and yet its food production rose more than one-quarter more 
than did its population. 35 Furthermore, throughout the 1950s Taiwan 
supplied its own domestic demand for basic consumer goods (for non-
food consumer goods) by using tariff barriers to encourage import sub-
stitution. Only after domestic manufacturing was supplying its 
domestic market did Taiwan begin-about 1960-to export a signif-
icant proportion of its industrial output. 
A result of this sequence was that when the growth in Taiwan's ag-
ricultural productivity finally slowed about 1970, that happened not 
only because Taiwan's arable land was reaching the limit of its productive 
capacity but also because a shortage of industrial workers was driving 
up industrial wages and thereby enticing farmers out of their fields. 36 
Rampant urbanization was nonetheless avoided. As late as 1986, 
21.8 percent of the Taiwanese still lived on farms, and many Taiwanese 
industries had located in rural areas to gain access to rural residents as 
employees. 37 As of 1986, Taiwan's average manufacturing employee 
was earning the equivalent of $1.78 an hour. 38 Direct testimony and 
statistics of consumption attest that those employees were well off. 
An official 1974 Taiwanese publication summed up what had oc-
curred there: "For two decades the growth of (Taiwan's} economy has 
been fueled by the rural sector. Industry took root rapidly because of 
the foreign exchange, domestic food supplies, and manpower resources 
that could be drawn from what was fundamentally a farming economy. 
These contributions of the rural sector were absolutely indispensable to 
economic modernization in the cities and in industry."39 
Rural Appalachia made similar contributions toward the industrial-
ization of the United States. Appalachia's coal contributed both directly 
and indirectly to American foreign-exchange earnings. Appalachia's 
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local provision of food and other subsistence supplies allowed low wages 
in mining, timbering, textiles, and other industries. Its labor was made 
available to industries without requiring that the industries pay enough 
to support the workers' families. But Appalachia is not a country. The 
benefits of Appalachia's contribution were dispersed throughout the 
United States and have gone unnoticed. 
In natural resource endowments, Appalachia was better off than 
both Japan and Taiwan. 40 But in the crucial categories of self-
sufficiency and self-financing, Appalachia was worse off. Contrasts be-
tween Taiwan and Appalachia are dramatic on both of these scores. 
With respect to financing, the onset of Appalachia's industrialization 
saw many members of the mountain elite selling or leasing much of 
their land to outside investors-whose agents, land-buyers, and law-
yers they often then became. 41 
Mountain land had not bred much money until major railroad, tim-
ber, and coal investments began arriving from outside sources in the 
1870s and 1880s. The more outside capital flowed into Appalachia, the 
more dependent the mountain economy became on the region that con-
trolled most of that capital, the North. Appalachia became an increas-
ingly "peripheral" region within an emerging "core" country, the 
United States. 
It is important to understand why Appalachia became financially 
dependent. The fact that a major portion of the region's land and re-
sources had long been controlled by absentee owners was part of the 
reason, 42 but the main reason was that many of Appalachia's people 
found themselves able to maintain their living standards only by ac-
quiring increasing amounts of income that were apportioned to them 
from outside the region. The crucial transactions were not those oc-
curring between naive farmers and savvy "mineral hunters" or land 
buyers. Some farmers admittedly alienated their mineral rights for only 
25 cents an acre, but had they charged the mineral hunters $25 or $250 
an acre, that would not have insured greater local control over Appa-
lachia's industrialization. 
Nor can Appalachia's growing dependency be explained by the be-
havior of those who supervised the region's mining or those who con-
trolled the capital invested. Richard Simon has suggested that if West 
Virginia's mine operators had automated sooner, dependency might have 
been avoided. The coal operators automated too late, he says, and what 
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prevented earlier automation (thereby also preventing higher wages) was 
"destructive competition" among the region's coal operators. 43 This is 
apparently a circular issue, however, for Appalachia's coal fields would 
not have been developed to the extent that they were if mountain people 
had not been willing to dig coal for wages lower than northern workers. 
In the economic picture, lower pay compensated for Appalachia's 
greater distance from coal's main markets-from the coal-burning fac-
tories, locomotives, and power plants of the North. Despite the high 
cost of transporting so heavy a commodity, 44 the mountains' bountiful 
cheap labor enabled Appalachian coal to sell at a competitive price-
until hindered from doing so by the price-and-wage supports estab-
lished under the National Recovery Administration in 1933. And when 
wages then shot upward, the mechanical coal loaders that had long 
waited in the wings were soon being used-greater mechanization sud-
denly becoming the easiest way to maximize profits in most Appala-
chian coal operations. 
The New Deal thus changed the coal industry's ground rules, but 
prior to 1933, Appalachia's coal operators generally perceived their 
maximum profitability to lie in policies of postponing automati~n, 
continuing to use relatively labor-intensive mining methods, and refus-
ing to bargain with labor unions. The anti-union policy was made 
workable by the existence of company towns. 4~ As long as they could 
successfully squelch unionism, almost all Appalachian coal operators 
continued to pay miners to shovel coal rather than buying underground 
coal-loading machinery. 
The fact that Appalachian coal operators were slow to automate does 
not necessarily verify Richard Simon's claim that they possessed less 
"development-minded leadership" than did northern coal operators. In-
deed, many or most of Appalachia's operators were of northern origin, 
and many of them also, southern as well as northern, enjoyed consid-
erable access to capital. 46 Appalachia's operators, like their counter-
parts elsewhere, tried to produce coal in the amounts and by the 
methods that would yield maximum profits. Appalachia's operators au-
tomated slowly because that was the pace that their cost-benefit analysis 
suggested would prove most profitable. 
As midwestern mines began adopting mechanization in the form of 
automatic coal cutters in the 1880s, thereby reducing the manpower re-
quired per ton of coal production, the proportion of coal income paid 
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out as wages in the Midwest temporarily dropped to a level of parity 
with the proportion being paid as wages in Appalachia. 47 Back in 1870 
and 1880 (as noted in chapter 2), the share of Appalachian coal income 
that went to miners had been much smaller than the share of midwest-
ern coal income that went to miners. (See table 4 for those percentages.) 
But by 1890 this was no longer the case. Although midwestern miners 
then received wages almost 6 percent higher per ton than Appalachian 
miners, this was only a hair below the amount by which the value of 
midwestern coal exceeded that of Appalachian coal at the mine head. 
By 1890 in both regions, workers were receiving about 74 to 75 percent 
of total coal income. 48 
Besides coal-cutting mechanization in the Midwest, other factors 
may have worked to hold labor's share of midwestern coal income down 
that low. By the 1880s-for one reason-the supply of good land near 
the Midwest that was available cheap, or was available free under the 
Homestead Act, had been exhausted. For another reason, the late 1880s 
saw several large and highly capitalized coal ventures begin in Appa-
lachia in the Flat Top-Pocahontas area that straddles southwestern Vir-
ginia's U-shaped border with southern West Virginia. Rapid expansion 
there required operators to draw on the pool of experienced miners in 
Pennsylvania and the Midwest49-and that required paying wages 
comparable to, or perhaps a whit higher than, those paid in Pennsyl-
vania and the Midwest. 
Soon, however, midwestern miners devised a way to regain their pre-
vious economic leverage. By the 1890s good homestead land was no 
longer an alternative against which midwestern coal operators had to 
bid for labor, but midwestern miners now turned to "combination," 
forming a consolidated labor union they called the United Mine Work-
ers of America (UMW). By 1902, when the largely non-unionized min-
ers of Appalachia were reduced to receiving only 63 percent of the value 
of the coal they mined, midwestern miners were largely unionized and 
were still receiving the 74 percent that they had received in 1890. 50 An 
econometric study estimates that as early as 1909-1913 the UMW was 
responsible for increasing its members' wages 38 to 43 percent over 
what their wages would have been without the union. 51 
While midwestern miners were thus constructing a new foundation 
under their self-interest, Appalachia was instead seeing operators seize 
the initiative-by shepherding miners into company towns where union 
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organizing could be outlawed under property-owners' prerogatives. The 
first company town for Appalachian miners went up in 1885, and by 
1910 about 70 percent of the region's miners lived in such towns. At 
that time, meanwhile, only 8. 5 percent of Indiana and Illinois miners 
lived in company towns. 52 
It is also important, however, to realize that unionization could ben-
efit only a limited number of Appalachian miners. "Better late than 
never" applies here, but the effects of late unionization included trau-
matic mass unemployment that, for many miners, became permanent 
unemployment. We should not let marginal acts of roguery like oper-
ators' coal-weighing tricks, or their company-store price gouging, 
obscure more fundamental realities that have kept Appalachia's coal in-
dustry profitable. When decisive unionization finally did occur in Ap-
palachia in the 1930s, it inspired operators to abandon their relatively 
labor-intensive mining methods and, in the process, to permanently 
abandon a large portion of their pre-Depression work force. When 
union membership became the rule and pushed up wages, mechaniza-
tion in Appalachian mines began to catch up with midwestern mines 
(which before 1933 had not only undercut almost all of their coal by 
machine but had also begun loading much of it by machine at the coal 
face). 53 As of 1933, only 1.2 percent of West Virginia's underground 
coal loading was yet mechanized, whereas 58.9 percent of Illinois's 
loading was mechanized. H Then, with their wage costs increased after 
1933, many Appalachian operators likewise embraced maximum mech-
anization. Loading machines, which many Appalachian operators now 
hastily acquired, reduced the total labor needs of a mine by at least 10 
percent and by up to 40 percent. 55 Among those miners who found 
themselves permanently excluded from the industry were a dispropor-
tionate number of black miners, many of whom then left the region. 56 
Prior to 1933's successful United Mine Workers organizing drive, 
however, union organizers had faced an uphill struggle-a struggle not 
only against the Appalachian "bosses" and their company-town system 
but also against the average miner's slowness to adopt class antagonism. 
For example, by the time the famous "Coal Creek rebellion" erupted in 
east-central Tennessee in 1891, coal had already been exported from 
Coal Creek by rail for twenty years {since 1871). The grievance that 
provoked Coal Creek miners to armed rebellion was the use by operators 
there of unpaid convicts as workers in the mines. That grievance had 
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been rankling since 1877. 57 By contrast, at newly opened mines located 
near Middlesboro, Kentucky-where conditions were no less oppres-
sive than the conditions inspiring class warfare just fifty miles away at 
Coal Creek-no major strike broke out until 1931. Unlike at Coal 
Creek, no cadres of convict labor competed with wage labor at Mid-
dlesboro, but other serious grievances had existed from the first open-
ing of the Middlesboro mines around 1890. 58 Middlesboro conditions 
were poor in the 1890s, but, unlike Coal Creek, class antagonism had 
not yet had time to develop at the Middlesboro mines. Over time, class 
antagonism slowly grew in Appalachia's coal districts. 
This growth of class antagonism should be seen in the context of nar-
rowing chances for upward mobility. 59 In many Appalachian areas, out-
siders had not been the first to attempt a capitalistic approach to 
development-not been the first to seek control of sufficient productive 
resources to compete, for instance, in the northern coal markets of 
places like New York and Chicago. Of the Flat Top-Pocahontas coal 
field (straddling the Virginia-West Virginia border) one scholar says 
that "locals tried like hell to exploit the coal, but lacked the necessary 
means to mount a large-scale operation. The locals [then] acted as mid-
dlemen, arranging sales of land and right-of-way to Philadelphia en-
trepreneurs who financed the thing."60 
And how did they finance it? Figures helping to answer that question 
were recorded after West Virginia appointed a state bank examiner in 
1891. Most of the Flat Top-Pocahontas coal field lay in West Virginia, 
and four state-chartered banks already existed in that coal field's West 
Virginia portion by that time. When visited by West Virginia's new 
bank examiner in 1891, however, their combined cash holdings totalled 
only slightly more than fifty thousand dollars. 61 
That same year miners' wages in the West Virginia portion of the 
Flat Top-Pocahontas coal field ran about $112,000 a month and $1.18 
million for the year. 62 Thus, not enough cash was available in the area 
to meet even a single fortnightly coal payroll. The four area banks to-
gether held $291,23 5 in checking deposits, 63 but capital invested in 
the area's coal mining already exceeded that. Indeed, by 1890, $10.5 
million was already invested overall in West Virginia coal mining, al-
though the state's banks held only $8.1 million in all forms of 
deposits. 64 And coal mining was not the only development that was be-
ing financed from outside the region. The year 1892 would see West 
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Virginia lead the nation in miles of railroad track completed within that 
year. 65 Both coal mining and railroads were major Appalachian indus-
tries using large amounts of money, but often that money merely shuf-
fled between northern bank accounts. Of the investment money that 
did enter Appalachia, most probably never became cash. 
The region's cash drought was not rapidly ameliorated. Eleven years 
later, in 1902, West Virginia's part of the Flat Top-Pocahontas coal 
field could count six local banks-one of them a national bank that had 
been founded in 1891. The local banks' checking deposits had multi-
plied eight and a half times since 1891, to $2.46 million. But their 
cash on hand had failed even to triple, growing only from $50,000 to 
$138,000. 66 Meanwhile, coal output in the area had tripled from 1891 
to 1902,67 and because the Plateau miners' average wage per ton was 
down only from 68 cents a ton to 67 cents, 68 the area's available cash 
had fallen in relation to its aggregate coal wages. 
Furthermore, it was not likely that very much cash could have been 
sent to the Flat Top-Pocahontas coal field for payroll purposes from 
elsewhere in West Virginia. By 1902 that state's monthly coal wages 
were totalling at least $1.4 million, and meanwhile all the banks in the 
state at any given time, including the national banks, held only about 
$3.8 million in cash. The banks' combined holdings of deposits, how-
ever, stood by 1902 at $54.7 million. 69 
In view of these financial realities it is clear that had early attempts 
to unionize the coal fields been successful, they might have slowed Ap-
palachia's journey into economic dependency but would not have re-
versed it. Successful early unionization would have driven much of the 
highly capitalized mining out of the region. This would have left mostly 
the option of subsistence farming, but the population was already too 
large for the land available. 
On the other hand, had there been large cash-on-hand holdings in 
the Flat Top-Pocahontas coal-field banks-indicating significant cash 
holdings among the general population-a local market for a variety of 
local products could have been created. The fact that by 1902 the local 
banks held almost eighteen times more in checking deposits than in 
cash reflects the fact that most of the money in the area was not at the 
disposal of either local purchasing decisions or local production deci-
sions. The company stores where miners made their purchases, using 
company scrip instead of money, offered many standardized outside 
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products-the kind of products that the local coal companies could im-
port in bulk from elsewhere by writing checks. 70 
Much of the money invested in Appalachia's coal production and 
railroads stayed in the North. Money controlled from the financial 
"core," indeed, soon became instrumental in a transfer of Appalachian 
political leadership out of the hands of traditional political-party bosses 
whose wealth was in land rather than in money. Studying the politics of 
this period, Gordon McKinney finds that a "new professional middle 
class created by the industrial revolution . . . came to dominate moun-
tain society." The Republican party had controlled most of the Plateau's 
politics since the Civil War, and now within that· party, says McKinney, 
"businessmen and the professional middle class sought to bring order to 
mountain society by challenging the old mountain Republican ma-
chines." But the old "bosses did not give up power easily. They con-
trolled the party structure, and they still spoke for many of the 
mountain people who resented the changes coming to mountain soci-
ety." The new middle class could afford to reward its campaign workers 
with money, however, and a drastic pruning of federal patronage jobs in 
favor of civil service appointments also worked in its favor. McKinney 
concludes that "by 1896 the issue had been settled . . . and the Re-
publican Party's commitment to local interests had disappeared." In-
deed, during the 1893-1896 depression, even "the Democratic party 
split into business and agrarian factions" in Appalachia as throughout 
the country. 71 
But where did northern interests acquire so much money to invest, 
including to invest in politics? A great deal of it, ironically, came from 
peripheral regions of the country-from the very regions that then had 
to look north and east to find investment capital. As of 1900, about 
one-third of the money on deposit in the national banks of Boston, De-
troit, Cleveland, and Minneapolis consisted of"bankers' balances" (that 
is, of money from other banks). In Chicago, Kansas City, and St. Louis, 
bankers' balances constituted about half of the deposits of national 
banks, and in New York City the proportion was much higher. Such 
balances in New York City as of 1900 amounted to $339.3 million, 
on which the New York City banks paid about 2 percent interest in 
good times and bad. This vast financial resource derived from the 
Gilded Age's shift away from cash and toward deposit money. Back in 
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1870, New York City's central banks had held only $65.9 million in 
bankers' balances. 72 
Viewing this from a regional perspective, we find that only 10 per-
cent of the outside deposits placed by state or national southern banks 
in other (national) banks were placed in the national banks of the 
South's three major financial centers (Richmond, Dallas, and Atlanta). 
Some of the South's bankers' deposits doubtlessly did go elsewhere in 
the South-but 35 percent of them went to New York banks, and an-
other 20 percent to banks in Chicago, St. Louis, and Philadelphia. 73 
Money thus gravitated to the North. One of the major reasons it did 
so was because that was where large borrowers went to draw their loans. 
Large borrowers-large developers and industrialists, including Appa-
lachia's-could not be adequately financed by small banks with limited 
funds and high overhead. Furthermore, interest rates were lower in the 
North than they were in the South, including in Appalachia. A situa-
tion evolved whereby from 1888 to 1911, interest rates on loans rested 
1 to 5 percent lower in the northeastern United States than in the rest 
of the country-averaging between 3 and 4 percent lower in the North-
east than in the South. 74 
Throughout this whole period, interstate branch banking was pro-
hibited, yet a complex network existed for the transfer of funds nation-
wide. The transfer of funds out of banks in peripheral regions such as 
Appalachia went far beyond the bankers' balances that were held in 
large cities. And not only did funds arrive from the periphery to be 
apportioned at the will of central bankers, but much of the risk for 
those large loans was in turn apportioned back out to the periphery in 
the form of "commercial paper."75 ("Commercial paper" referred to a 
range of negotiable instruments backed by promissory notes rather than 
by actual collateral. Businesses issued the initial promissory notes to ac-
quire ready cash or credit, and brokerage firms distributed the 
promissory-note-backed "commercial paper" in instruments of all de-
nominations throughout the country, spreading out the investment risk 
to those holding the paper.) 
After the financial crisis of 1897, and particularly after that of 1907, 
many outlying banks began to invest heavily in commercial paper-
thereby diversifying their portfolios in order to guard against bank-
ruptcy and to fulfill new banking laws. Partly a bank's scale of 
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operations, but also the diversity of its portfolio, determined whether it 
could fulfill the increasingly stringent banking laws, both federal and 
state, that were legislated during the late nineteenth and early.twentieth 
centuries. As for the danger of bankruptcy, even a local panic or local 
depression could sink a local bank if it used all its savings-deposit 
money to issue local loans. · 
By the early twentieth century, a situation had evolved whereby 
large industrialists generally had little difficulty gaining credit from 
financiers for their unbacked promissory notes. These notes in turn con-
stituted the backing for the "commercial paper" issued by the finan-
ciers. Northern financiers such as J. P. Morgan had perfected methods 
for what an economic historian calls "easy access to the pooled resources 
of the country's savers, directly and via the intermediation of collec-
tion." The historian adds that now "the country had a machine for the 
mobilization of capital."76 
Finance capital thus fled the periphery and accumulated ever more 
at centers that were already bursting with it. A situation evolved in 
which, as the same historian puts it, "the American industrialist had 
access to big money but not to small." 77 The optimal course for a pe-
ripheral region such as Appalachia would have been to accumulate, 
within the region, sufficiently large and concentrated savings to fi-
nance its own industries. But this was not feasible as long as the re-
gion was importing a major share of its necessi~:ies and was paying for 
those imports with its "foreign exchange" assets (that is, with its U.S. 
dollar income). 
The case of Alabama illustrates this. Why were insufficient local sav-
ings accumulated in Alabama for that state to build up large banks and 
thus to begin financing its own mining and manufacturing? Alabama's 
case calls into doubt any theory that Appalachia could have avoided eco-
nomic dependency by manufacturing more products within the re-
gion-such as by manufacturing more steel. The economic historian 
Richard Simon has suggested that perhaps West Virginia's dependency 
derived partly from having coal but not having much iron ore. Simon 
writes that "perhaps the presence of iron ore in addition to coal, as in 
Alabama, would have induced expansion of steel manufacturing in 
West Virginia. But West Virginia had no great deposits of iron ore." 
Simon hypothesizes that "underdevelopment was the result of the in-
complete industrialization." 78 
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But the different natural-resource endowments of West Virginia and 
Alabama cannot explain West Virginia's economic dependency, because 
Alabama too, despite its development of steel manufacturing, fell into 
dependency. This occurred because despite its steel making, Alabama 
like Appalachia became a major field for investments from the northern 
United States. 
Indeed, Alabama's steel industry, despite financial control from the 
North, possessed insufficient capital until Birmingham's main steel 
mills were sold in 1907 to their primary competitor, U.S. Steel Com-
pany. U.S. Steel then imposed what were called "Pittsburgh Plus" 
prices on the output of Birmingham mills, meaning that U.S. Steel's 
Birmingham products could not be sold anywhere for a price lower than 
it would have cost to supply the same steel from Pittsburgh. 79 The 
profit margin that this created between high Pittsburgh Plus prices and 
Birmingham's low production costs (including its low wages) was then 
withdrawn to Pittsburgh. 
Why did Birmingham's steelworkers, under those circumstances, 
not claim a share of the immense profits? Because the labor force had 
still poorer prospects outside the steel mills than it had in them. That 
is, Alabama's steelworkers were replaceable by still poorer workers. Un-
der such circumstances-and even if sweated workers do manage to 
unionize and to force up wages-W. Arthur Lewis ·reminds us of "the 
propensity of manufacturers to move from low-wage centres to lower-
wage centres." Lewis goes on to ask, "Is there no way to break out of 
unfavourable factoral terms of trade? Simply to raise productivity in the 
exporting sectors (whether manufacturing or agriculture) does not do 
the trick, if exporters'. wages remain tied to low productivity in food; 
since export prices then fall pari passu with rising productivity. "80 
The point here is that despite Alabama's participation through man-
ufacturing in the "value added" column of economic statistics, Ala-
bama's dependency on the North grew from the same root as did the 
dependency of Plateau Appalachia with its almost solely extractive in-
dustry. W. Arthur Lewis's insight points us back to the importance of 
the subsistence potential of a region's agriculture. People able to main-
tain a satisfying living standard through subsistence farming, or 
through locally marketed agricultural production, are not likely to un-
dertake wage work for a pittance. For many Appalachians, agriculture 
alone could no longer maintain their previous living standard, but 
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neither could industrial work alone accomplish that. So agriculture 
continued in Appalachia, much of it now carried on by the region's 
industrial workers, including those who lived in company towns. This 
constituted a subsidy from agriculture to industry, a "subsistence repro-
duction oflabor power." In Appalachia, as elsewhere in the world, such a 
subsidy has allowed low wages. But unlike Japan and Taiwan, Appala-
chia did not capture the benefit of its low wages-the U.S. North did. 
5 
The New Deal 
and Appalachia's Industry 
We relied on PWA {the Public Works Administration} to activate the 
heavy industry at once and thus increase the total number of purchasers. 
We relied on AAA {the Agricultural Adjustment Administration} to in-
crease farm purchasing power immediately and thus still further add to 
the number of purchasers. These added to NRA additions would so far in-
crease 110lume that I thought (and I still think) the increased labor cost 
could be absorbed without much increase in price. The President spe-
cifically asked industry to take this gamble. 
-Hugh Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth 
From the 1880s on, and particularly after 1920, Appalachia's highly 
competitive mines enforced a curb on the profits attainable by northern 
coal operators. In 1920 the mines of West Virginia and Kentucky sup-
plied only 23 percent of the country's bituminous coal, but by 1927 
they were supplying 41 percent. 1 Already by 1924, production in Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois had fallen 27 percent from its 1920 level, whereas 
production in West Virginia and Kentucky had risen 23 percent from 
its 1920 level. As for the size of the work force, that fell more than 
two-fifths from 1923 to 1929 at the bituminous mines of Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. 2 
Low-priced coal from Appalachia's largely non-unionized mines de-
feated efforts by the United Mine Workers (UMW) to enforce compli-
ance by northern coal operators with the February 1924 Jacksonville 
Agreement. Under that agreement, most northern miners received 
$7.50 a day at a time when most Appalachian miners were non-
unionized and receiving about $3.00 a day. In 1927 northern operators 
shook off the last vestiges of the Jacksonville Agreement. A 1927 strike 
by two hundred thousand UMW miners failed to resurrect the agree-
ment and, in that one year, fifty-five thousand northern bituminous 
mining jobs were permanently abolished .. Throughout the 1920s, in-
deed, midwestern operators slashed their high-cost labor force by in-
stalling new underground machines to load coal. By 1929, more than 
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one-third of Illinois's deep-mined coal, and more than one-fourth of In-
diana's, was machine loaded. By contrast, in Appalachia as of then only 
2 percent was yet machine loaded. 3 
Ideally, Appalachia's mines should have been unionized from their 
first days. Had that happened-had coal miners achieved collective 
bargaining as early in Appalachia as in the North-coal mining might 
have developed as a stable industry, and an optimal allocation of the 
industry's resources might have been possible. In that case, much less 
mining would have occurred in Appalachia. Fewer Appalachian miners, 
in turn, would have meant fewer part-time farmers adding to agricul-
tural demands on the region's eroding hillsides. From many angles, an 
earlier unionization of Appalachia's mines would have been beneficial. 
The only sour note might have been a longer history of class antagonism 
in the region. Perhaps, however, an earlier origin of class antagonism 
might have moderated its intensity. As it was, the dichotomy between 
the unionized North on one hand and non-union Appalachia on the 
other engendered unstable conditions for the entire coal industry east of 
the Great Plains. 
The willingness of Appalachian miners to dig coal for low wages did 
not mean that their wages were always pegged low, just usually. It al-
lowed Appalachian coal operators to respond faster than northern op-
erators to any change in market conditions. When demand for coal was 
strong, its market price shot upward. At the end of World War I, some 
Appalachian operators paid wages as high as $25 a day, taking advan-
tage of high coal prices. Such temporarily high wages drew miners into 
Appalachia from Pennsylvania and the Midwest. But when demand for 
coal plummeted again to much lower levels, Appalachian miners' wages 
fell as low as $1.50 a day in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Wage vari-
ability gave Appalachian operators great flexibility in their operating 
costs, for about 65 percent of total operating costs consisted of wages. 
Thereby, Appalachian operators generally managed to increase their 
share of the coal market through both good times and bad. 4 Even the 
seasonal alteration between high wintertime demand for coal and low 
summertime demand helped Appalachia's flexible non-union opera-
tions at the expense of the less-flexible union operations in the North. 5 
Furthermore, when major strikes hit the unionized North, Appalachia's 
mines achieved marketing gains that the unionized areas could not eas-
ily reverse after their strikes ended. The dependability of coal deliveries 
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from Appalachia's usually strike-proof mines earned them a lower haul-
ing rate per mile than the railroads were willing to grant mines in the 
North and the Midwest. 6 
Because Appalachia's wages were generally low, mechanization in its 
mines commonly lagged behind mechanization in midwestern mines. 
When demand for coal shot upward, this translated into not only 
higher Appalachian wages but also faster Appalachian mechanization. 
Back in 1909, for example, only 41 percent of Appalachia's coal pro-
duction was yet being undercut by machines. (The rest was either un-
dercut by hand-pick or was "shot from the solid.") Meanwhile, 51.4 
percent of the coal produced by midwestern mines (those of Ohio, In-
diana, and Illinois) was already being undercut by machine. 7 By ten 
years later in 1919, however, World War I's tremendous coal demands 
had inspired Appalachian operators to have 70.7 percent of their coal 
output machine cut-surpassing the Midwest's proportion at that time 
of 66.3 percent machine cut. 8 
About 1923-a time of weak market demand but strong union de-
mands-midwestern mines began using underground machinery to 
load a significant portion of their coal production. In Appalachia, by 
contrast, machine loading remained insignificant until the New Deal 
era of the 1930s. (By 1940 the mountain region would mechanize to the 
extent of machine loading approximately 27. 1 percent of its under-
ground coal production, but by then the Midwest would be machine 
loading 70.6 percent.)9 
The coal industry, all this while, could mine far more coal than the 
United States could consume. Even at the height of market demand in 
1918, when the price of coal soared to astounding heights, less than 
two-thirds of the coal industry's effective capacity came into use. 10 Dur-
ing the 1920s, the obstacles to any agreement among coal operators for 
equalized production cutbacks proved insurmountable. This was the 
decade that saw the UMW cripple northern mines through strikes 
while a large percentage of the Midwest's coal production migrated to 
Appalachia. 11 Then too, the 1920s also saw oil and gas make enormous 
strides in replacing coal as an energy source-and also saw major tech-
nical improvements that increased coal-burning efficiency in various in-
dustries, thereby further restricting demand for coal. 
Problems in the 1920s' coal industry inspired many of the ideas that 
would later be imposed throughout American industry under the New 
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Deal's National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). In 1928 a congres-
sional committee considered the Watson Bill, which was supported by 
the UMW and by some coal operators whose mines had long been 
unionized. A similar Davis-Kelly Bill followed in 1932 and gained con-
siderable support-but again not enough to pass. Both of these bills 
foreshadowed the fundamental business-labor trade-off that finally be-
came law in 1933 under the NIRA. Both the Watson and the Davis-
Kelly bills called for price supports, as desired by northern operators 
with their high-cost mining operations. Both bills would also have 
guaranteed workers' rights to organize and to bargain collectively. 12 
When Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933, however, he did not 
give immediate attention to industrial and commercial recovery. 
Roosevelt hesitated in those areas to seize the mandate that his landslide 
electoral victory offered. After the new administration's first month 
slipped past without any major "recovery" initiative, the Senate passed 
a recovery bill introduced by Senator Hugo Black of Alabama. The 
Black Bill called for reducing the industrial work week to thirty hours 
per worker. Because Black's bill contained no minimum wage require-
ment, Roosevelt feared it would lower workers' purchasing power, and 
a small army of presidential advisors began creating an alternative bill 
before Black's bill, already through the Senate, could move on through 
the House of Representatives and confront Roosevelt as a fait accompli. 
Roosevelt's recovery bill initially emphasized direct employment in-
crease ("direct economic start-up," this was called) including massive 
public works. But by the time the bill went to Congress on 17 May 
1933, its provisions for public works were smaller than they originally 
had been. Instead the final bill emphasized a plan for indirectly increas-
ing employment and restarting the economy by devising "codes of fair 
competition" for each of the country's major industries. These codes 
would fix prices within agreed parameters (thereby in~reasing profits) 
and would limit production (thus limiting competition). Beyond that, 
the administration's recovery bill repeated some popular themes of the 
Black Bill, including minimum standards for working conditions and 
also labor's right to organize and bargain collectively-two provisions 
appearing in the new bill's famous Section 7(a). 13 On 13 June 1933, 
this bill passed Congress as the National Industrial Recovery Act. On 
16 June, Roosevelt signed it and named Hugh Johnson, a veteran of 
World War I's War Industries Board, to head a National Recovery Ad-
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ministration (NRA). A Chicago lawyer named Donald Richberg was 
appointed as Johnson's assistant. 
The NIRA provided benefits primarily for large and influential par-
ticipants in the American economy, including big labor as well as big 
business. It added governmental power to the powers already inherent 
in bigness, proving detrimental to three other major (but less organized) 
interest groups: farmers, small business people, and consumers. 14 
Much of Appalachia's coal mining was admittedly carried on by 
large companies, but not generally by the large northern coal compa-
nies that stood to benefit from the NIRA. 15 Nor, in the spring of 1933, 
were very many Appalachian coal miners represented by the coal indus-
try's only major union, the United Mine Workers (UMW). 
Northern coal-operator associations joined John L. Lewis of the 
UMW in helping to draft Section 7(a) of the NIRA-the section pro-
tecting collective bargaining. Because most northern mines had been 
unionized long before 1933 and could not be deunionized, their owners 
had long sought the unionization of Appalachia's mines as the ultimate 
solution to Appalachia's low coal prices (which were now castigated as 
"unfair competition" to fit the NIRA's Weltanschauung). 
John L. Lewis of the UMW went into the new NIRA era open eyed. 
Like his archrival William Green of the American Federation of Labor, 
Lewis accepted what amounted to price fixing under the NIRA. De 
facto price fixing was the price that business leaders demanded, and 
that labor leaders accepted, in exchange for labor leaders' treasured Sec-
tion 7(a) of the legislation. 16 Lewis reportedly said at this time that he 
was only looking out for current miners. Miners' sons, he reportedly 
said, would have to look for work in the cities. 17 Lewis was manifestly 
not, however, looking out for all current miners. His initial proposal 
for a nationwide daily minimum wage of five dollars for all coal 
miners 18 would have ruined many Appalachian operations, throwing 
their miners out of work. 
Meanwhile, before the NIRA passed Congress and went to Roosevelt 
for his signature, John L. Lewis set in motion a successful UMW whirl-
wind campaign that largely unionized Appalachia's coal fields. Before 
the National Recovery Administration (NRA) ended its hearings about 
wages and hours for a bituminous coal "code of fair competition," the 
UMW had already lassoed Appalachian operators into a September 
1933 "Appalachian Agreement" that raised wage levels in the mountain 
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region enormously. Representatives of the major Appalachian operators 
testified at the NRA's code-formulation hearings that those high wages 
could only be maintained if the NRA stimulated "increased demand 
and increased prices" for coal. 19 
Before the UMW's well-timed organizing drive, wages as low as 
$1.50 a day had been common in Appalachia's mines. Now, as the bi-
tuminous coal code negotiations ended, Appalachia's major coal mines 
were already unionized and their operators had already agreed to pay 
almost three times that much. In their NRA-sponsored code they reaf-
firmed their agreement to pay about $4.20 a day-only forty cents be-
low Pennsylvania and Ohio's standard minimum and only sixty cents 
below that of Illinois. 20 
During the hearings, industry spokesmen pointed out that labor 
costs constituted 65 percent, on average, of the total operating costs of 
producing coal. The logic of the situation called for lower coal prices, 
said one industry spokesman, because oil and natural gas were rapidly 
displacing coal as an energy source. In 1923 bituminous coal had pro-
vided 63.5 percent of U.S. energy, but by 1930 it was providing only 
5 S. 7 percent, and the Depression was seeing coal use fall faster than the 
use of its major competitors (oil being its prime competitor, with nat-
ural gas next). Under such circumstances, asked the coal industry 
spokesman, was it logical to raise the price of coal? No, he said, but 
because miners' wages had already been raised, the price of coal would 
have to go up too. 21 
Replying on behalf of the NRA, Donald Richberg made no objec-
tion to coal prices going up, but Richberg did object to any continu-
ation of the "open shop" in Appalachian coal mines. Like John L. Lewis, 
Richberg favored the "closed shop." To bring about "fairly uniform 
standards of hours and wages" among U.S. coal miners, Richberg de-
sired what he called "an equal organization of the employees uniform to 
compare with the organization of the employers." A coal industry 
spokesman counterargued that the employers had only become so or-
ganized because the NRA had demanded it. 22 
Prior to the New Deal, as we have seen, most Appalachian coal op-
erators had perceived their maximum profits to lie in relatively labor-
intensive mining methods combined with anti-unionism. As for the 
miners, they and their families had in general subsisted partly off the 
land. The miners had tended to raise large families who helped them 
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maintain their agricultural pursuits but who at the same time consti-
tuted a pool of surplus labor, undermining the miners' bargaining po-
sition vis-a-vis the mine operators. 
The transition that now occurred in 1933 insured only that some of 
Appalachia's miners would share in the extra profits that accrued to op-
erators through price supports-for the new wage gains of 1933 con-
vinced many Appalachian operators to minimize their labor needs by 
mechanizing more thoroughly. Many more operators waited for the 
NIRA's constitutionality to be challenged, thinking that. wage levels 
might then be reducible in. a post-NIRA situation, but their hope 
proved futile. The NIRA's demise in 1935 inspired a new National La-
bor Relations Act (the Wagner Act), which reinstated labor's right to 
organize and to bargain collectively. Indeed, 1935 also saw Congress 
pass a Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (the so-called First Guffey 
Act), which provided for a new coal code to set minimum wages and 
hours and to decree minimum and maximum coal prices. This First 
Guffey Act imposed a 13. 5 percent tax on the coal produced by any 
bituminous operator who did not abide by the new code. 
The Supreme Court voided this First Guffey Act in 1936 for the 
same reasons it had struck down the NIRA in 1935; but, despite losing 
those two battles, ultimate victory went to high-price and high-wage 
adherents when the Supreme Court in 1937 upheld the National Labor 
Relations Act, and when Congress that year passed a Second Guffey Act 
similar to the first. 23 These 1935 and 1937 New Deal victories became 
the signal for a heightened pace of mechanization in Appalachia's 
mines. 24 Appalachian coal operators' savings through lower wages now 
no longer exceeded the midwestern operators' savings through higher 
productivity per worker, so Appalachian operators now also sought to 
maximize productivity per worker. 
If low-wage labor was ever at a premium in the mountains, it was 
during the Depression. And yet, in reaction to the new high wage lev-
els, Appalachian operators reduced their labor needs through a renewal 
of the mechanization drive they had begun during World War I but had 
then abandoned. World War I and its immediate aftermath had created 
an unprecedented demand for coal that had resulted, temporarily, in 
high coal prices, high union membership (two-thirds of all U.S. miners 
were then unionized, including, temporarily, many Appalachian min-
ers), and high wages. Now in 1933, these same three results were 
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achieved despite low demand for coal. In 1933, high coal prices, high 
union membership, and high wages were achieved in effect by govern-
ment fiat. A renewed surge of automation was provoked by the high 
wage demands and was made financially feasib~e by price supports. Af-
ter 1933-and especially after 1938-Appalachian coal production 
rose far faster than employment rose in the mines. 25 
Meanwhile, because the NRA and the AAA (Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration) had caused a sharp rise in consumer-goods prices, 
real wages for the miners were not rising quite as much as their nominal 
wages. Already by 15 August 1933 a national survey found food prices 
16 percent higher than they had been five months earlier. 26 Indeed, by 
mid-July, :ilfter four New Deal months, overall U.S. wholesale prices 
had already risen an average of 27.5 percent-although overall retail 
prices were still reflecting backlogged inventories of durables and 
semidurables and had risen only 6 percent during those first four 
Roosevelt months. 27 
Also meanwhile, automation proved a mixed blessing even for some 
of the miners who were not replaced by machines, for automation in-
creased the coal dust that causes black lung disease. The principal cul-
prits in creating dust were the cutting machines-and already by 1919, 
as noted, 70.7 percent of Appalachia's coal production was machine 
cut. When the U.S. Public Health Service finally studied black lung 
disease among Appalachian miners in the 1960s, it found fully one-
third of former cutting-machine operators suffering from black lung-
a far higher percentage than the 19.3 percent average incidence among 
former miners who had been employed in any capacity whatsoever at 
the coal face. 28 
Use of cutting machines went back as far as the late 1880s in a few 
mines, and by the end of World War I, most U.S. coal production was 
undercut by machine, but not until 1963 was any systematic study be-
gun of the health damage caused by different types of mining in the 
United States. In 1931 Great Britain had begun to require that limited 
compensation be paid to miners for any "respiratory disability which 
could not be attributed to silicosis."29 (Compensation in Britain for sil-
icosis had begun even earlier.) But in the United States the New Deal 
ignored this whole subject, including the medical toll exacted by the 
mechanization the New Deal itself inspired, and not until 1947 did the 
federal government undertake a general survey of "all forms of tuber-
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culosis" among coal miners. This survey catalogued miners' lung prob-
lems, and their resultant mortality, state by state and even county by 
county, but it did not distinguish between the different jobs performed 
underground. 30 A more analytic study was carried out on more than 
four hundred patients at a West Virginia hospital in the early 1950s and 
revealed not only the existence but also the probable extent of black 
lung disease in the United States. 31 No significant prevention was yet 
attempted, however. Finally, between 1959 and 1961, the state ofPenn-
sylvania X-rayed the lungs of sixteen thousand working miners and 
compared those findings to X-ray data about the general population. 
Pennsylvania's study set the stage for a study begun in 1963 by the 
U.S. Public Health Service, which surveyed 3, 740 Appalachian miners 
and former miners, all of them chosen at random to prevent self-
selection because of lung problems. About one-third of those examined 
were retired miners-who, as retirees, tended to have longer exposure 
to coal dust than did still-working miners. 32 
. We have already seen what this survey found among former cutting-
machine operators-that fully one-third of them suffered from black 
lung. As for loading-machine operators, the scudy found that 22.5 per-
cent of former loading-machine operators had black lung, whereas only 
14.9 percent of former hand loaders (shovel workers) did so. 33 The tran-
sition from hand loading to a significant degree of machine loading in 
Appalachia was initiated by the high-wage policies of the New Deal. 34 
Black lung is a disease that denies its victims sufficient oxygen to 
sustain normal levels of exertion. Many black lung victims desire death 
long before it arrives. Black lung existed as a human cost for more than 
half a century before it was acknowledged as an economic cost to its 
victims and to society. The human cost of black lung, as well as its 
personal economic cost, was already stupendous when federal black 
lung pensions were finally legislated by the Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act of 1969. 35 
Admittedly the mechanization of Appalachian coal loading drasti-
cally reduced the number of miners-perhaps to such an extent that the 
absolute number of Appalachia's black lung victims was falling rather 
than rising by about 1960. 36 But this does not exculpate the New Deal, 
for in the 1930s the British government was already initiating under-
ground dust control and other preventive measures. The British thereby 
cut the average death toll among their miners significantly between 
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1932 and 1950. 37 Similar preventive measures should also have begun 
in the United States in the 1930s rather than waiting until 1969. And, 
over and above the black-lung question, the instigation of a trend to-
ward capital-intensive mining in the midst of a depression was not only 
economically unsound but inhumane. 
Rexford Tugwell exonerated the NRA of human costs because a wel-
fare net was unfurled beneath its victims. Looking back from the van-
tage of 1977, Tugwell managed to see the NRA philosophically. In 
retrospect he saw a silver lining in the fact that already by 1934 the 
New Deal had begun inspiring a political realignment that might prove 
auspicious. "As this alignment went on," Tugwell mused, "it did not 
matter much, politically, ... that the NRA was likely to fail. What 
was important was that people's immediate needs were being satisfied." 
After all, Tugwell continued, the NRA's fundamental "mistakes meant 
nothing immediately to the sufferers from the depression. If they were 
still unemployed, they had relief or there was public work." 38 
This ignores, unfortunately, the fact that the NRA's two-year sabo-
tage of recovery left deleterious results for decades. The NRA coal 
code, for instance, hastened conversion to coal's primary competitor, 
oil, and thereby contributed to today's potentially disastrous U.S. oil 
dependency. 
Tugwell, in his 1933 reenactment, called the NRA "likely to fail." 
Ironically, however, the NRA only failed to the extent it succeeded. Its 
failure was in conception rather than in execution. The NRA did in fact 
largely establish the wage and price "standards of fair competition" that 
it advocated. How, then, had such a poor idea managed to gain suffi-
cient support to become law? The short answer is that Franklin 
Roosevelt's pursuit of political expediency had overly influenced his per-
ception of what was economically desirable. 39 Roosevelt found it polit-
ically expedient to pursue two contradictory recovery policies 
simultaneously.40 On taking office, what Roosevelt mainly sought was 
to avoid serious, possibly revolutionary, political challenges for which 
the Depression was creating a constituency. German political develop-
ments in that spring of 1933 were not reassuring. Roosevelt considered 
the specifics of recovery efforts less important than that something or 
other be tried. "This nation asks for action, and action now," he de-
claimed at his inaugural. "We must act and act quickly."41 
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In human terms there was undeniably much to admire about the 
New Deal. Unfortunately, admiration for Franklin Roosevelt and many 
of his associates has contributed to postponing analytic research about 
the New Deal. Analytic research about the New Deal's effect on Ap-
palachia is only just beginning. At the national level, however, an 
econometrician has demonstrated what others have long guessed: the 
NRA was not economically neutral but was actively counterproductive. 
As that econometrician summarizes his findings: 
Monetary expansion after June 1933 was mainly due to gold inflows {and 
thus the] 14 percent average annual rate of increase in the money supply during 
the two-year NIRA period can be considered an exogenous shock-indepen-
dent of the NIRA legislation itself. . . . {Meanwhile] the industrial codes 
contributed to prices approximately 14 percent per year during the NIRA pe-
riod. The codes exactly nullified the monetary expansion! Despite nominal ex-
pansion of the money supply, there was literally no expansion of the real money 
supply. Thus there was no stimulus to any real variables in the economic sys-
tem. In the absence of the codes, the monetary stimulus would have been 
expansionary; in the presence of the codes, the monetary stimulus was impo-
tent .... The combination of the monetary stimulus and the NIRA-induced 
inflation left real output virtually unchanged. Thus the contradictory impact 
of the codes can be measured, at least in part, by what contributions to real 
output and {to] employment the monetary stimulus would have made in the 
absence of the codes. 42 
Nor were NRA-type price supports permanently terminated when 
the Supreme Court voided the NIRA in 1935. Like NRA-type wage 
supports, price supports soon reappeared. Congress reenacted signifi-
cant price supports through the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and, 
more strongly, through the Miller-Tydings Enabling Act of 1937. 43 
The NRA was a fundamental flaw in the early New Deal and a ma-
jor cause of prolonging the American Depression far beyond Europe's 
recovery. Let us now look at the New Deal's agricultural policies and 
their more mixed effects. 
6 
The New Deal and 
Appalachia's Agriculture 
The National Recovery Administration . . . {has) so encouraged the 
business people of this country that they are setting about their affairs 
with renewed energy. . . . The manufacturer, with his people working 
full-time, is engaged in producing commodities and articles for the use 
of the people of this country. . . . There must be placed within the reach 
of the people in the rural sections of our country purchasing power before 
this problem will be solved, and that is the situation with which the Fed-
eral Government is wrestling. 
-H. G. Kump, governor of West Virginia, 21 July 1933 
In May 1927 a torrential, once-in-a-century rainstorm struck much 
of the Appalachian Plateau, tearing topsoil and clay off its plowed 
hillsides in sheets. Three years later, from Arkansas to West Virginia 
in a west-to-east belt, the 1930 growing season saw the onset of a 
major drought. In northern West Virginia, the Monongahela River 
and the Tygart Valley River shrank to isolated pools that were trans-
ferred downstream through water hoses so that the cities of Morgan-
town and Elkins could receive drinking water. 1 As far east as 
Roanoke, the year 1930 saw only 16.27 inches of precipitation, well 
below half of that Virginia city's annual average. 2 In Kentucky, the 
Red Cross sent county-by-county surveyors through the state, and 
from eastern Kentucky they predicted that tremendous suffering lay 
ahead during the coming winter, making a relief program inevitable 
there. In October 1930, Kentucky's Red Cross director visited four 
counties in eastern Kentucky and found "people getting along as 
best they could on a very narrow margin, but each day consuming 
their winter supply which in a normal year would not be touched 
by this season.''3 Many of the residents had sold their livestock, 
which doomed them to malnutrition over the winter unless they were 
given relief. 
In reporting these conditions, Kentucky's Red Cross director pre-
dicted that relief would have to start in November. But on 20 October 
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1930, the national Red Cross closed its Kentucky relief offices. 4 By No-
vember in eastern Kentucky's Rowan County, the county judge was 
committing children to institutions because their parents could not feed 
them and a Red Cross field representative was warning that "people will 
starve to death unless something is done soon."~ In adjacent Morgan 
County, the same field representative found three deaths from pneumo-
nia and found people begging from door to door. Here too she predicted 
starvation unless relief began soon. 
Nothing was done soon. On 27 November 1930 eight inches of snow 
fell on eastern Kentucky and the temperature dropped to 16 degrees 
fahrenheit. By mid-December the Kentucky Red Cross director was re-
porting that "the picture of distress . . . in the eastern part of our state 
is almost unbelievable .... There is a growing army of itinerants trav-
elling on foot."6 Other people were selling their household furnishings 
to traveling peddlers to obtain money for food. Still others were robbing 
tobacco wagons. Kentucky's infant mortality rate had climbed 10 per-
cent in the previous four months, and some schoolchildren were found 
bringing nothing in their school lunch buckets except green nuts. 7 Sim-
ilar reports came from West Virginia. 8 
Finally in January 1931 the national Red Cross reopened its Ken-
tucky and West Virginia relief offices. Many of the people who were 
then helped had never before received any form of charity. Their average 
ration, however, was only two dollars a month per person, with a max-
imum for the largest families of twenty dollars a month. According to 
Kentucky's Frontier Nursing Service, this sufficed only to buy a low 
grade of grain and provided "no margin to give a man working-calories, 
to give children growth, to enable an expectant or a nursing mother to 
carry her baby, or to stave off the ravaging effects of pellagra or tuber-
culosis. No provision whatever is made for milk for the young 
children."9 And yet, as of 11 February 1931, the national Red Cross 
had barely distributed half of the money it had collected for its Drought 
Relief Fund. 10 
For many full-time Appalachian farmers, the 1930-1931 drought 
proved more traumatic than the Depression that was then beginning. In 
Appalachia's mining areas, on the other hand, it was not so much the 
drought as the Depression that brought impoverishment. In the coal 
fields, not only spring 1931 but many springs saw small children dying 
of bacillary dysentery (the "bloody flux"), deaths often precipitated 
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when hungry children rapidly ingested too many raw weeds. In spring 
1931 in Kentucky's highly industrialized Bell County, at least thirty-
five children died of the bloody flux. 11 
Such conditions did not suddenly cease when Franklin Roosevelt 
took office. As of September 1933 desperation still characterized the 
coal fields. From southern West Virginia's coal fields that month, 
county relief supervisors reported that relief was providing only enough 
money for food. Despite approaching winter, home evictions for unpaid 
rent were beginning to snowball. Medical care was desperately inade-
quate. In the coal fields of West Virginia's McDowell County, epidem-
ics of typhoid, diphtheria, and dysentery were threatening. Equally 
severe conditions were still being reported in November 1933 among at 
least some of East Tennessee's miners and their families. 12 
By 1933, federal relief for many of Appalachia's unemployed and un-
deremployed wage workers was not only necessary but had been over-
due for years. Entailing as it did widespread destitution among wage 
workers, the Depression temporarily reversed America's long-term 
trend toward increased urbanization. Even among intellectuals a back-
to-the-land mood manifested-marked by nostalgia for simple rural 
lifeways but also by a lot of economic rethinking. Certainly in Appa-
lachia's preindustrial era, by all accounts, starvation had been virtually 
impossible. And during the region's industrialization period, roughly 
1880 to 1930, all indications point to a fall, rather than any rise, in 
average living standards. 13 In fact, by the time of the 1927 flood and 
the 1930 drought, many Appalachian farm families had been sliding 
toward poverty for decades. 
Concerted and consistent federal programs tailored to meet the 
actual needs of such families were able to yield long-term benefits, 
but only a few New Deal programs fell into that category. Most New 
Deal programs that affected Appalachia did so merely accidentally, 
and their long-term results have proven mixed. Initially the New Deal 
emphasized restoring the nation's commodity markets. Only gradually 
did the Roosevelt administration tackle the issue of rural poverty. In-
deed, no unified conception controlled the New Deal or completely 
dominated any separate New Deal agency. Many officials desired a 
unified approach, but Roosevelt preferred operating with only vague 
aims, leaving the means for accomplishing those aims ad hoc and some-
times contradictory. 14 
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One contradiction has been identified by Rexford Tugwell. Tugwell 
influenced the contents of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AA Act) 
and was appointed assistant secretary of agriculture under Henry A. 
Wallace, but he never actually worked within the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration (AAA). Later Tugwell set forth the view that the 
operation of the AAA brought about "what was plainly to be a disaster" 
for many southern farmhands, sharecroppers, and tenant farmers: 
In spite of what {Henry A. Wallace} said, the small farmers who were so 
much praised had miserably few government benefits from the operation of 
AAA. These would go to the larger operators, not the smaller ones. They 
would either sink into poverty where they were or move to city slums in search 
of other employment. The problems of another generation were created by the 
policies of 1933, and absolutely nothing was done to avert what was plainly to 
be a disaster. 15 
Tugwell's point here is mainly about the Deep South, where because 
of the AAA, as he goes on to say, "wages were supplanting the share-
crop arrangements in force since the abOlition of slavery and where la-
borers were being replaced by machines." These two interrelated effects 
of the AAA, says Tugwell, created a new and desperate clientele for 
Harry "Hopkins' social workers who previously had had no rural 
responsibilities." 16 And the subsequent northward migration of dis-
placed tenants, sharecroppers, and farm laborers to city slums has in-
deed created Tugwell's "problems of another generation." 17 The NRA-
hastened elimination of many Appalachian mining jobs (described in 
the previous chapter) was thus paralleled by an AAA-hastened elimina-
tion of many sharecropping jobs in the Deep South. 
As for Appalachia's agriculture-although the AAA attempted to 
reduce the output of Appalachia's two basic subsistence products, corn 
and hogs, participation in that "corn-hog" limitation program was vol-
untary, and most mountain farm families did not participate. The 
AAA also, however, limited production of one of the mountains' main 
farm products of a purely commercial nature, tobacco. In this case par-
ticipation was made effectively mandatory. Most of Appalachia's coun-
ties grew little or no tobacco, but in several dozen of them it was a 
vitally important cash crop. 18 
The New Deal's method of limiting agricultural production was 
called allotment. It originated in the ruminations of a former Montana 
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wheat farmer named M. L. Wilson. Wilson had given up farming to 
become a Montana State College agronomist. In the mid-1920s he 
had become an official of the U.S. Agriculture Department. Wilson 
devised the allotment plan as a means of reducing U.S. wheat produc-
tion, which had overexpanded during and immediately after World 
War I, and which since the early 1920s had glutted its market. Faced 
with wheat's overproduction crisis, many individual wheat farmers 
produced still more wheat in a desperate bid to maintain their family 
incomes and meet their debt payments-ironically increasing their 
production to survive the overproduction. The allotment idea called for 
annual quotas of wheat production. Farm-by-farm quotas would be al-
lotted by the government to farmers who were willing to cooperate with 
the program-their cooperation being purchased through "rental fees" 
that the government would pay for the acreage they removed from 
wheat production. 
By February 1933, however, Wilson had developed second thoughts 
about any general applicability of his allotment idea, suspecting himself 
ofbeing, as he put it, "more or less gripped in the provincialism of the 
Northwest.'' 19 
Meanwhile, nonetheless, Rexford Tugwell had already by July 1932 
secured Roosevelt's rejection of "a Cornell [University} opinion looking 
toward the saving of the family farm, [in favor of} a western one want-
ing to bolster the big wheat producers."20 "It was necessary, however," 
Tugwell himself tells us, "to be aware of the South; and there was some 
question whether [the allotment approach} would do for cotton what 
[M. L. Wilson} promised it would do for wheat.'' 21 
There is no sign that any attention was given-either before the 
passage of the AA Act, or before its powers were invoked-to asking 
how it would affect Appalachia or any other region as a region. The 
AA Act was not formulated region by region but commodity by com-
modity. With respect to allotments, the AA Act authorized the gov-
ernment to limit the production of certain farm products-wheat, 
cotton, corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, milk, and milk products. 22 By im-
posing production limits, the market value of each of these commodi-
ties was to be raised. The field crops on the list were to be limited 
mainly by allotting only a certain number of acres for planting to each 
of them, and livestock was to be limited by allotting only so many 
head to be raised. 
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Appalachia produced significant amounts of four of these farm prod-
ucts-corn, hogs, tobacco, and milk. As for secondary "milk prod-
ucts," these in the mountains consisted mainly of butter, which was 
churned not so much for sale as for home use and barter. Cheese mak-
ing was important in several parts of Older Appalachia (the Valley sub-
region), but it was uncommon in most of the region, especially in 
Newer Appalachia (the Plateau subregion). 23 
The two basic subsistence products of the region overall were corn 
and hogs. These also happened to be the only two AAA reductions ad-
ministered in tandem. That is, a farmer could only receive money for 
reducing his corn acreage if he also reduced his hog numbers, and vice 
versa. The other reductions were all administered separately. 
The compensatory payments mailed to farmers who participated in 
the corn-hog program reimbursed them at approximately the pre-AAA 
market value of the corn production and of the hogs that they forewent. 
And in situations in which the corn and hogs involved were destined for 
market, this level of compensation seems justified. Most Appalachian 
farmers, however, raised corn and hogs less for sale than for subsistence, 
and the true cash equivalent of their lost production was therefore not 
how much they could have previously sold their corn and hogs for but 
how much it would cost them to replace them-that is, the current store 
price. A considerable difference existed between these two amounts. 
The corn-hog program operated for two years, 1934 and 1935, arid 
the "base period" that it adopted was 1932-1933. In other words-to 
consider only corn for a moment-1932-1933 was the base period 
whose farm-by-farm statistics of corn acreage planted and corn bushels 
harvested were used to calculate the farm-by-farm corn acreage that the 
AAA allotted to the farmers participating in its corn-hog program. In 
1932 and 1933, however, bumper crops had made it cheaper for many 
farmers to buy corn than to grow it. The 1932 corn crop had sold at an 
average on-site farm price of $0.29 a bushel, and during the winter of 
1932-1933, the price had fallen as low as $0.188 a bushel. Then in 
1933-1934 a major drought afflicted the Plains states, raising the na-
tion's average on-site corn price by December 1934 to $0.79 a bushel. 
In eastern Kentucky, and perhaps elsewhere in Appalachia, corn prices 
went as high in 1934 as $1.00 a bushel. 24 
The fact that the 1934 corn harvest totalled less than half as many 
bushels as the 1932 harvest was a consequence mainly of the Great 
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Plains' 1934 drought and only secondarily of the AAA's reduction ef-
forts. But in Appalachia, unaffected by that drought, the cause of 
corn's dearness was immaterial. What mattered in Appalachia was that 
corn now cost $0.79 to $1.00 a bushel and that farmers who had 
signed up for the AANs corn-hog program were being reimbursed for 
their sacrificed production (of 20 to 30 percent of their 1932-1933 corn 
production) at only $0.30 a bushel. 25 One Tennessee livestock market-
ing specialist complained to Washington that "because it was cheaper in 
the base years for a man to buy corn at $.25 cents a bushel than to grow 
it, I see no reason why our Program should compel him to continue 
buying it at an increased price." To compel a farmer to buy expensive 
corn rather than to grow his own cheap corn, this expert said, might 
well "interfere with, or prevent, a balanced set-up" on Tennessee 
farms. 26 It could also prevent earning a livelihood from farming. 
This specialist was asking, in effect, that Tennessee farmers who had 
registered for the 1935 corn-hog program be allowed nonetheless to 
practice "import substitution." But to substitute home corn production 
for corn purchases would have undermined the entire allotment ap-
proach to solving the glut of corn and hogs on the market. Further, 
if we glance at the political situation, we find midwestern interests 
more or less controlling U.S. agricultural policies. In November of 
1933, for instance, five midwestern governors felt so pressured by the 
direct action tactics of Milo Reno and the Farm Holiday Association 
that they went to Washington and almost managed to stampede the 
Roosevelt administration into pegging farm prices and allocating to 
all individual farmers the amounts that they would be allowed to sell, 
irrespective of market demand. 27 In such a political atmosphere, it 
simply was not feasible to antagonize midwestern farmers by allow-
ing AAA-contracted farmers elsewhere in the country to grow their 
own livestock feed-by allowing farmers elsewhere to quit buying 
seventy-nine-cent midwestern corn, in this case, even though they had 
formerly bought twenty-five-cent midwestern corn. I could find no 
answer from Washington to the Tennessee specialist's fear that the 
AAA threatened balanced farming. 
Indeed, not only the AANs production restrictions per se threatened 
balanced farming but also rules prohibiting alternative profitable uses 
for the land removed from corn production. Rules governing alternative 
crops and land uses were much more stringent in the corn-hog program 
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than they were in other AAA programs. The AAA even had rules gov-
erning alternative uses of the farm labor and equipment removed from 
corn production. 28 
With respect to hogs, the 1934 corn-hog contract mandated a 25 
percent reduction (below the 1932-1933 average number) of 1934-born 
hogs raised for sale. Participating farmers who possessed extra hogs 
could either trade them or give them away. Compensation from the 
AAA to the farmers came in the form of a five dollar bounty for each 
market-intended hog that was permitted. 
For Appalachian people enrolled in this program, the most onerous 
aspect of its hog provisions was that hogs raised for home consumption 
were restricted to the average annual number per farm raised for home 
consumption during the two base years (1932-1933). 29 This was bur-
densome because the AANs intervention came at a time of growth in 
the subsistence demands on Appalachian agriculture. Already in 1929, 
before the Depression, Appalachia had contained 166,000 "self-
sufficing" farms-one-third of the U.S. total concentrated in about 3 
percent of the country's land area. 30 With the Depression's onset, in-
dustrial cutbacks within the region itself and in its diaspora meant that 
subsistence agriculture not only had to support people who were return-
ing to Appalachia's farms from residence elsewhere but also had to. pro-
vide a larger portion of income for many people who had maintained 
continuous rural Appalachian residence but who now needed to increase 
their subsistence farm activities as their off-the-farm wage work de-
clined or disappeared. 
In eastern Kentucky, part~time farming was denser than anywhere 
else in the United States. There the federal Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics reported that an almost 30 percent "increase in the num-
ber of farms from 1929 to 1934 was brought about largely by change 
of occupation from mining to farming. That is to say, the same fami-
lies were involved, but because of less employment in the mines or 
forests, they did relatively more farming and became classed as farm-
ers in 1934. There was, however, a limited amount of immigration 
and emigration."31 
The number of farmed landholdings increased during the years 1929 
to 1934 throughout Appalachia-although nowhere else so dramati-
cally as in eastern Kentucky-and even the number of residents per 
farm inched slightly upward. In Older and Newer Appalachia com-
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bined (but with eastern Kentucky excluded), 1930 had found 5.45 res-
idents per farm on average, whereas 1935 found 5.6 per farm-an 
increase of slightly over one person per seven farms. In eastern Ken-
tucky, meanwhile, the number of mouths to feed per farm decreased by 
about that amount. But this occurred concurrent with the amazing 30 
percent increase in the number of eastern Kentucky holdings being se-
riously farmed, as mentioned above. 32 Throughout Appalachia, farms 
were being called on to provide a greatly increased proportion of their 
residents' income. 
By basing its overall corn allotments and its subsistence hog allot-
ments on earlier production per farm-rather than taking into account 
the number of people, and the proportion of their income, that each 
separate farm actually had to provide-the AAA effectively hindered 
some of its Appalachian participants from supporting themselves with 
the skills tradition had given them. Beyond doubt this contributed to 
driving some people onto relief. 
Such regional dynamics set in motion by the AAlls allotment pro-
gram were easily overlooked. The AAA had no institutional mecha-
nism for monitoring how its allotment program affected farmers' 
overall economic life. Rural Rehabilitation committees were created un-
der the Federal Emergency Relief Administration partly to monitor the 
overall welfare of relief recipients, but those committees had very little 
power, and certainly had no influence at all on the AAA. 
The AAlls acting administrator, H.R. Tolley, stated in April 
1935 that "commercial slaughter is the important item for a corn-
hog program" and that therefore it did not make much difference that 
up to 150,000 fewer "small producers" had chosen to sign 1935 
corn-hog contracts than had signed 1934 corn-hog contracts. 33 As for 
why so many small farmers chose to eschew the 1935 corn-hog pro-
gram after participating in 1934, presumably they decided that the 
costs of participation outweighed the benefits. In West Virginia, 1934 
had seen 2,169 farmers sign the AAlls corn-hogs contracts, but in 
1935 only 1,425 farmers signed up. The number of participating 
farms thus fell by 34.3 percent, but in the process the base corn acre-
age on participating farms dropped off only 28 percent, 34 indicating 
that farmers who had found the 1934 corn-hog program disadvanta-
geous tended to have smaller operations than those who had found 
it advantageous. 
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A specialist on the AAA has written that in 1933 many farmers "saw 
at once that this program had little to offer small producers, that mar-
ginal [rather than fertile} land would be taken out of production thus 
minimizing reduction of surpluses, and that the program might inter-
fere with sound rotation practices."35 
One might reply to such objections, of course, that the AAA at least 
offered something to small producers, making it partly justified on that 
ground alone. But in the market, small farmers had to compete with 
large farmers. The substantial money payments received by large 
farmers from the AAA helped them mechanize and fertilize, thereby 
increasing their productivity relative to small farmers' productivity. 
And more directly as competitors, large farmers could use their AAA 
payments to buy out small farmers. 36 What helped large farmers 
tended automatically to hurt small farmers within the overall context of 
market competition. 
In Plateau Appalachia the main crop grown strictly for marketing 
was tobacco. Tobacco was a cash crop important to the livelihood of 
many small farmers in eastern Kentucky, western West Virginia, south-
western Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and western North Carolina. 37 
How did small tobacco growers fare under the AA.!ls tobacco program 
relative to large tobacco growers? John B. Hutson, who was chief of 
the AA.!ls tobacco section, recalled later that "there were some pres-
sures for minimum acreages for producers"-by which he meant that 
some people wanted a minimum size to be established for the AA.!ls 
tobacco allotments. Then, no matter how small a farmer's tobacco 
plot may have been in previous years, if the farmer had previously 
grown any tobacco at all (say, a mere one-sixteenth of an acre), that 
would have entitled him under the AAA program to grow a plot of an 
official minimum size (one-half acre, say, or perhaps one acre). Hutson 
recalled that "that kind of problem did at one stage receive considerable 
backing by Congressmen and Senators. In those early years we took the 
position that it was not possible to establish minimums. . . . We 
pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to really favor small 
producers by establishing these minimums, because we would cut, ob-
viously, the large operator."38 
The formula for apportioning tobacco production cuts could easily 
have included a provision establishing a minimum acreage size. Tech-
nically no difficulty existed. The obstacle would have been opposition 
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from large operators. The choice to lump small with large farmers was 
a political choice reflecting the distribution of power in farm organiza-
tions and in American politics generally. Because Appalachia's tobacco 
growers were almost aU small growers, the AA.!ls decision against set-
ting a minimum size for allotments hurt Appalachia as a region. I make 
this explicit because although an initial AAA bias against small farmers 
has generally been acknowledged, the regional implications of this bias 
are still ignored. 
In the case of eastern Kentucky, we saw in chapter 5 that the Na-
tional Recovery Administration prevented mine operators there from ap-
plying their earlier hard-times response of selling coal cheaper and 
prevented the miners themselves from applying their customary response 
to hard times, working cheaper. That decreased eastern Kentucky's pre-
vious share of the national coal market. 
And now, in the workings of the government's tobacco program, 
eastern Kentucky was hurt once more. Because small holdings were the 
rule in eastern Kentucky, full-time subsistence farming was generally 
not feasible, 39 but this area's traditional cash crop, tobacco, was a 
highly intensive crop, and if the government had not interfered with 
tobacco plots of less than one or two acres per farm, fewer eastern Ken-
tuckians would have needed welfare. 
Technically, the participation of farmers in the tobacco program, as 
in all other AAA programs, was voluntary. But the distinction between 
"voluntary" and "mandatory" retained little meaning after the Kerr-
Smith Act of June 1934 levied a 24 percent marketing tax on every 
pound of tobacco grown outside the program. The tax was explicitly 
meant to prevent anyone from doing better by ignoring the AAA to-
bacco program than by cooperating with it. 
Nor did the tobacco program fall by the wayside as did the hog part 
of the corn-hog program when the AA Act was ruled unconstitutional 
in January 1936. By the time that Supreme Court ruling occurred, the 
U.S. Agriculture Department had already prepared legislation to imbed 
the AAA allotment program within a new program for soil 
conservation. 4° Crops that had formerly been called "surplus" were now 
relabeled "soil depleting," and the program continued. Indeed, the gov-
ernment's tobacco contracts now became more restrictive, specifying 
that acreage removed from tobacco production could not be used for any 
other similarly soil-depleting crop. In 1938 a West Virginia county 
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agent tried to convince the second AAA (newly created that year) that 
contracted acres removed from tobacco production should be permitted 
for use in subsistence production. He argued that "if all tobacco growers 
in West Virginia quit growing tobacco and grew additional acreage of 
corn, oats, wheat and such like it still would all be consumed on the 
farm and the amount produced for sale would not be increased."41 Un-
fortunately, that argument only fit the 1933-1935 reaso"n for crop re-
ductions. The county agent's argument was now three years out of date. 
Corn, oats, and wheat were no longer officially "surplus" but "soil-
depleting," and as such they could not be grown on government-
contracted land, even for home consumption. 
Meanwhile, farmers in a position to farm more capital intensively 
found little difficulty in circumventing the output limitations at which 
the AAA aimed. In the case of cotton, for instance, the acreage planted 
by 1939 had fallen 47.2 percent from the acreage that had been planted 
to cotton back in 1929-and yet cotton production had only fallen 21.2 
percent over those years. 42 Between 1935 and 1940 alone, cotton's av-
erage productivity per acre was increased 33.4 percent. 43 Overall, for 
all crops by 1939, thirty-eight million fewer acres were harvested than 
in 1929 and yet total farm production was up 10 percent. 44 
The acreage cutbacks of both the first and second AAAs inspired an 
immense acceleration of American agriculture's chemical revolution-
involving vastly increased use of fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides. 
In the case of corn (which was still slated for reduction after 1935 al-
though hogs were not) not only the chemical revolution but also new 
hybrid corn seeds helped to maximize per-acreage production. Requir-
ing far more chemical fertilizer than ordinary cross-pollinating corn, 
hybrid corn leapt from obscurity in 1933 to cover 75 percent of mid-
western cornland by 1940. Hybrids averaged 15 to 20 percent greater 
output per acre than the cross-pollinating corn that remained Appala-
chia's staple. 45 The result was more intense corn cultivation in the Mid-
west. In the United States overall, 1939's corn acreage was down 11 
percent from 1929's corn acreage, but harvested production was up 7.8 
percent. 46 Large-scale producers of corn-as of cotton and wheat-de-
feated the intent of the allotment program by raising their productivity 
per acre. 
But was this option theirs exclusively? Could not Appalachian farm-
ers keep pace by increasing their own productivity? Did not every 
106 Appalachia's Path to Dependency 
farmer in the United States have an equal right to use inputs that would 
raise production per acre? The answer to this, unfortunately, is that ex-
ternal constraints on production per acre were more pronounced in Ap-
palachia than in, say, the Midwest. Capital not being available to 
subsistence farmers, they could not make their methods capital inten-
sive. In 1929, for instance, wholesale fertilizer sales as a proportion of 
all wholesale business was already four times lower in West Virginia 
than in the United States as a whole. 47 
Appalachia's relative lack of chemical applications doubtlessly had 
its good side in terms of health, but not all progress was similarly 
double-edged. One input of unqualified benignity was lime. By low-
ering the acidity of soil, lime enables farmers to establish the pH level 
most likely to aid their crops. Between 1932 and 1940 the total use 
of lime in American agriculture increased seven fold. 48 Appalachia's 
Valley subregion is rich in limestone, and numerous lime sources had 
been developed there prior to the New Deal. In Pendleton County-
part of West Virginia's Blue Ridge area-a progressive farm movement 
during the World War I era had established six lime grinders where 
previously none had existed. 49 But in Appalachia's Plateau subregion, 
lime was often difficult for farmers to acquire. As late as 1938 an "acute 
lime problem" afflicted most of West Virginia, with no solution in 
sight. ~0 A similar shortage of agricultural lime existed in much of 
eastern Kentucky. 51 
For some purposes, such as to neutralize soil acidity in pastures, lime 
could be replaced by agricultural phosphate (also known as superphos-
phate). And toward the end of the 1930s the government did achieve 
considerable success in distributing phosphate at a subsidized cost. 52 
Following the transition period in 193 5-1936, indeed, the govern-
ment's agriculture program began to benefit Appalachia in various 
ways. Regional considerations began to enter the New Deal's agricul-
ture program after 1935, along with a farm-by-farm approach. As 
the emphasis shifted away from rescuing commodity markets, in-
creased attention was paid to saving the land. In Appalachia, the farm 
programs of this "second New Deal" helped to inhibit, and occasion-
ally to reverse, the region's twin curses of soil depletion and soil ero-
sion. Much of the attack on these two problems was driven by the 
same sort of financial incentives (money payments to farmers) as drove 
the AAA allotment program. Improved methods of land use were in-
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creasingly rewarded under the Soil Conservation Service inaugurated 
in 1937. 
The federal government's ecological initiatives after 1935 were im-
pressive. This environmental vision of the second New Deal was often 
unaccompanied, however, by any comparable social vision. Lewis C. 
Gray, who coordinated the U.S. Agriculture Department's elaborate 
1929-1935 study of Appalachia, described himself as "a hard-boiled 
economist" who was not sociological in his outlook. 53 Gray's foremost 
recommendation for solving Appalachia's economic and social problems 
was the "conversion of the land to public ownership and its utilization 
for public forests, parks, or game preserves."54 
Much land was converted to public ownership in the 1930s. Through 
such land buying as well as through the Agriculture Department's late 
1930s emphasis on better land use, environmental destruction was 
slowed in Appalachia-but in the process the region's economic de-
pendency was increased, helping to set the stage for the 1940-1960 
mass population exodus from the region. This exodus in turn exacer-
bated urban problems in the cities where migration deposited Appala-
chia's emigrants. 
Some of this bleak social result was avoidable. As early as 1916 the 
principles of a prosperous and sustainable Appalachian agriculture had 
been enunciated by the well-known economic geographer J. Russell 
Smith. Smith had challenged American agronomists to "develop and 
teach a mountain agriculture that will make the mountaineer prosper-
ous and leave him his mountain."55 Smith's main point was that Ap-
palachia needed tree plantings that would increase the region's 
production of fruits, nuts, and seeds-especially for animal fodder. 
Without neglecting orchard fruit trees, Smith emphasized certain forest 
trees with great potential as food sources. For tree-grown fodder, Smith 
suggested "the mulberry, the persimmon, the honey locust, the acorn, 
and the chestnut, [which} are primarily forage crops, chiefly pig feed, 
but also good for poultry, sheep, goats, and cows." (The American 
chestnut, of course, subsequently succumbed to a blight that has yet to 
be defeated, but the Chinese and Japanese chestnut remain available.) 
For supplemental human consumption Smith recommended walnuts 
and pecans, adding that "the pig also dearly loves both of these, but 
they are too good for him." Because Appalachia's people were accus-
tomed to eating pork, and because excess hogs could be marketed, 
108 Appalachia's Path to Dependency 
Smith emphasized forest trees that produced good hog fodder-includ-
ing, besides the trees mentioned, pawpaws. 56 
Smith's ideas for forest-grown animal fodder were important because 
they offered the best basis-perhaps the only basis-not merely for re-
versing Appalachia's soil erosion and depletion but also for sustaining 
the region's subsistence reproduction of labor power and, with it, the 
region's competitive standing in U.S. commodity markets. Smith 
pointed out that mulberry trees drop their ripe fruit continuously for 
ten summer weeks and are "considered by many Carolina farmers to be 
as valuable as corn, acre for acre. The persimmon," he added, "is 
equally valuable in the autumn."57 Farm Extension agents ignored, 
however, Smith's case for providing animal fodder through such "tree 
crops" planted on hillsides that corn and other row crops were eroding. 
Then in 1933-1934 the first chairman of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (TVA), Arthur E. Morgan, began promoting tree crops within 
the context of a reforestation-and-wood-industry program in the Ten-
nessee Valley. By October 1934 Morgan was able to report that "studies 
are being made for small cooperative industries based on special uses for 
particular woods. A forest policy is evolving. Abandoned lands are be-
ing acquired, several million trees are being raised for reforesting, and 
a training program for practical foresters is being prepared." Regarding 
forest tree crops, Morgan announced that "the raising of tree crops to 
supply food for hogs, and tree products for sale, is being promoted, and 
large research and breeding nurseries are already planted. Hickories, 
pecans, walnuts, Japanese and Chinese chestnuts, Japanese and Chinese 
persimmons, mulberries, paw-paws and other tree crops are being de-
veloped for land too hilly for plow crops.''58 Thus J. Russell Smith's tree 
crops were temporarily promoted-and planted in nurseries-by one 
New Deal agency, the TVA. 
Of the TV A's three directors, Arthur Morgan served not only as 
chairman but as the director in charge of the TVA's forestry programs. 
What he was advocating in this case, however, was the use of forests to 
produce animal fodder-and soon his encroachment on "agriculture" 
was rejected. Later, Arthur Morgan wrote that what he sought through 
tree crops was one means of reversing the Tennessee Valley's history of 
being "confined to subordinate functions in great industries.'' He added 
that the tree-crop "program was stopped by the other two members of 
the (TVA} board voting as a majority, and the men who were working 
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in the program were summarily discharged. Much of the land was then 
made available, at fifty cents to two dollars an acre, to lumber compa-
nies and others, who then stripped it of its forests." 59 
So the TV A's experiment with tree-produced animal fodder was 
aborted. A less-ambitious reform sponsored by the TVA director in 
charge of agriculture, Harcourt A. Morgan, proved more acceptable, at 
least temporarily. Utilizing the TVA's immense capacity to produce fer-
tilizer, Harcourt Morgan determined that the TVA's fertilizer should be 
plentiful, cheap, and should not consist of the nitrate needed by row 
crops but rather of the phosphate that grasses and legumes needed. 60 
This new "phosphate gospel" was both preached and administered by 
Harcourt Morgan, and it pushed Tennessee Valley farming away, tem-
porarily, from soil-abusing row crops such as corn and cotton and 
pushed it toward livestock raising. Then during the later New Deal this 
phosphate gospel was expounded throughout the Appalachians by the 
Agriculture Department and by state extension services. The TVA it-
self, however, began abandoning Harcourt Morgan's phosphate gospel 
ten years later, in the late 1940s, returning a great deal of Tennessee 
Valley acreage to row crops (and especially to corn) by ceasing to pro-
vide farmers with cheap phosphates and instead giving them cheap 
nitrates. 61 Appalachia, by contrast, has not abandoned the phosphate 
gospel with its concommitants of hay, pasture, and livestock. 
Thus the later New Deal years set Appalachia on a long-term course 
that has taken a great deal of land out of corn and other high-erosion 
crops, putting it into hay and pasture. Hay has displaced corn as the 
region's dominant harvested crop. Corn is a far more intensive crop, of 
course, but even when compared acre by acre, corn had dominated Ap-
palachia's harvested acreage on the eve of the 1930s. Aside from feeding 
farm families and their livestock, much of this corn had been raised by 
wage workers to increase their family living standards, and during the 
Prohibition years of 1920-1933 a good many mountaineers had in-
creased their corn acreage to participate in the moonshining boom. 62 As 
of 1929 in the region's 190 counties, 125 counties were harvesting more 
farm acreage of corn than of any other crop. Hay had followed corn in 
1929 by leading harvested farm acreage in forty-six counties-but only 
in West Virginia had hay-led Appalachian counties outnumbered corn-
led Appalachian counties. The farther south one went in Appalachia, 
the more hay was dominated by corn, until in Georgia and Alabama it 
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became cotton, not hay, that contended with corn for acreage domi-
nance. In four of Alabama's five Appalachian counties, as of 1929, cot-
ton acres outnumbered corn acres, and the same was true in five of 
Georgia's twenty Appalachian counties. The only other exception to 
Appalachia's corn-hay syndrome occurred in the eight Virginia counties 
that made up the Shenandoah Valley and its environs. In seven of those 
counties, wheat acreage led the acreage of all other crops, and in the 
eighth county, fruit acreage led. 63 
By the second half of the century, that 1929 picture had changed a 
great deal. In 1959, only fifty Appalachian counties still harvested 
more acres of corn than of hay, 64 and by 1982 only eight still did so. 65 
In a topography as hilly as Appalachia's, the decline of corn acreage 
and rise of hay adds up to considerable environmental progress. It can-
not be labeled a complete solution as hillsides growing grasses and le-
gumes do not completely cease to erode. They merely erode less than 
they would if planted in row crops. Probably only the production of an-
imal fodder through forest tree crops can place Appalachia's agricul-
ture, and with it the region's traditional lifeways, on a permanently 
sustainable basis. 
7 
The Welfare of Rural Appalachia 
We must raise our guard against placing a penalty upon industry or a 
premium upon indolence. . . . We must not permit our people to be-
lieve that the government will do for them what they should do for 
themselves. 
-H. G. Kump, governor of West Virginia, 14 January 1937 
New Deal policy makers betrayed no misgivings about the usefulness of 
pumping money into "backward" areas such as Appalachia. Harry 
Hopkins and his assistants often bucked local political opposition to at-
tain their relief quotas. And Franklin Roosevelt, from 1934 on, fre-
quently blamed the South's low living standards on its dearth of 
money-money with which southerners could buy goods and also could 
pay taxes for better roads, schools, and social services. When New Deal 
money injections into the rural South did not revive its economy, the 
government's prescription nonetheless stayed the same. At a March 
1939 press conference, Roosevelt reiterated that anything done "to im-
prove this economic problem No. 1 [the South) ultimately comes back 
to a question of greater purchasing power on the part of the average 
Southern family." 1 
There is nothing inherently wrong with government intervention. 
In fact, since at least the 1920s, Appalachia has suffered from region-
wide economic liabilities that cry out for planned solutions. Early in 
1929, before the stock market crash, Appalachia was singled out for 
study by the U.S. Agriculture Department's Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics. Cooperation in that first major social and economic survey 
of the region came from the extension services of Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee-four of the five main Appalachian 
states. 2 As the Depression worsened, the study continued, and by early 
1933 a draft of its recommendations was circulating among policy 
makers. Most of those recommendations were eventually tried before 
the New Deal was over. But at first, in the formative flurry of 1933, 
regional distinctions were buried beneath the national drive to some-
how revive markets for America's major commodities, agricultural and 
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industrial alike. The first New Deal approached the economy commod-
ity by commodity, not region by region. 
Thus, despite the federal government's longstanding regional ap-
proach to some fields (such as electric power), and even despite its new 
multipurpose Tennessee Valley Authority overlapping the southwestern 
flank of Appalachia, it proved slow to adopt the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics' regional approach to Appalachia. That bureau itself did in-
augurate an Appalachian Regional Office in 1934, but its headquarters 
were in Washington, D.C., and it attempted little before 1939. Mean-
while the New Deal's agricultural adjustment program began to veer 
toward regional thinking in its second incarnation (beginning early in 
1935), 3 but in this new scheme the bulk of Appalachia was divided be-
tween two of the country's rwelve AAA farming classifications: "gen-
eral farming" and "self-sufficing."4 (Not until 1965, when the 
Appalachian Regional Commission was established, did the federal 
government design explicitly Appalachian policies. That commission's 
diagnosis and policies lie beyond the scope of this book.)~ 
As applied to Appalachia, the New Deal fell into three broad cate-
gories: industrial, agricultural, and relief (now called welfare). 
In the industrial category, the National Recovery Administration of 
the 1933-1935 "first New Deal" sponsored wage and price minimums 
that damaged the ability of Appalachian coal to compete with northern 
and midwestern coal6 -and this at a time when the Depression was 
curtailing opportunities for people to migrate out of Appalachia. Al-
though the Supreme Court invalidated the NRA in May 1935, that 
merely abolished coal's price supports until the First Guffey Act was 
passed three months later, in August 1935. And wage minimums were 
effectively reenacted even sooner, in July 1935, by the Wagner Act-
inspiring Appalachian coal operators to hasten their replacement of 
miners with machines. This mainly involved installing automatic coal-
loading machines, which, as has subsequently been revealed, increased 
the incidence of black lung disease among Appalachian miners. 7 
Turning then to the New Deal's agricultural program and its effect 
on Appalachia, we found the AAA working to the disadvantage of 
many Appalachian farmers by inspiring unprecedented advances else-
where in crop productivity per acre. Tobacco and corn-hogs were the 
rwo AAA programs most directly relevant to Appalachian farmers, and 
both of those programs worked against many of the region's small farm-
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ers. In the later 1930s, on the other hand, the New Deal's growing em-
phasis on financial incentives for land-use improvements helped to slow 
the rate of Appalachia's soil depletion and erosion. 
Like the New Deal's industrial and agricultural programs, its relief 
programs did not completely achieve what any of their varied constit-
uencies hoped for. Social visions abounded in the 1930s. One visionary 
who made the most of her position was Eleanor Roosevelt. Eleanor 
Roosevelt's visit to depressed West Virginia mining communities in Au-
gust 1933 triggered a chain of projects that continued as long as the 
New Deal itself. Traveling incognito for several days in West Virginia, 
Eleanor Roosevelt came to believe that the government should expand 
various community development projects that had been started in the 
mountains by the American Friends {Quaker} Service Committee work-
ing in league with state extension services. This led directly to the 
founding of five government-sponsored communities for "stranded" un-
employed coal miners: Westmoreland in Pennsylvania; Arthurdale, Red 
House, and Tygart Valley in West Virginia; and Cumberland in Ten-
nessee. These five communities soon weighed like five albatrosses 
around the federal neck-becoming among the most controversial of 
the ninety-nine new communities eventually sponsored by the govern-
ment's subsistence homestead program. 8 The head of West Virginia's 
extension service later wrote that "instead of {Eleanor Roosevelt's] visit 
leading to needed additional Federal aid to carry out the program al-
ready underway with the guidance of Extension and Friends, the Fed-
eral Government took all responsibility away from the local agencies 
and people"-substituting "government help from the top down 
{which] eventually ended as a dismal failure 0 " 9 
Arthur E. Morgan, who chaired the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) from 1933 to 1938, saw the difficulties faced by intentional com-
munities. When Morgan returned to private life he lauded the 
strengths of organic, non-intentional communities that were based on 
family ties and lifelong connections. 10 As for economic issues, Morgan 
deemphasized national objectives in favor of instead achieving "a large 
degree of local and regional self-sufficiency." Morgan believed that 
"with highly developed regional self-sufficiency, a great part of our eco-
nomic maladjustment could be solved. For planning the most satisfac-
tory degree of self-sufficiency, a minimum region may be no larger than 
a local neighborhood or a township. A village and a surrounding area 
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of ten or twenty square miles may be regionally self-sufficient in many 
respects. This area in turn might be part of a larger region of perhaps 
four or five hundred square miles, with many more elements of 
self-sufficiency." 11 
Arthur Morgan was not a localise or regionalist in any cultural sense. 
He evinced no affection for local color or provincial traits. Perhaps be-
cause of his background as an educator, however, he saw pitfalls in the 
path of people who were shifting from a low-money life-style to the 
broader horizons and greater individualism that are possible in money-
supported lives. 12 This was not a concern shared by the TVA's two other 
directors. One of them, David Lilienthal, a brusque young lawyer, op-
posed any goal for the TV A less definable than the production and dis-
tribution of kilowatt-hours. ("I don't have much faith in 'uplift,' " was 
one of Lilienthal's sayings.) 13 But the educator Arthur Morgan saw self-
discipline as part of any worthwhile grassroots monetization. "In rural 
America," Morgan said, "there are millions of people living in families 
where even in prosperous times the total cash income is less than one 
hundred dollars a year. . . . For children in such families economic op-
portunity is primary and vocational training is the first essential, but 
unless it is accompanied by the cultural growth of discrimination and 
self-discipline, the waste of personality which will accompany the in-
crease of income, may be very great." 14 
Arthur Morgan not only pondered human development in tandem 
with economic development but he thought about the future of Appa-
lachia. To minimize the mountain region's dependence on the larger 
U.S. economy, Morgan suggested the creation of local self-help coop-
eratives that could produce for local consumption and could distribute 
what they produced. With respect to agriculture, Morgan considered it 
counterproductive for Appalachia to attempt much exporting of staple 
products to regions that were turning out the same things with higher 
productivity. Agriculture, said Morgan, was not the ideal way for Ap-
palachia's people to fulfill their cash needs. Rather, he said, "agricul-
tural products ought to be something tolive on at home, so that we will 
not have to buy things from the outside. Agriculture ought to be like 
the home garden that sustains people, but is not primarily the source 
of income .... Agriculture in the southern mountains ... ought to 
support this region in food but not to supply its money except from 
special crops. . . . If we use our agriculture to feed our own region and 
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then begin to manufacture the things we need at home, we shall have 
{an} answer to the problem of balancing agriculture and industry." 15 
This approach parallels the path that Taiwan has followed to economic 
success since World War II. 
The speech containing Arthur Morgan's regional prescription be-
came the most controversial of his career, for it also contained a sug-
gestion that "local money" could usefully be issued to supplement U.S. 
money. Morgan suggested that "to a certain limited degree this region 
might well set up its own local economy. It can produce its own goods 
and deal with itself. But if a region is going to build up a new economy 
by making things it needs at home, it will in a limited sense have to 
build up a whole economy and not a fragment of an economy. . . . I 
would have a central purchasing organization, a central sales organiza-
tion, a distributing organization, and I think I'd have that cooperative 
organization have its own tokens of credit,-a sort of local money." 16 
This idea was controversial at the time and it will be controversial 
again if it receives another hearing. Arthur Morgan was in effect pre-
scribing the sort of financial prerogatives that Appalachia had enjoyed 
before the Civil War. Arthur Morgan delivered his speech in Knoxville 
in November 1933, at a time when Knoxville's city government was 
issuing one of America's most successful local currencies. In mid-June 
1932, Knoxville had begun paying its city employees with "tax war-
rants," which were claims on the city's future tax income. The tax war-
rants paid 6 percent interest. Almost all Knoxville merchants accepted 
them. They could not be deposited in banks, and thus they circulated 
faster than U.S. dollars, stimulating Knoxville's economy. The tax war-
rants helped rescue the city government finances, for after six months of 
paying city employees with them the city began receiving them into its 
coffers as tax revenues faster than it was paying them out as salaries. 17 
Once the New Deal got under way, most industrial wages in Appa-
lachia began rising rapidly, which was a boon for the workers involved. 
Unfortunately, however, these wage increases were subsidized not so 
much by industrial recovery as by price increases. Appalachia's main 
employer was the coal industry-an industry whose previous response 
to hard times had been to pay lower wages and to sell coal cheaper. In 
1933 this kind of response was suddenly penalized by the NRA-
sponsored "codes of fair competition," which set minimum prices and 
minimum wages. The NRA damaged Appalachia's competitive position 
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in coal markets, and that damage in turn helped to inspire the New 
Deal's homestead projects. A picture emerges of government interven-
tion trying to offset the effects of previous government intervention. An 
in-house study reported that "when some of the codes of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act began to have the effect of closing down, or 
threatening to close down, still more mines, in the late summer of 
1933, thus to leave still more stranded miner communities, the sug-
gestion was made in some quarters that one section ofN.I.R.A. should 
be used to undo the incidental damage wrought by another. Whether or 
not this was the deciding force, it was decided to establish four 
subsistence-homestead projects for stranded miners." 18 Actually, count-
ing the Red House project in West Virginia, which was run by Harry 
Hopkins's relief agency rather than by the Division of Subsistence 
Homesteads, five projects were started for stranded miners. 19 
One means for extending aid in a noncommunity setting was the 
New Deal program of rural rehabilitation loans. This program made 
federal advice available without subordinating farmers to federal super-
vision. Research conducted by Benita J. Howell shows in detail why ru-
ral rehabilitation loans proved more successful among a number of 
mountaineers than planned communities proved. 20 
As the New Deal continued, on-site federal officials divided among 
themselves as to what policy could best deal with isolated mountain 
people and with the headwater land those people often abused. In 
West Virginia, some federal personnel felt that fully one-fifth of the 
state was so rugged and inaccessible that the government should buy 
it up and prohibit farming there. These officials cited not only exces-
sive erosion in such areas but also the high cost of providing social ser-
vices there. Other officials counterargued that people who lived in 
remote locations "seem reasonably well content at present," and that 
therefore "the best solution lies in rehabilitation of these families in their 
present locations."21 
A survey made of the southern nubbin of West Virginia's Lewis 
County in February 1941 offers a closer look at one of those remote lo-
cations. The survey found 326 people living there in 63 households. 
Demographically, however, these were not normal American house-
holds, or even normal West Virginia households. Their age distribution 
was extremely skewed toward youth. In the United States as a whole at 
that time only 34 percent of the population was aged 19 or under-and 
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in West Virginia as a whole only 42 percent of the population. But in 
that remote southern tip of Lewis County a full 52 percent of the pop-
ulation was aged 19 or under. Indeed, 44 percent was aged 14 or 
younger. The area was making an unrecognized contribution to Appa-
lachia's economy by performing subsistence reproduction of labor 
power. In the words of the survey, "The principal export product of 
this area appears to be children." Almost two-thirds of the households 
had received relief in 1940. One-third of them had no other cash in-
come, and this one-third averaged half again more cash income than the 
other households. 22 
In chapter 4 we saw that an age spectrum skewed toward youth was 
chronic in Appalachia. And in fact, during the industrialization period 
of 1880 to 1930, West Virginia's population pattern grew increasingly 
skewed toward youth. 23 But the point to note here is that before any sig-
nificant relief money appeared, West Virginia's southern Lewis County 
farm households, and tens of thousands like them throughout Appala-
chia, must somehow have managed to subsist despite their handicap of 
. an age spectrum weighed heavily toward children. Before the New 
Deal, the southern Lewis County households had received little if any 
relief money. Now one-third of them depended on relief for their entire 
money income. How then had those families managed to support them-
selves prior to the New Deal? How many of their breadwinners had 
"worked out"-living and working away from home-and how much 
had other members of the families damaged their home farms in the 
process of farming them? 
Only partially does the southern Lewis County survey help us puzzle 
out such questions. The district contained, it says, "relatively few 
young adults and older adolescents, aged 15 to 30 years." This age 
group had evidently "tended to migrate from the area when the oppor-
tunity came.''24 As of February 1941 not many of these absent youth 
were "working out" at wage jobs. Apparently their opportunity to leave 
the area had instead come when the· federal government took over re-
sponsibility for supporting their elders and their younger siblings, free-
ing these young adults and older adolescents to try bettering their own 
condition elsewhere. Before the Depression, working out had been com-
mon among mountaineers. But as of early 1941, the Depression was not 
yet quite over and the survey found that only half as many sons as 
daughters were then making their homes outside the district. Four-
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fifths of the absent daughters were absent because they had married 
elsewhere. By and large, they had thereby acquired greater affluence. 25 
Left behind were disproportionate numbers of children and older 
adults. The survey concluded on a note of concern about the children:· 
"Inasmuch as the principal export product of this area appears to be 
children, it is of utmost importance that their health and education 
should be one of the principal aims of any adjustment program."26 The 
surveyors betrayed no hint, however, that people were already adjusting 
their lives to the government's relief payments. 
In 1932, relief payments in West Virginia had barely exceeded $2 
million. Then, from the beginning of 1933 through the middle of 
1940, relief payments in West Virginia (including paychecks issued by 
the Civilian Works Administration in 1933-1934 and WPA paychecks 
issued from 193 5 on), combined with paychecks dispersed to West Vir-
ginians by the Public Works Administration, the Civilian Conservation 
Corps, and the National Youth Administration, totalled about $320 
million. 27 If evenly dispersed, that would have given $23 every year to 
every West Virginian regardless of age, more than $100 a year to every 
West Virginia household. In 1993 dollars it would have been more than 
$800 a year for every household. 
As of 1939, the WPA called 23 percent of its West Virginia em-
ployees "displaced from agriculture" (as compared with 47 percent "dis-
placed from industry"). 28 This tells us that West Virginia farm 
households received WPA jobs roughly in proportion to their percent-
age of the population. 29 Rural workers were limited to fifteen hours of 
WPA work weekly, however, whereas urbanites could work for the 
WPA up to twenty-four hours a week. That delivered greater than half 
again more WPA income to urbanites than to rural workers, but none-
theless many farmers on the WPA rolls were making more money in-
come than they ever had. 
An increased dependence on money income was not a consequence 
intended by this federal outlay. Nor, for that matter, were WPA or other 
relief payments ever explicitly designated for the purpose of decreasing 
agricultural pressure on mountain land. And although farmers' high re-
lief payments helped to set the stage for later mass emigration from Ap-
palachia-yet out-migration too was never explicitly intended to result 
from high relief payments. 
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In retrospect, despite our present-day realization that some of Ap-
palachia's present problems derive from welfare, we must ask whether 
in fact there was any alternative to providing high relief payments to 
farm families-or any alternative to their later mass emigration from 
Appalachia's farms-if wholesale erosion and soil depletion were to be 
reversed. Neither at the micro level in such places as West Virginia's 
southern Lewis County, nor in a West Virginia land-use planning effort 
that began about 1940, do we find any suggested means to stop erosion 
except by terminating agriculture. West Virginia's land-use planning 
committee had no major alternative income to offer hill farmers unless 
they quit cultivating their fields and planted trees in them, thereby 
qualifying for a one-time payment of five to thirty-five dollars an acre 
from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. 30 
And only certain trees qualified for this one-time payment. The 
plantings had to be of AAA-approved "forest trees," which in West Vir-
ginia consisted of four species of pine and two of spruce, plus yellow 
poplar, black locust, and black walnut. 31 None of these trees provided 
good animal fodder, with the single exception that hogs were willing to 
eat black walnuts, and thus the AAA:s financial incentive to plant fields 
and pastures with AAA-approved trees offered no real hope for main-
taining rural Appalachia's way oflife. The mountains' native oaks, with 
their acorns, provided better hog fodder than walnuts-and oaks are 
easier to grow than walnut trees on cleared land-but the AAA did 
not subsidize oak plantings, perhaps because oak logs fetched less 
money at sawmills. 
As a state almost entirely hilly, West Virginia did devise guidelines 
for the degrees of slope that were considered usable for cultivation and 
for pasture. Those guidelines, however, were prescriptions for disaster. 
As of 1939, the West Virginia extension service was advising farmers 
that slopes of up to twenty-five degrees were suitable for cultivation un-
der certain conditions, and that slopes of up to thirty-five degrees were 
"suited generally for pastures.'o32 This did perhaps prompt some 
progress during a decade when Civilian Conservation Corps workers 
were finding corn cultivated on slopes of up to eighty degrees. 33 But in 
the absence of terraces to inhibit water runoff, twenty-five degrees was 
far too steep for row crops, and thirty-five degrees far too steep for pas-
ture. As recently as 1977, 1982, and 1987, West Virginia has led the 
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nation in pasture erosion-its 1987 soil loss estimated at an average 
annual rate of 6. 7 tons per acre of pasture. 34 
In a 1926 meeting, a Tennessee extension agronomist had an-
nounced that "mountain lands can never compete with good lands; 
but since the people will not move out of the mountains to better 
farming sections, the only thing to do is to help them use what they 
have to the best advantage." 35 Yet little help was forthcoming. Indeed, 
after the Cumberland Homesteads project was established in east-
central Tennessee's Cumberland Plateau area, the Tennessee extension 
service had "to make an investigation to ascertain crop possibilities in 
the area" before it could advise the homesteaders about even their cash~ 
crop options. 36 
Later in the 1930s, however, there was more mountain-farm re-
search. In 1937-1938, for instance, a TVA supervisor in southwestern 
Virginia made important long-term calculations of the amount of ero-
sion prevented on average open hillside pastures through the applica-
tion of ninety-six pounds of agricultural phosphate per acre. Fifteen 
months after applying the phosphate, the TVA supervisor found le-
gumes covering 40 percent more surface of the phosphated pastures 
than of similar pastures left unphosphated. During those first fifteen 
months, the phosphated pastures lost four-sevenths less soil through 
erosion than the unphosphated pastures, and one-third less water ran off 
the phosphated pastures. 37 
From the perspective of any farm family that intended to continue 
farming, here surely was an improvement that was preferable to plant-
ing hillside pastures with AAA-approved forest trees. Imp.roved pas-
ture, besides lessening erosion, would enable a farm to raise more 
livestock. And already by 1936 (when the government was paying only 
$5 an acre to farmers for planting forest trees) the government financial 
incentive for phosphating pastures was at least $2.50 an acre. 38 But re-
member that even after phosphating, those open pastures would still 
lose about three-sevenths of the soil they had been losing without phos-
phate. Thus phosphating would slow the destruction of hillside pas-
tures but would not prevent it. Was a choice thus required between 
phosphating pastures (thereby maintaining an area's population density, 
at least for awhile) or reforesting hillside pastures with the expectation 
that most people would soon have to leave such a reforested area? Those 
seemed the only choices offered by government policy. 
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And yet, as mentioned in chapter 6, the principles of a prosperous 
and sustainable Appalachian agriculture had long been publicized by). 
Russell Smith, who in 1916, we noted, had challenged America's vast 
agricultural research establishment to "develop and teach a mountain 
agriculture that will make the mountaineer prosperous and leave him 
his mountain."39 For hillside fields, Smith emphasized terracing-
something that New Deal officials were unaccountably slow to recom-
mend to mountain farmers and were loathe to support with financial 
incentives. 40 After terracing hillside fields, Smith recommended the 
evenly spaced planting of mulberry, persimmon, honey locust, oak, 
chestnut, and pawpaw trees-all of which provide excellent animal fod-
der, especially for hogs. 41 Smith's ideas may well have represented-
and may still today represent-the only sustainable way to practice 
agriculture on the hillsides of the Appalachian Plateau. 
Conclusion 
If the roots of the changed economy of the 1980s lie before 1960, we 
must find those roots and explore them .... The perspective of our his-
tory from the inflationary stagnation of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
is different than it was when an earlier gene[1ltion of economic historians 
chronicled our victorious march through the troubles of the 1930s to the 
apex of American world prestige at the end of Eisenhower's presidency. 
-Jonathan Hughes, American Econ()1flic History 
The stagnation of which Jonathan Hughes speaks is still with us in 
the 1990s, and I venture to say it has grown systemic to American cap-
italism. This rethinking of Appalachia's odyssey began with Frederick 
Jackson Turner's comment that early American settlers poured "their 
plastic pioneer life into geographic moulds." 1 As we have seen, they 
were also pouring their lives into the molds that we call economic sys-
tems. Even in a single region, no one mold-no one economic sys-
tem-molded the behavior of everyone. Many of Appalachia's people 
poured .their efforts into subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems, many 
others into the capitalist system, and many into both. 
Concurrently-and within either system-auspicious material con-
ditions called forth enterprise but inauspicious conditions evoked an ob-
session with obtaining subsistence. In the pioneering, frontier period of 
Appalachia's history, self-sufficiency came easily to most people. Under 
those easy conditions the average farm family could be entrepreneurial 
without jeopardizing its subsistence. Indications abound that Appala-
chia as a region was self-sufficient in food prior to 1860. Many pioneers 
invested in guns or animal traps not merely to provide for their families 
but also to trade animal pelts for nonnecessities. All the evidence in-
dicates that prior to 1860, Appalachia exported large amounts of com-
modities proportional to its population-its food exports generally 
occurring as livestock "on the hoof." But Appalachia's exports used ex-
changes that were at least partly financed by credit provided from out-
side the region-and this proved, under later conditions, to be a seed 
of economic dependency. Within the region as well, money was being 
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created by state-chartered banks-and this suggests that a less-
dependent odyssey of capitalist development might have been possible 
than what eventually occurred. Meanwhile, most of the region's eco-
nomic exchanges involved no transfer of money at all. The region prior 
to 1860 was clearly not economically dependent. 
As we turned to the agricultural production levels achieved in Ap-
palachia during the forty years preceding the beginnings of its major 
industrialization (that is, between 1840 and 1880), we found, in absolute 
figures, that most forms of agriculture registered increased production 
during those years. But when the amount of agricultural production per 
capita was calculated, a rapid decline could be seen. This decline of food 
production per person was particularly precipitous in the region's Pla-
teau area west of the mountains proper. The Plateau subregion experi-
enced a population boom during those years-from 130,018 people in 
1840 to 501,655 people in 1880, a growth of 286 percent. 2 
During those forty years before the Plateau's major industrialization 
began, the number of hogs per person fell by more than half. The num-
ber of cattle and work animals per person fell by almost half. Grain 
production per person fell by one-third. At the same time, potato pro-
duction per person increased slightly and so apparently did dairy pro-
duction-both indicating a shift toward less desired foods that required 
more work to produce. 3 This is understandable, because the Plateau's 
average farm size decreased by more than half in just thirty years ( 1850 
to 1880).4 
The farmers who raised surplus livestock, and the intrepid drovers 
who canvassed the various districts to gather herds and drive them to 
market, were almost all independent operators, almost all self-
employed. 5 After the depredations of the Civil War, however, and after 
the subsistence demands of a postbellum population boom, there no 
longer existed so much surplus livestock to export on the hoof from Ap-
palachia. Other forms of enterprise then began expanding. It is in this 
period that Altina Waller's book Feud shows us Devil Anse Hatfield as 
an extremely entrepreneurial timber operator along the Tug Fork River. 
Devil Anse lacked any significant money to invest. He operated on. 
credit, promising future payments or future timber deliveries, in ex-
change for immediate merchandise for his family and work crew. 
Devil Anse Hatfield's low-money timber business dissolved when he 
lost his timber lands in 1888. This was symptomatic of a Gilded Age 
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trend throughout Appalachia, particularly in Plateau Appalachia. The 
finding of an expert on the Flat Top-Pocahontas coal field (which strad-
dles the West Virginia-Virginia boundary) bears repeating: outsiders 
were not the first people to try to exploit that coal field. "Locals tried 
like hell to exploit the coal," he says, "but lacked the necessary means 
to mount a large-scale operation. The locals [then) acted as middle-
men, arranging sales of land and right-of-way to Philadelphia entre-
preneurs who financed the thing .''6 
The type of small, low-money, high labor-investment enterprise that 
had often succeeded before the Civil War was much less likely to suc-
ceed after the Civil War. Why? 
The primary reasons were probably technological. Decentralized, 
low-capital forms of enterprise faced increased competition throughout 
the United States after the Civil War from newly available technologies. 
Concentrated, capital-intensive means of production offered economies 
of scale that investors of capital found attractive. But the increasing de-
ployment of such means of production is not all that is important. We 
have also asked who controlled their deployment and why they con-
trolled it. We have asked why Appalachia's own entrepreneurs often 
found themselves confined to relatively low-capital, old-fashioned pro-
duction methods while outside investors often were financing the de-
ployment of up-to-date technologies under their very noses. 
Prior to the Civil War, "easy money" periods had predominated in 
the United States, whereas "tight money" periods had usually lasted 
only a few years in the wake of each financial panic. The panics occurred 
about every twenty years, generally precipitated by eastern bankers' de-
mands that western and southern bankers redeem their banknotes in 
specie (metallic money). The western and southern practice of requiring 
only low specie reserves behind local banknotes made possible rapid 
economic development in "new" areas, where the bulk of assets con-
sisted not of financial holdings but of potential, of natural resources 
(e.g., land, timber, and mineral holdings). 
Then in 1863, as a war-finance measure, Congress passed a national 
banking act that offered bankers the option of replacing their state char-
ters with federally issued charters. Under a federal charter they could 
still issue banknotes (as they had done as state banks), but now they 
would have to back their banknotes 111 percent with U.S. bonds. The 
intent of Congress was to sell more U.S. bonds to raise money for the 
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war, but the actual effect was to make federal charters unattractive to 
bankers. Congress heightened bankers' aversion by failing to sanction 
the use of land, timber, minerals, or other real estate as collateral that 
national banks could accept to guarantee loans. In March 1865, how-
ever, Congress (by a single vote) passed an act imposing a 10 percent fee 
on any bank of any sort that passed a banknote of any nonnational 
bank-in effect thereby outlawing state-bank banknotes-and sud-
denly bankers stampeded to acquire federal charters. Prior to 1862, 
which was when government "greenbacks" had begun appearing, all 
banknotes had been issued by state-chartered banks. Now suddenly 
none were. 
This is not to say that easy money disappeared. Only cash became 
relatively scarce after 1865 (that is, only specie and banknotes). Easy-
money practices continued in the realm of checking-deposit money. In 
1865 deposit holdings exceeded cash in the United States by a ratio of 
only one and a half to one. By 1914 deposits would exceed cash by al-
most nine to one. 7 
Thus the money growth that accompanied America's rapid postbel-
lum industrialization was a ballooning growth of deposit money accom-
panied by stagnation in the amount of cash that was circulating. This 
was something new. Prior to the Civil War, cash had expanded faster 
than deposit money. From 1834 to 1860, cash in circulation (specie and 
banknotes together) had grown 251 percent, whereas bank deposits had 
grown only 204 percent. 8 
The most important long-term effect of the 1865 law terminating 
state-bank banknotes was the financial advantage that it conferred on 
the region that held the most financial reserves as of then. This was not 
a "natural" advantage. Indeed, the Northeast had itself acquired its 
substantial financial assets largely by issuing banknotes against other 
forms of assets-slaves, land, timber, fish, rum, etc. 9 In effect, the 
1865 law denied to other regions the right to follow the Northeast's 
path to acquiring large financial reserves. 
Meanwhile, by the 1880s, out-migration was ceasing to offer Appa-
lachian farm families hope of retaining their life-style if they relocated 
elsewhere. The Ozarks had absorbed a stream of Appalachia's young 
people from the 1830s onward, 10 but by 1880 the average farm size in 
the Ozarks was down to 121 acres, almost 50 acres below Appalachia's 
average farm size. 11 
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Agricultural production per capita continued its decline in Appala-
chia, and one consequence of this decline was that employers could ob-
tain low-wage labor from at least some of the Plateau's farm families. 
Even a low wage enabled hard-pressed farm families to live better, ini-
tially, than they would have lived without any wage income at all. The 
evidence suggests that most of the Appalachian farm families who 
turned to wage labor did so because, solely as farmers, they were be-
coming poorer. Most of those who did begin wage labor also continued 
to farm part time, or to alternate between farming and wage work. 
Their turn toward wage work does not mean that they were completely 
impoverished, but it suggests that they saw their living standard de-
clining. The wages offered by coal operators generally stayed relatively 
low in Appalachia, but those wages could be attractive because when 
combined with continued farming they tended at the time to increase 
living standards at least slightly. 
As major industrialization thus got under way, many of the region's 
farmer-miners continued calculating within a different economic system 
than did their employers. In Antonio Gramsci's terms, the farmer-
miners and their employers participated in different historical blocs. 12 
Appalachia's farmer-miners did not necessarily seek a different goal than 
the coal operators who employed them. Although most of the region's 
farmer-miners entered the mines primarily for subsistence goals, some 
of them surely did so to acquire more than their subsistence needs. The 
crucial difference was that most farmer-miners held values rooted in 
their subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems, whereas most coal opera-
tors held values rooted in the cash-credit-and-wage system (capitalism). 
These two different economic systems fostered different evaluations of 
any given behavior. Within Appalachia's subsistence-barter-and-borrow 
systems, the most advantageous investments were generally invest-
ments of labor and land-whereas in the capitalist system labor was 
subordinate to capital investment, which held the initiative and gener-
ally proved more advantageous. 
Appalachia's industrialization initially served the short-term inter-
ests of both financial investors and miners, but eventually the economic 
interests of the financial investors were served far better than those of 
miners. To see why this occurred, I analyzed Appalachia's low-money 
economic systems. Some might call them systems of "household econ-
omy." Here I have put less emphasis on production than on exchange 
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(on distribution) and have therefore called them subsistence-barter-and-
borrow systems. Their means of production were mainly labor-intensive 
subsistence farming and their means of exchange were mainly barter 
and borrowing. These systems were driven primarily by voluntary rec-
iprocity. Simultaneous two-way exchanges held lower priority than ex-
changes in a time-lapse pattern to suit mutual convenience. 
These "traditional" economic systems did not cease to function 
when, more than one hundred years ago, Appalachia's major industri-
alization began. What occurred then was a meshing: capitalist relations 
meshed with Appalachia's "traditional" economic relations. The bur-
geoning capitalist relations were characterized by contracts (such as la-
bor in exchange for cash wages, or for "in kind" wages, or for company-
scrip wages) and by cash or scrip purchases of store goods. Meanwhile, 
the continuing, and indeed thriving, "traditional". relations remained 
based on networks of voluntary reciprocity, including labor exchange. 
But why, if the subsistence-barter-and-borrow economy thrived dur-
ing Appalachia's industrialization era, did so many of Appalachia's peo-
ple eventually find themselves in need of federal relief when the 
industrial economy faltered? 
The answer is that, by continuing alongside outside-controlled in-
dustrialization, the continuing networks of mutual aid served to reduce 
wage demands and thus to transfer Appalachia's wealth (in the form of 
labor's products) outside the region. The long-term effect of continued 
low-money networking among industrial workers was that the workers 
subsidized U.S. industry at their own eventual expense. 
Looking back over the full train of thought that leads to this con-
clusion, each step in the logic of this present book has been prefigured 
by earlier economic paradigms. In the process of criticizing earlier 
ideas I am also making use of them. Walt Rostow's too-optimistic 
five-step paradigm of economic development, for instance, prefigures 
my own formulation of five steps that have led Appalachia into eco-
nomic dependency. Rostow's five steps were ( 1) the traditional society, 
(2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the take-off, (4) the drive to ma-
turity, and (5) the age of mass consumption. Similarly I have found 
five steps in Appalachia's economic past, but they have led to depen-
dent development. 
First, there indeed used to be a "traditional society" functioning in 
Appalachia, but that society was not preoccupied with attaining merely 
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its subsistence. Most of the region's earliest white settlers were intent on 
attaining both subsistence and profits. 
Second, from 1840 to 1880 there then occurred "preconditions for 
take-off," but what Appalachia's preconditions actually prefigured was 
dependent, not independent, growth. For internal as well as exogenous 
reasons, Appalachia by 1880 was starting to grow dependent on outside 
sources for some of the food it consumed and for a great deal of money 
that helped to mediate its own internal economic exchanges. 
Third, what followed between 1880 and 1930 (the region's indus-
trialization era) can then accurately be called a "take-off," but what 
took off, again, was dependency. Appalachia's industrialization con-
stituted a dependent economic development. Independent economic 
development in this low-capital region would have required greater ag-
ricultural or financial autonomy than Appalachia enjoyed. Sufficient 
autonomy in those two areas eluded the region for reasons both eco-
nomic and political. 
And then, following Rostow on to a fourth step, the New Deal 
helped drive Appalachia's dependency on to "maturity" by encouraging 
even many of the region's full-time farmers to increase their dependence 
on a money system based outside the region. The fact that completely 
sustainable mountain agriculture was not promoted by the New Deal, 
and that local autonomy was not encouraged, constituted two major 
missed opportunities. 
With the New Deal's liquidation in 1942, the region moved on to a 
fifth stage, but rather than a stage of "mass consumption" this was a 
stage of mass emigration. Even this did not solve the region's problems, 
however-perhaps because people tended to emigrate during their most 
productive phase of life. During the 1960s, major federal transfer pay-
ments were reinitiated in the region and continue today. 
The causes of the century-plus path toward dependency have in-
cluded acts of commission as well as acts of omission. Not merely things 
that were not done, resources that were not available, helped to cause 
dependency, but also things that were done. To a considerable extent, 
therefore, my findings have paralleled Andre Gunder Frank's idea of 
"the development of underdevelopment" and have paralleled Richard 
Simon's earlier application of that paradigm to Appalachia (in a study as 
yet unpublished). 13 But I have modified Simon's analysis after finding 
that not merely industrial conditions fostered dependency but also ag-
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ricultural and financial conditions. The present study nonetheless 
builds on the groundwork already laid by Simon and others. 
Lest I leave the impression that I think everything was shifting sand 
in Appalachia's past-totally opposite the region's popular image-
let me point out that three invariables have pushed Appalachia toward 
ever greater dependency and have demanded emphasis in this book. 
Appalachia's dependency (1) invariably increased with its growing per 
capita imports of manufactured products, (2) invariably increased with 
its growing per capita imports of agricultural products, and (3) in-
variably increased with the increased role of outside money in its eco-
nomic relations. 
Of these three causes of dependency, the first resulted more or less 
automatically from general U.S. industrialization, because Appalachia 
was not as well suited to urbanize (and thus to achieve high productivity 
in manufacturing) as was most of the United States. But to a significant 
degree the second cause, Appalachia's agricultural imports, occurred 
because the region failed to maintain its most favorable agricultural op-
tion, namely, multiple-use trees that could supply not only wood prod-
ucts but also tree-produced fodder for livestock. The destruction of 
forests, and the type of agriculture then practiced on the deforested 
land, helped cause the need for high agricultural imports, and by low-
ering the region's wage demands it also maximized coal-mining. In 
both of these ways deforestation and subsequent agricultural practices 
increased the region's dependency. 
As for the third cause, the increased role of money that entered Ap-
palachia from outside the region, here the crucial factor was the March 
1865 congressional act that imposed the 10 percent tax on the passing 
by any bank of currency issued by a nonnational bank. Appalachia's li-
ability of importing money rather than locally creating it heightened 
the region's first two liabilities. Under these circumstances, it was in 
the long-term interest of Appalachia's people to avoid dependence on 
outside money-on money wages and even on money passed out free by 
a well-intentioned government. To avoid such dependence was often not 
possible. But the presence of money in a form capable of buying outside prod-
ucts (I emphasize this because purely local forms of money are also pos-
sible) automatically drew the relatively cheaper outside products into 
Appalachia and lowered the value of all competing local products and 
thus of all competing local labor, paid or unpaid. In other words, as the 
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relative cost of imports into Appalachia fell, and as their amount grew, 
the value of the local labor that competed with those mass-produced im-
ports fell. Not only the value of Appalachia's competing wage labor fell 
but also the value of unpaid home labor that competed with imports. 14 
What is unequal in "unequal exchange" is the amount of time and ef-
fort required to produce the same amount of economic value. 
Despite this long-term disadvantage inherent in Appalachia's grow-
ing dependence on outside money, individuals often possessed little 
choice about contributing to it. During the region's industrialization, 
for instance, most wage earners enjoyed less choice about their degree of 
money dependency than most full-time farmers enjoyed. And when the 
Depression struck, unemployed wage earners enjoyed less choice than 
full-time farmers about whether or not to accept welfare payments. 
Going back, then, to the question of why capitalism won its contest 
with Appalachia's traditional economic system, we now can see that the 
region's true traditional system, its true pre-1865 economic system, 
was hobbled by its own productivity lag and also by certain federal pol-
icies. The region's true traditional economy has more and more had to 
hobble along on only one of its two initial legs-namely, on its 
subsistence-barter-and-borrow leg. Appalachia's economy, virtually 
shorn of its internal market for its own products, became excessively 
dependent on its subsistence-barter-and-borrow systems. And the 
built-in labor intensivity of those systems hastened the day when too 
many rural mountaineers would compete for the use of too little land. 
Until that demographic squeeze came about, however, the benefits de-
rived from children in rural Appalachia remained comparable to the 
benefits that children conferred during other historic population explo-
sions, such as Java's and Northern Ireland's. Some of Appalachia's chil-
dren made their economic contribution to the region's industries, but 
most children made their contribution in the subsistence agriculture 
that formed a necessary complement for Appalachia's low wages and 
thus for the competitive market position of its exports. 
While conducting interviews with people born in the early twentieth 
century, I was told by a woman born in 1905 in West Virginia's Lincoln 
County that as an adolescent she used to ask her mother why their fam-
ily was so large. (Eight of her parents' children lived to adulthood.) Her 
mother would answer, "So we'd have someone to help with the farm-
work." The daughter continued, "I always said, 'Why? ... Why so 
Conclusion 131 
many children?' Cause, see, it put a burden on me. I was the second 
child in the family. And I helped raise all those children from about the 
fourth or fifth one down, down below me .... Not only babysitting. I 
was washing diapers, and feeding children, and cleaning up after them, 
and a little bit of everything. Took them with me when I went places." 
When I asked this woman whether she thought that people in the 
early twentieth century generally could do better on a farm by having 
more children, her answer was, "/never could see it.'' 15 
This woman's recollections reflect the constricted economic oppor-
tunities that had resulted from several generations of land subdivision, 
soil depletion, and soil erosion. But even by the 1920s Appalachia's 
large families had not necessarily outlived their usefulness. This wom-
an's family farmed full time, but both full- and part-time farming 
helped to subsidize Appalachia's coal industry. As a result, when the 
U.S. demand for coal quit growing in the 1920s, thereby intensifying 
competition within the coal industry, Appalachia managed to compete 
very successfully and to acquire a much larger share of total U.S. coal 
production. Concomitantly and inseparably, however, the 1920s saw the 
worst ecological abuse yet inflicted on Appalachian farmland. By that 
time, fifty industrializing years had seen more and more mountain farm 
families becoming involved in wage labor. By the time the Depression 
began, many mountain farm families, perhaps most, were drawing on 
supplemental sources of income outside agriculture. The full-time 
farmer of one year might be only a part-time farmer the next year. A 
farmer could dig coal or cut timber during the winters-or when farm-
ing was not going well or cash was particularly needed-but his family 
could retain its land and thereby retain the option of farming when it 
chose, or when mines and lumber camps were shut down. In many cases 
workers in their prime years worked away from their home farms while 
spouses or grandparents stayed on the farms overseeing the farm work 
of children. A 193 7 statistical study of West Virginia found that "be-
tween the ages of 25 and 55 the farm loses its relative strength in the 
total population, but beyond fifty-five, it exceeds in ratio either the ur-
ban or rural non-farm groups. This condition has existed in West Vir-
ginia for at least forty years due to a very large number of our young 
people leaving the:; farm, and perhaps also leaving the state, when they 
have reached maturity. Our farm families today are composed in a ma-
jor part of young people and old people :>~6 
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During the Depression, when the industrial sector faltered in sup-
plying the money component (or the company scrip component) in the 
income of part-time farmers, Appalachia's coal operators were able to 
cut wages to almost nothing because most mining families still raised 
much of their own food. 17 Thus Appalachia's coal operators could 
maintain a strong competitive posit~on in what coal market still ex-
isted-until in 1933 the National Recovery Administration enforced 
nationwide wage-and-price supports. Both the wage and the price sup-
ports penalized labor-intensive operations in favor of those more capital 
intensive. The NRA's intervention thus increased the number of moun-
tain miners and farmer-miners constrained to accept relief. 
Admittedly, major relief payments were desperately needed before 
1933 in Appalachia's more money-dependent areas, including its coal 
fields. Not merely the relief payments made to unemployed or under-
employed full-time wage workers were needed but also the relief pay-
ments made to part-time wage workers. Economic intervention by the 
NRA increased the amount of relief needed by both of these groups, but 
the NRA did not cause the original problem. 
When I looked at Appalachia's full-time subsistence farm families, 
however, I began to suspect that, on average, they did not need all the 
relief money they received. That relief, including work relief under the 
WPA, increased the money dependency of many full-time farm fami-
lies, weaning them away from their intense networks of borrowing and 
barter. Thus it increased their dependency on the larger economy, over 
which they exercised no control. 
That still was not the full story, however, for a look at Appalachia's 
pre-New Deal conditions of soil erosion and soil depletion made me ask 
if perhaps it was necessary to de-agronomize much of the region's farm-
ing population in order to save the land. This was concluded by the 
U.S. Agriculture Department after its elaborate 1929-1935 study of 
the Economic and Social Problems and Conditiom of the Southern Appala-
chiam. That study found the region's population had grown 55.8 per-
cent from 1900 to 1930 and recommended that it be shrunk again, 
gradually, by much of that amount. The study found that Appalachia's 
actual farm population grew only 5 percent during those thirty years, 
but it pointed out that the region's "more isolated areas" produced "a 
more or less continual outward movement of people (mostly young 
folks) to cities" and to industrialized parts of the countryside (such as to 
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coal fields). 18 The report failed to recognize, however, that such sub-
sistence reproduction of labor power contributed to the region's and the 
nation's economic competitiveness. 
The Agriculture Department's study made five major recommenda-
tions, and each of the five was to some extent attempted by the New 
Deal. As summarized by Appalachian scholar Ronald Eller, those rec-
ommendations were: "( 1) conversion of land to public ownership; (2) 
establishment of small, rural, farm-forest communities; (3) develop-
ment of local manufacturing; (4) combining employment in the mines 
with part-time work in small factories or on the farm; and (5) 
emigration." 19 
Any one of those recommendations could potentially involve the re-
location of mountain farm families, and relocation was often a more 
compelling policy the more aims a given project tried to fulfill. Only 
subsequently did many federal officials begin to realize how traumatic 
relocation usually became for subsistence farm families-how little 
their way of life lent itself to mobility, either economic or psychological. 
Of course, only a small percentage of Appalachia's farm families were 
relocated directly by the New Deal. But relief payments often raised 
farm families' money income above what it had been prior to the De-
pression, and this tended to encourage their migration out of Appala-
chia a few years later, when relief payments ended at the same time 
World War II was creating jobs outside the region. 
I have not tried to estimate how much relief Appalachia's full-time 
farmers actually needed during the Depression. Primarily it was the 
form in which relief came-money-that weakened the region's low-
money economic systems of subsistence production and reciprocity. The 
results left many full-time farm families genuinely dependent on regu-
lar money income by the time nine years of government aid had ended. 
Many of these farm families then followed the trail of government 
money in the 1940s and took defense-related jobs outside Appalachia. 
Admittedly, the American economy had exploited these people more 
on their mountain farms than it exploited them later when it had to pay 
them fully family-supporting wages. One of my points, indeed, is that 
both Appalachia's regional economy and America's national economy 
benefited more from these people when they were self-sufficient and 
supplied subsidized workers to industry than it has benefited from them 
since they have joined more fully in the money economy. So I grant that 
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previously they were more exploited and that now they are less ex-
ploited. But to be less exploited is not necessarily to be better off. 20 
How willingly did these people undergo the changes in their way of 
life? How willingly did they abandon an economic system suffused with 
voluntary reciprocity and enter a system virtually void of it, based in-
stead on binding contracts? How glad were these people to leave their 
farm homes and how glad later were they to have left? Simply because 
they made the transition does not mean_ they made it willingly. 21 A 
family's choices can be narrowed by choices that other families have 
made. Once telephones enter most homes, for instance, the nontele-
phone grapevine tends to atrophy, and it becomes a hardship to live 
without a phone. It is not merely a question of "keeping up y;ith the 
Joneses" by installing a phone. If the cost-free communication network 
ceases to function, a phone can become a necessity. 
Or consider horses. In West Virginia's Lincoln County the number of 
farm horses and mules was finally outstripped in the late 1950s by the 
number of farm motor vehicles. 22 Once that occurred, a· spectrum of 
horse-related supplies and jobs rapidly grew scarce. Horses and mules 
were of course produced locally, but not motor vehicles. As local pro-
duction for local use declined, it became an increasing hardship to lack 
sufficient money to buy imported items. A reduced provision of regional 
products to the region's own markets, in other words, and a higher pro-
portion of necessities coming in from outside, increasingly hindered the 
Appalachian people's acquisition of necessities through barter and bor-
rowing. To hanker after store-bought goods is one thing, but to leave 
home to get them is another matter. What drove most out-migrants to 
leave home was not so much a hankering for store-bought goods as a 
need for them. The disappearance of alternatives to store-bought goods 
coerced many families to emigrate from rural Appalachia. 
Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, many of Appalachia's emigres be-
gan returning to the region as retirees, and some of them were then 
able to "cash-in" on favors they had rendered in northern cities to 
other emigres from their home neighborhoods in the mountains. In 
the 1960s, for instance, some returnees to West Virginia's Wayne 
County could retire comfortably in their old neighborhoods by bring-
ing home what John Lozier and Ronald Althouse call "a combination 
of cash and a specialized coin whose exchange value is limited to· the 
local system."23 
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Nonmonetized economic relations have been crucial in many moun-
tain people's lives but have often failed to interest economic analysts. 
Robert Heilbroner incorrectly supposed that subsistence farming had 
helped to cause the Depression. Subsistence farmers in the 1920s had 
numbered half the nation's farm population. Ignoring their immense 
economic contribution in the form of subsistence labor reproduction, 
Heilbroner complained that their low level of money expenditures con-
stituted a drag on the economy. 24 
From our perspective in the 1990s, several problems are evident in 
thus equating a high GNP with economic health. People who raised 
their children largely outside the money economy-children who then 
went to work in wage jobs while raising their own children partly off 
the land-subsidized American industry by helping to keep its prod-
ucts competitive. When New Deal relief, including work relief, put 
money into the hands of such people, what resulted was not (as one 
might have wished) the mechanization of their farms and thus the at-
tainment of higher productivity. Not enough money was provided to 
make that possible-except to the tiny minority of farm families al-
lowed into the Rural Rehabilitation program. Furthermore, relatively 
few Appalachian farms were suited for mechanization. Relief money 
went to buy consumer goods rather than producer goods, and one eco-
nomic result was to reduce Appalachia's subsistence reproduction of 
low-wage labor. 
The New Deal's massive relief program was only one of the two main 
means by which an enlargement of purchasing power was attempted in 
the 1930s. The other major means was the New Deal's high-wage pol-
icy. The NIRA of 1933, the Wagner Act of 1935, the two Guffey acts 
of 1935 and 1937, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 contrib-
uted to raising wage levels in Appalachia and raising, with them, the 
prices of Appalachian-produced goods. In the nation as a whole, the 
New Deal's insistence on wage enhancement outdid its relief programs 
in distributing money. Even in Appalachia, despite its long relief rolls, 
wage hikes dispensed more money than relief payments dispensed. 
Franklin Roosevelt's strategy of priming the economic pump by sub-
sidizing consumers proved only temporarily more successful than 
Hoover's supply..:side strategy of underwriting investment-for the 
New Deal's internal contradictions prevented a genuine recovery. Rex-
ford Tuxwell writes that when Roosevelt took office "the enormous sum 
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(for those days) of $3.3 billion was presently requested for unemploy-
ment assistance when obviously the government had no such funds to 
appropriate .... [Roosevelt] meant to raise the price level so that 
[this] vast burden of debt could be liquidated."25 The government 
would borrow money for relief purposes, in other words, and then 
would inflate prices so it could pay the money back in dollars worth less 
than those it had borrowed. There is thus no point in asking how 
Roosevelt hoped to avoid the bleak result that Michael Weinstein's 
econometric study of the NRA found, for Roosevelt did not wish to pre-
vent price rises that would nullify the benefit of an increased money 
supply. Tugwell reports that Roosevelt's intention in reflating the cur-
rency was precisely to raise prices. "The idea," Tugwell says, was "to 
'reflate' by manipulating the price of gold in a [gold] market monop-
olized by the government .... Perhaps when prices had been restored 
to their former levels the process [of reflation] could be stopped." The 
only danger, according to Tugwell, was that inflation might not occur: 
"The catch in the plan had seemed plain enough. It was that currency, 
in fact, was no longer so closely related to gold that the value of dollars 
would be greatly affected {i.e., lowered] by what happened to {the 
gold] price." And as Tugwell feared (but should have hoped), buying 
gold to increase the money supply did not in fact raise prices signifi-
cantly. It took the NRA's industrial codes to do that. In any case, Tug-
well tells us, "Roosevelt concluded that he could not ignore the demand 
for raised prices."26 
Not until the 1970s did the wage-and-price hikes of the New Deal 
years begin coming home to roost. Indicators of the American people's 
well-being continued rising until the early 1970s, but since then many 
of those indicators have been pointing downward. This is basically be-
cause U.S. goods tend to cost more to make than goods produced else-
where. More, for instance, than comparable goods made in East Asian 
countries such as Japan and Taiwan. In 1986, when Taiwan's average 
manufacturing employee was being paid the equivalent of $1.78 in 
U.S. dollars, the wages of manufacturing employees in West Virginia 
were averaging $10.38 an hour. 27 
In the 1930s, competitiveness abroad remained a moot issue because 
the Depression had inspired most foreign countries to establish high 
tariffs and strict import quotas, thereby reserving their home markets 
for their own products. 
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As early as 1935, however, the director of the Brookings Institution 
saw trouble ahead. In weighing what he called "different methods of 
disseminating the benefits of progress," he pointed out that 
attention must be called to their bearing upon international competition. 
Insofar as an increase in money wages is accompanied by increasing prices, the 
ability of American manufactures to meet competition in foreign markets is 
obviously impaired. . .. Consideration must also be given to the import side 
of the problem of international competition. High money wages in the United 
States are made the basis for demands for protection of American wage levels 
against cheap foreign-made goods. The American-made goods may be quite as 
cheap as the foreign in terms of the amount of human energy required to man-
ufacture them; they are dear only in the price sense-the result of the higher 
level of money wages. . .. Distributing benefits of progress by means of pro-
gressively lower prices rather than by means of advancing wages {is} the broad 
highway along which continued economic progress must be sought .... When 
this road is followed the benefits of technical improvements are conferred au-
tomatically upon all divisions of the population. 28 
Another prescient forecaster predicted that unless New Deal policies 
were reversed, the continued viability of the U.S. economy would de-
pend on making fundamental changes in the nature of both U.S. and 
international banking. 29 Such changes did occur through the Bretton 
Woods conference of 1944, which created the International Monetary 
Fund. The Bretton Woods system helped to postpone the need to lower 
U.S. prices until after Richard Nixon broke the dollar's final link to 
gold in August 1971. As one scholar says, "The Bretton Woods mon-
etary system lent the United States an ability to finance its payments 
with its own liabilities.'' 30 
Meanwhile, from $7.2 billion in 1946 the investment of U.S. cor-
porations in their foreign subsidiaries rose by 1975 to $133 billion. 31 
U.S. corporations acquired large percentages of the productive assets of 
many IMF countries. (Not of Japan, however, for Japanese law prohib-
ited virtually all foreign direct investment.)32 
The new U.S. corporate owners of productive foreign assets often 
turned those resources toward producing goods for the U.S. market. 
American consumers then acquired the cheap "foreign" products flood-
ing the market by running up huge balance-of-trade deficits. Mean-
while, revolutions broke out in many of the countries whose productive 
resources were being turned so heavily toward exports. 
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With the early 1970s, however, a turning point was reached within 
the United States. Foreign direct investment inside the United States 
from abroad rose from a mere $13. 3 billion in 197 0 to $18 3 billion by 
1985. 33 Today's U.S. deficits, both public and private, are fed by 
(among other things) Americans' efforts to outbid foreign purchasers of 
productive assets in the United States. This has proven self-defeating. 
The primary available alternative is to foster nonmonetized (or, more 
specifically, nondollarized) sectors in the U.S. economy, so that fewer 
dollars will suffice to carry on economic exchanges within the United 
States, leaving a higher proportion of dollars to be used for paying for-
eign debts. Every dollar issued by the Federal Reserve System creates a 
potential foreign claim against U.S. assets, and thus we now need ways 
to conduct more internal business without using so many dollars. 
In the 1930s the New Deal helped to liquidate, in Appalachia, the 
very sort of money-of-account barter systems that we now stand in need 
of. The unpleasant alternative to such decentralized barter systems 
might be a centralized and regimented national barter system. 
Only now, as we traverse the 1990s with our manufactures uncom-
petitive in many foreign markets and less and less retaining a remnant 
of our own domestic market-only now are the dragon's teeth sown 
by the New Deal ripe for harvest. They are not a harvest that we can 
plow under. 
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Mine Workers 
United Mine Workers (UMW), 53, 74-75, 
83, 85-88 
United States Steel Company, xxx; "Pitts-
burgh Plus" prices of, 81 
''uplift," 114 
urbanization, 22-23, 71, 96, 107, 129, 
146 n 14 
Valle Crucis, N.C., 165 n 16 
Valley. See Great Appalachian Valley 
Valley Appalachia. See Older Appalachia 
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value systems, ix, xxi-xxiii, xxxvi, 13, 65, 
126-27. See also capitalism; subsistence-
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Washington, D.C., 6, 112 
Washington County, Va., 167 n 37 
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Weingartner, Paul ). , 21 
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Weller, Jack, 65 
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Wilkinson, Richard, xvii, ll 
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